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Abstract
With the spread of information technology (IT), consumers can easily purchase products
and spread opinions about their purchases. Social media has become a force in the marketplace.
Not surprisingly, retailers have sought to develop and implement innovative strategies to
leverage social media. In the online daily deal industry, coupon offerings are frequently linked
with convenient access to social media to “spread the word” and enhance coupon sales. But the
online daily deal industry is fairly new and little rigorous analysis has been directed at
understanding the causal relationships between deal characteristics and deal outcomes, the causal
factors leading to repeat daily deal promotions, or the causal interrelationships among daily deal
promotions, social media commentary, and changes in firm ratings. This dissertation
investigates all three questions in depth. Throughout, we link our investigations to an overall
consideration of the implications for developing an empirically validated business model of the
industry.
This thesis consists of three separate but related essays and employs a significant data set
that we developed by accessing publicly available Groupon sites. At various points, this data set
is paired with data we gathered electronically from Yelp and demographic data directly from the
2010 U.S. Census. The first essay focuses on the impacts of the minimum requirements, a
unique deal characteristic of Groupon deals, on social media sharing and deal outcomes.
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The second essay focuses on e-WOM and local competition factors on retailers’ initial and return
Groupon promotion decisions. The final essay focuses on the main effect of Groupon
promotions on e-WOM, and investigates mediators and moderators of the main effect. Our study
contributes to the literature of various areas, including e-WOM, local competition, business
customer loyalty, and online daily deals. Our findings provide important implications for
retailers and online daily deal platforms.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

Online daily deal sites, such as Groupon, provide a new marketing tool for retailers.
Combining e-coupons and social media, the online daily deal e-market connects retailers with
consumers. On the one hand, online daily deal sites provide consumers with a variety of deals
and coupons. On the other hand, these sites may benefit retailers by attracting new consumers.
This dissertation includes the investigations of business models of online daily deals by
examining consumer economic behaviors and retailer decisions using the data collected from the
largest daily deal site, Groupon.com.
The first essay focuses on the relationship between the deal design, social media sharing
by consumers, and deal outcomes. We analyze the causal impacts of the existence of minimum
requirements on Facebook likes and deal outcomes, including quantity of coupons sold and deal
revenue. Using Groupon data we collected electronically, we find that the presence of a
minimum requirement increases Facebook likes, quantity of coupons sold, and total deal revenue
at the time point when the minimum requirement is met and at subsequent two-hour intervals
over the deal horizon until the end of deal promotion. The findings suggest that minimum
requirements is an effective way for retailers to engage their consumers in social media and to
increase their revenues from coupon selling. Yet Groupon has decided to remove this option
from all deals, a decision which is in rather sharp contrast to our findings.
The second essay focuses on the sustainability of Groupon’s business model from its
business customers’ perspective. Despite significant literature highlighting the importance of
both e-WOM and local competition on business strategies, we found no detailed empirical
analysis of how these factors causally impact a restaurant’s initial and return promotion
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decisions. We address these questions for the Chicago-area restaurant segment of Groupon’s
business, utilizing a dataset we developed that combines promotion details, location factors, and
e-WOM measures. Using our extended propensity score matching method, the analysis
identifies the significant causal factors that impact a restaurant’s promotion decisions. While
some findings follow expectations, others indicate impacts that clearly differentiate the online
daily deal arena from the historic discount coupon setting. Important implications for Groupon
lie in identifying which restaurants to target for potential business, and developing a more
strategic marketing plan.
The third essay focuses on the impact of Groupon promotions on a retailer’s online
reputation. Despite a decreasing trend in retailers’ Yelp ratings after Groupon promotions, we
know little of the causal factors which may explain the negative impact of Groupon promotions
on online ratings. We also know little concerning whether the negative effect is similar for all
types of retailers. In this essay, utilizing a dataset combing promotion data from Groupon, online
review data from Yelp, and area demographics for restaurants in the Chicago area, we show that
Groupon promotions have a negative impact on consumers’ perceptions of food quality and
service quality, which further cause a decline in Yelp ratings, i.e. food quality and service quality
mediate the negative main effect of promotions on online ratings. We also find that Groupon
promotions have a negative impact on online ratings only for higher rated restaurants, versus a
positive impact for lower rated restaurants. Our results provide important implications for
managers to make promotion decisions and to avoid potential damage to their firm's online
reputation.
In sum, the results presented in this dissertation provide insight into the business models
of online daily deal e-market and insights as to how the models can be improved. These studies
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also contribute to the literature on e-WOM, social media, local competition, and business
customer loyalty.
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Chapter 2

Relationships among Minimum Requirements,

Facebook likes, and Groupon Deal Outcomes
Daily-deal coupons have gained a prominent foothold on the web. The earliest and largest player
is Groupon. Originally, Groupon deals were a mix of deals with a minimum requirement (MR) of
coupon sales before a deal became effective and deals without a minimum requirement (NMR).
Eventually, Groupon stopped using MR deals. For Groupon and its retailer customers, might this
decision have actually resulted in negative impacts for both parties (fewer coupons sold and lower
revenue)? The structure of Groupon deals (including a “Facebook like” option) together with
electronic access to the necessary data offered the opportunity to empirically investigate these
questions. We analyzed relationships among MR, Facebook likes (FL), quantity of coupons sold
and total revenue, performing the analysis across the four largest retail categories. Using timestamped empirical data, we completed a propensity score analysis of causal effects. We find that
the presence of MR increases Facebook likes, quantity of coupons sold, and total revenue at the
time point when the MR is met and at subsequent two hour intervals over the horizon of deals. A
key finding is the initial differences observed when MR is met not only continue, but actually
increase over the life of the deals.

2.1 Introduction
Given the interest in social media sites, it is not surprising that marketers have sought to
develop and implement innovative strategies using such sites. Numerous retailers have launched
promotions on their Facebook pages, promotions which are claimed to have increased sales
significantly (SimplyZesty, 2011). Such “social commerce” has also been prominent on daily
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deal sites such as Groupon, leading some to refer to daily deal sites as “social couponing
websites.” Yet, to date, we know of no non-anecdotal, empirical investigation of the
relationships among deal characteristics, usage of social media links, and deal outcomes.
Consider Groupon, the acknowledged daily deal industry leader. As many retailers do,
Groupon prominently displays a clickable “Like” icon to link to a consumer’s Facebook
postings. Once a consumer clicks the icon on a Groupon deal’s webpage, information about the
deal, including the title, a picture, and a link to the deal, is shared with all of the individual’s
Facebook friends, which may number into the thousands. This Facebook like (hereafter FL)
spreading of a deal can positively impact the number of coupons sold for the deal and thus
increase total deal revenue. In addition, some Groupon deals have included a minimum coupon
sales requirement, a specified number of coupons that must be sold before any coupon is
authorized for use. If the minimum requirement (hereafter MR) is 50 for a given deal, that deal
would not become valid until 50 coupons had been sold. If the deal period ends before 50
coupons are sold, no one can take advantage of the deal (the deal becomes null and void). In
legal terminology, an MR deal is a “contingent offer” that takes effect when and if at least a
certain number of coupons are sold within a specified period.
Until an MR deal is confirmed (meets the required number of sales), customers have two
incentives to hit the “Like” icon and share that deal with their Facebook friends. The first is
what we term a social sharing incentive (hereafter SI), and the second is a personal incentive
(hereafter PI) linked to helping ensure that the MR is met and the deal confirmed. Once the MR
is met and the deal confirmed, customers still have the SI, but no longer the PI. Moreover, for
Groupon deals that do not include an MR, “no MR” or NMR deals, customers have the SI but not
the PI.

6

What is the effect of the MR and the associated PI to share the deal on deal performance
(quantity of coupons sold, and revenue from coupon selling)? If the MR only makes deals with
get confirmed more rapidly, then is the true impact may be negligible. Over 99% of deals meet
their MR, on average, in roughly eight hours. However, if the MR results in a significant
increase in sales and revenues across the whole promotion period, then MR matters. Practically,
this issue has a particular poignancy. Groupon has stopped using MR in their deals. From the
perspective of generating revenue from the promotion, Groupon and the retailers have apparently
overlooked the positive effect of having an MR. Our analysis suggests that returning to using an
MR could significantly increase the quantity of coupons sold and deal revenues from coupons
sold.
To investigate possible causal impacts of the MR on FL, quantity of coupons sold, and
total revenue, we use a propensity score analysis (hereafter PSA) (Mithas and Krishnan 2009)
utilizing deal data we collected for three major cities, Chicago, Boston and New York, running
across Groupon's four largest retail categories enabling analysis of possible categorically
differential relationships. Our analysis includes comparisons at two-hour intervals from the time
when MR are met until the end of a deal. The time dimensionality of our investigation sets it
apart from previous PSA. To the best of our knowledge, our research is the first to study the
causal impact of the MR feature on consumer responses on Groupon using longitudinal data. We
find that the presence of an MR results in increased FL, greater quantity of coupons sold, and
higher total deal revenue both when the MR is achieved and every two hours subsequently until
the end of deal promotion. More interestingly, we find that the initial differences in FL, quantity
of coupons sold, and total revenue caused by the MR do not just maintain after the MR is met,
but actually increase over subsequent time intervals until the end of a deal. Additionally, the
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longer it takes for the MR to be met, the longer the PI exists, leading to a greater impact of PI,
which, in turn, results in greater differences in FL, quantity of coupons sold, and total revenue.
As explained below, our results have important managerial implications for retailers and
Groupon.
The remainder of this essay is as follows. Section 2.2 briefly summarizes related workto-date, differentiates our analysis from previous work, and sets forth the scope of this research.
Section 2.3 provides essential details on Groupon and our data collection process. Section 2.4
provides an initial data summary and a PSA to assess causal effects. Section 2.5 offers
concluding remarks and next steps in our continuing analysis of the daily deal industry.

2.2 Literature Review
2.1.1 electronic-Word of Mouth (hereafter e-WOM)
On Groupon, a consumer can share the information about a deal with his/her Facebook
friends by clicking the FL icon, providing e-WOM on that specific deal. Given the large body of
literature on e-WOM, we limit our review to recent papers about the impact of e-WOM on
product sales. Liu (2006) collected e-WOM messages on movies released during May and
September in 2002 from Yahoo! Movie, finding, in a cross-sectional study, that most of the
explanatory power of e-WOM information came from WOM volume, not its valence. In another
analysis of e-WOM on movie box office revenues, Rui et al. (2013) collected data on movies
from Twitter. While previous literature measured e-WOM through volume or dispersion, Rui et
al. (2013) directly measured the number of recipients of each tweet using the unique social
structural information on Twitter. The authors argued that their evidence indicated a causal
effect of WOM on product sales. Other researchers have examined the effect of e-WOM on the
sales of products such as books (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006), music (Dhar and Chang 2009),
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craft beers (Clemons et al. 2006), and digital cameras (Zhang et al. 2013). Through an
experimental study, Benlian et al. (2012) examined the direct and positive influence of e-WOM
on four consumer beliefs (perceived usefulness, perceived ease of use, perceived affective
quality, and trust), which can further increase sales for e-retailers. To date, research in this
stream has focused on attempting to identify the influence of social media on product sales in a
single retail category, with no analysis across categories.

2.2.2 Social Promotion
Our work is also related to the growing literature on social promotion. With the
development of IT facilitation of online collaboration through social media, such as Facebook,
YouTube, and blogs, consumers now have the ability to spread ideas and recommendations more
quickly, widely, and cheaply than ever before (Ferguson 2008). Byers et al. (2012a) empirically
analyzed e-WOM (in this case, social sharing through Facebook) in the daily deal Groupon
setting. They found that daily deal sites benefit from word-of-mouth effects during sales events,
but did not examine underlying deal characteristics or differences across retail categories.
Grounded in observational learning theory, Luo et al. (2014) empirically examined the influence
of deal popularity on a consumer’s deal purchase and redemption time decisions. Using
consumer level data, the authors found that deal popularity increased consumers’ purchase
likelihood and decreased redemption time. Li and Wu (2014) utilized aggregate level data from
Groupon and found a positive influence of observational learning and social media word-ofmouth on the quantity of coupons sold.

2.2.3 Summary
Our analysis differs from previous research in at least three key respects. First, we
present a set of structured hypotheses concerning the relationships among deal characteristics,
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usage of social media links, and deal outcomes. Utilizing PSA that enables the investigation of
causal relationships, each hypothesis is empirically tested using time-stamped data we gathered
electronically. Second, the empirical analysis and hypothesis testing are conducted for separate
retail categories. Third, using time-stamped data, we completed our analysis at specified time
points until the deals end.

2.3 Introduction to Groupon and Data Collection
2.3.1 Introduction to Groupon
Groupon was an early entrant into and is the current leader of the daily deal industry
(Yipit report, 2011). Groupon began selling daily deal coupons for local retailers in Chicago in
November 2008 and has continued to expand, now offering daily deals in 175+ geographic
markets spanning the North American continent. Every day in each geographic market, Groupon
provides multiple deals from multiple retailers dedicated to that geographic market. Individual
deals can also specify an MR that must be reached for the deal to be valid, a unique characteristic
of Groupon deals. Each Groupon deal page includes a FL icon through which consumers can
share the deal information (including title, picture, and link to the deal) with all their Facebook
friends.
Groupon’s revenues come from its share (approximately half) of the coupon price (The
Washington Times, July 2009).1 There are at least two reasons for local retailers to share so
much of the coupon price with Groupon. First, Groupon promotions provide opportunities for
price discrimination, a new marketing tool for exposure to new customers, and a potential

1

According to various ad-hoc discussions, including one with a Boston-based merchant who had used Groupon, the
actual percentage of coupon revenue that Groupon shares is negotiable. Because the actual percentage of the share
varies, we analyze total revenue. Thus, the size of the split is not relevant to our analysis.
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“advertising” effect (Edelman et al. 2011). Second, compared with traditional TV advertising
and Yellow page advertising, Groupon promotions offer retailers a direct and immediate influx
of customers (Dholakia 2011).

2.3.2 Data Collection
We collected longitudinal data from Groupon through its public API2 for three major
cities (Chicago, Boston, and New York) from September 13, 2011 until July 31, 2012.3 We
monitored all deals in the three cities during the data collection period. However, to be sure that
we captured the entire sales and revenue stream from the deals we studied, we focused on local
deals. We operationally defined local deals as coupon offers with two key characteristics: 1) the
offer is only provided to a specific region or market, and 2) the coupon can only be redeemed at
the seller’s physical store (no online redemption). In making this choice, we ignored two other
sets of Groupon deals: 1) “getaway deals” involving coupons for discounts on flights, hotel
rooms, and/or cruise packages, deals provided by a nationwide partnering of Groupon and
Expedia; and 2) “online deals” involving coupons that can only be redeemed online, deals gain
that are likely nationwide rather than local. Both excluded deal types likely had sales beyond
those in the three cities.
Each deal has a set of characteristics including: deal description, original or retail price,
discount rate, discounted price (i.e. coupon price), the length of promotion on Groupon
(promotion length), whether the deal is featured (featured), coupon duration, whether there is an

2

An application programming interface (API) is a source code based specification intended to be used as an
interface by software components to communicate with each other.
3
From December 23, 2011, to January 9, 2012, coupon sold information is not available, because Groupon changed
its deal display policy. From February 17, 2012, to April 12, 2012, FL are not available in our data set, again
because of a shift in API policy. We excluded deals in those date ranges and obtained data covering approximately
ten months.
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MR, and whether the deal has limited number of coupons for sale (limited supply). Each deal is
associated with a retail category, such as “Arts & Entertainment,” or “Beauty & Spas.”
The data collection period was a transition time in which Groupon moved from all MR
deals to all NMR deals, with the middle months having both MR and NMR deals.4 Our focus in
this essay is on the deal decision (whether or not to have MR) itself, not the characteristics of the
retailer making the deal with Groupon. We do consider the retailer’s business category, which
we discuss below. Our analyses used the six deal decision characteristics that are objective and
available: coupon price, discount rate, promotion length, featured, coupon duration, and limited
supply. Thus, we assume that MR and NMR deals do not differ across other retailer
characteristics, an assumption we test in our robustness checks. We had two other observable
deal characteristics: 1) the city where the deal was offered and 2) day of the week the deals were
offered. However, analyses including them indicated no significant difference in results, and
thus, for simplicity, these variables were dropped.
During a deal’s promotion period, Groupon displayed the amount of coupons that had
been sold up to any given moment in time. With coupon price and the amount of coupon sales,
we also obtained total deal revenue at each time point. Groupon also showed the number of
users who had clicked the FL button to express their positive feedback at any given point during
each deal's life yielding the number of FL for that deal at each time point. We monitored each
deal’s cumulative sales and FL every hour over the duration of the deal, although for brevity and
clarity, all of our reporting in this manuscript is done for two hour periods.

4

Groupon appeared to completely abandon MR after January, 2013. We contacted Groupon about the stop of usage
of MR. They responded that most of the deals had no problem meeting the MR since Groupon had grown its
consumer base very fast. It seems Groupon did not need to have the MR.
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We focused on four major categories for our analysis: “Arts & Entertainment” (A&E),
“Beauty & Spas” (B&S), and “Health & Fitness” (H&F), and “Restaurant” (REST). These
categories were chosen because they accounted for: a) roughly 80% of total local deals, each
with a minimum of 10%, and b) about 75% of total Groupon revenue from local deals. Over the
data collection period, 79.1% of all local deals were from these four categories. During our
entire data collection period, only 2.1% (23 out of 1082) of MR deals in the four categories failed
to meet the MR. In the results presented below, we excluded failed deals. For completeness, we
redid the analysis with all such deals included and report the results in Appendix A.4. In all but
one statistically insignificant instance, in the A&E category, results are consistent with those
where failed MR deals are not included.

2.4 Analysis
2.4.1 Minimum Requirement (MR) versus No Minimum Requirement (NMR)
Deals
We suggest that there are two incentives for consumers desiring an MR deal. First, there
is the SI (social incentive) of wanting their friends to have the opportunity to get a good deal.
But second, until the MR is satisfied, consumers wanting to take advantage of the Groupon deal
also have a PI (personal incentive) to trigger the contingency (i.e., get enough people to buy so
that the MR is met). NMR deals also have the SI but not the PI. We examine SI and PI in turn.
We are not the first to suggest a social incentive for sharing. Snyder and Omoto (2000)
and Peddibhotla and Subramani (2007) divide a person's incentives to share into “other-focused”
incentives (including what they label as social affiliation, altruism, and reciprocity), and “selffocused” incentives (including what they label as self-expression, personal development, and
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enjoyment). We included both categories in SI, because both are associated with the pleasure
received from sharing with a friend.
In discussing self-interest, altruism, and incentives, Jensen (1994) (also see Jensen and
Meckling 1994) put it another way:
“It is inconceivable that purposeful action on the part of human beings can be
viewed as anything other than responses to incentives. Indeed, the issue of incentives
goes to the heart of what it means to maximize or optimize, indeed to the very core of
what it means to choose. Rational individuals always choose the option that makes
them better off as they see it. …. As Meckling and I make clear in our article, there is
nothing inconsistent between self-interested and altruistic behavior. … To find
extensive evidence of altruism, we need only look to the willingness of people to give
to charity, and to help family, neighbors and even strangers.”
Using Jensen’s terminology (and that of economics), we argue that altruism, while it may
contain, as Jensen suggests, self-interested motivation based on a positive response to the
individual from others who note the altruistic behavior or from good feelings from having acted
altruistically, exists throughout the deal offer period.
For MR deals, what we call the PI to share exists until the MR is satisfied and the deal is
confirmed. PI relates to ensuring that the deal “makes” so that the individual is able to benefit
from the deal. This additional, and self-interested, motive exists only for MR deal offers and
only up to the point in time at which the MR is met. Thus, we separated our deals into MR deals
and NMR deals and analyzed the time-linked patterns in deal sales and overall outcomes. Our
first set of hypotheses (H1, H2 and H3) suggest that, because of the extra incentive, i.e. PI, FL,
quantity of coupon sales, and total revenue will be higher for MR deals than for NMR deals at the
time equivalent to when the MR deal is confirmed. However, there would be little value to MR's
if they only resulted in MR deals being confirmed a bit sooner, particularly when the vast
majority of MR deals are confirmed quickly. We suggest that MR deals will have a long term
advantage over NMR deals because of a social contagion effect. After the MR is met, more FL
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will result in more people being aware of and (likely) positively disposed toward the deal leading
to more sales and revenue. These additional sales also suggest additional people will make their
friends aware of and (likely) positively disposed toward the deal, increasing the FL, coupon
sales, and revenue in the next period. This pattern will continue in future periods until the deal
reaches its end point, either its sales limit or its time limit. Thus, the "Ha" hypotheses below add
a “virtuous” cycle of FL, coupon sales, and revenue that continue across the entire deal. Thus,
all other factors equal,
H1: When the MR is met, MR deals have more FL than do NMR deals.
H1a: The advantage in FL for MR deals over NMR deals continues over
subsequent time intervals.
H2: When the MR is met, MR deals have more coupons sold than do NMR deals.
H2a: The advantage in coupons sold for MR deals over NMR deals continues over
subsequent time intervals.
H3: When the MR is met, MR deals have greater total revenue than do NMR deals.
H3a: The advantage in total revenue for MR deals over NMR deals continues over
subsequent time intervals.
Before we proceed to causal analysis and testing, we first examine the attribute means to
see if direct comparisons might suffice.

2.4.2 Attribute Mean Comparisons for MR and NMR Deals
We first tested for normality across the characteristics. Normality was rejected for all
characteristics for all four retail categories, thus we used the Wilcoxon non-parametric test for
differences. Table 1 summarizes median values with mean values in parentheses, and median
comparisons for MR deals versus NMR deals on the six deal characteristics for the four retail
categories. For example, in the A&E category, the median price of MR deals was $20,
significantly lower than the median price, $25, of NMR deals. In all tables, significance levels
are indicated using asterisks (*’s) with *** indicating significance greater than .01; **
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significance greater than .05; and * significance greater than 0.10. As Table 1 shows, 14 points
of significant difference exist among the 24 possible comparisons (six characteristics by four
retail categories), suggesting that these factors differ across categories and deal characteristics.
Table 1. Summary of Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test for Larger Median of Two Groups of Deals (Group
Means in Parentheses)
A&E
# of deals
Price ($)
Discount rate (%)
Promotion length
(days)
Featured
Coupon duration
(days)
Limited supply

B&S

H&F

REST

MR

NMR

MR

NMR

MR

NMR

MR

NMR

216
20
(29.42)
51
(53.26)
3
(3.38)
0
(0.14)
124***
(131.84)
1
(0.78)

494
25***
(37.87)
51
(52.97)
3***
(3.81)
0
(0.11)
61
(95.94)
1**
(0.85)

295
39
(61.14)
56
(60.38)
3
(3.36)
0
(0.10)
187***
(232.84)
1
(0.76)

413
45***
(83.87)
58
(61.51)
4***
(3.97)
0
(0.08)
186
(199.69)
1
(0.80)

195
45
(127.04)
64
(66.27)
3
(3.48)
0**
(0.10)
186***
(200.15)
1
(0.69)

313
40
(357.08)
67
(67.63)
4***
(4.05)
0
(0.05)
185
179.24
1***
(0.81)

353
20
(22.19)
51
(53.71)
3
(3.10)
0
(0.10)
185***
(169.81)
1***
(0.79)

325
20
(23.93)
51
(54.30)
4***
(3.73)
0
(0.08)
152
(151.42)
1
(0.70)

This led us to seek an appropriate method to perform MR-NMR deal comparisons.
Recently Mithas and Krishnan (2009), henceforth M&K, demonstrated the use of a causal
analysis approach involving matching cases based on propensity scores. In the approach, a case
from a control group (for us, an NMR deal) is matched with a case from the treatment group (for
us, an MR deal) where the matching is based on the similarity of their propensity scores, defined
as the likelihood of being in the treatment group. The next section explains the process and
illustrates our utilization in the Groupon setting. As explained in detail below, our setting had a
time dynamic that sets it apart from M&K’s approach. This time dynamic aspect allowed us to
observe changes in patterns of similarities or dissimilarities over time.

2.4.3 Propensity Score Approach and Causal Analysis
2.4.3.1. Propensity Score Analysis (PSA)
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The six characteristics listed in Table 1 are the observable characteristics for each deal.
Consistent with previous literature, we utilized a strong ignorability assumption “that underpins
the PSA.” This assumption implies that the observed characteristics are all that matter.
However, unlike the M&K context, our context had few previous research efforts against which
our variable set could be compared. Our variable set is consistent, however, with those used in
the few studies reported in Section 2.2. Later, we report a sensitivity analysis which examined
the effect of possible variable omission.
As noted above, we collected data each hour over the life of a deal. Due to occasional
server glitches, outages, and/or downtime, missing values occurred for some deals. To avoid
issues with interpolating or estimating missing values, we deleted any deal with one or more
missing hourly observations from our analysis. Table 2 lists the number of MR and NMR deals
in each category that had complete hourly data.
Table 2. Number of Deals (2604) with Complete Hourly Observations

MR
NMR

A&E
216
494

B&S
295
413

H&F
195
313

REST
353
325

Analysis using propensity scores strives to compare two similar deals, one from the
treatment group and one from the control group. The similarity is based on a probability
estimate (or the propensity score) obtained using the six deal characteristics as predictive
variables. The propensity score is defined as: “the conditional probability that a subject with X =
xi will be in the treatment group, where xi is the observed vector of background variables”
(Mithas and Krishnan 2009). We employed a caliper matching approach with the caliper set at
0.05.5 The steps in caliper matching are:

5

Though Mithas and Krishnan (2009) utilized a kernel matching estimator, we employed a caliper matching
process, that is, a technique with a defined distance measure between an MR deal and a matching NMR deal. We
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Step 1: sort MR and NMR deals in a given retail category according to estimated
propensity score (from lowest to highest);
Step 2: determine the common range of propensity score for MR and NMR and discard
deals outside the common range;
Step 3: begin with the lowest propensity score deal, say MRi, from the propensity-score
ordered list of MR deals; identify the NMR deal with propensity score closest to and
within 0.05 of the propensity score of MRi. If a match is found, select the two deals (that
is, matched pairs are one-to-one). If no match within the caliper range is found, remove
MRi from the analysis;
Step 4: repeat step 3 until no MR deal remains on the ordered list; and,
Step 5: repeat steps 1 through 4 for each retail category.
Table 3 provides the common range (termed “support”) for each category and the number
of matches obtained within each category across the relevant range. Referring back to Table 2,
we can see that the largest possible number of matched pairs for A&E is 216, for B&S 295, for
H&F 195, and for REST 325. The actual matches obtained were 194, 219, 169, and 221, which
we viewed as a reasonable proportion of possible matches for all four retail categories.6
Table 3. Common Support of Propensity Score before Matching and Number of Matched Pairs

Common range (called the
“support”) of propensity score
Number of matched pairs

A&E

B&S

H&F

REST

(0.196, 0.862)

(0.078, 0.881)

(0.056, 0.859)

(0.058, 0.917)

194

219

169

221

The PSA method relies critically on the ignorability assumption. Based on this
assumption, we estimated propensity scores from observable factors. Our matching method
enabled us to find the closest matches for MR deals. After matching, the following percentages
of NMR deals were included: 39.3% for A&E, 53.0% for B&S, 54.0% for H&F, and 68.0% for

investigated both a kernel matching process and a nearest neighbor estimation. Finding no significant difference, we
report only the caliper marching process because, in our view, it is the clearest and easiest to understand.
6
The use of PSA typically entails the loss of some observations. Increasing the size of the caliper will tend to
increase the number of matches but the matches are not as close or as tight. We doubled the size of the caliper
(from .05 to .1), but this resulted in only one more match for A&E, B&S, and REST, and two more matches for
H&F. Thus, we stayed with the .05 caliper choosing the better matched pairs rather than adding a few, but less well
matched, additional pairs.
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REST. Though, as is typical in PSA, some observations are lost, we argue that the included deals
are neither a trivial set of deals nor a small outlier subset. In addition, as shown in Table 4, there
is no statistical difference for observable deal characteristics between the included pairs of MR
deals and NMR deals. The only difference between the two groups is that one has MR (treatment
group) whereas the other one (control group) does not (NMR). The purpose of matching is to
limit observable difference in characteristics within each matched pair to MR or no MR. If we
compared without matching, the influence of MR could be confounded with differences in the
observable deal characteristics.
Table 4. Summary of Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test of Two Groups of Deals after Matching (Group Means in
Parentheses)
A&E
MR
# of matched pairs
Price ($)
Discount rate (%)
Promotion length
(days)
Featured
Coupon duration
(days)
Limited supply

B&S
NMR

194
20
23.5
(30.26)
(31.11)
51
51
(53.02)
(53.35)
3
3
(3.40)
(3.43)
0
0
(0.14)
(0.15)
99
90
(110.14) (115.30)
1
1
(0.84)
(0.77)

MR

H&F
NMR

219
40
40
(65.54)
(67.01)
56
58
(60.80)
(61.05)
3
3
(3.61)
(3.63)
0
0
(0.11)
(0.10)
186
187
(208.90) (220.32)
1
1
(0.74)
(0.77)

MR

NMR

169
49
49
(140.09) (162.47)
67
64
(67.11)
(66.15)
3
3
(3.57)
(3.63)
0
0
(0.07)
(0.08)
186
186
(186.68) (194.51)
1
1
(0.72)
(0.70)

REST
NMR
221
20
20
(23.21)
(23.04)
54
51
(54.75)
(54.25)
3
3
(3.53)
(3.52)
0
0
(0.09)
(0.09)
185
185
(156.47) (157.24)
1
1
(0.72)
(0.76)
MR

Earlier we indicated that our analysis had the added feature of a time dimension. Until an
MR deal actually becomes valid (i.e., the MR is met), we explained earlier that there is both an SI
and a PI. Once the MR is satisfied, only an SI remains. For NMR deals, there is only the SI
throughout the time periods. Thus, for each matched set of an MR and an NMR deal, we began
our comparisons at the point in time when the MR deal became valid (termed “time point 0”).
The first point or “0” time comparison represents the endpoint of the period during which an MR
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deal involves both an SI and PI while its matching NMR deal involves only SI. We continued
our comparisons of paired deals every two hours across the next 40 hours (see discussion below
on this choice of duration). This allowed us to analyze whether there are observed differences at
the end of the period in which both SI and PI were present for the MR deals but only SI was
present for the NMR deals, and whether any such differences continue, diminish, or expand over
the period in which only an SI exists for both the MR and NMR deals. For thoroughness, we also
completed our analysis using time 0 as 2 hours after the deal begins. Appendix A.3 provides the
tables for that analysis (corresponding to Tables 5-8 below). We found no significant
differences. We note that, for retailers and for Groupon, the differences at the end of the deal are
the ones that matter for their bottom line. These are the same under either starting point.
In analyzing the data across the various two hour periods, we completed a test for
symmetry (Mira 1999), an assumption inherent in the Wilcoxon test. The results were mixed in
the sense that for 45 of the periods, symmetry was not rejected, but for 115 periods, symmetry
was rejected. We decided to report the Wilcoxon test results but also to include tests results for
the nonparametric sign test, a test that does not assume symmetry. In Tables 5-8 that follow, we
used the following format for each data cell:
median

(mean)

significance of
Wilcoxon test

significance of sign test

Figure 1. Example of Cell Structure for Tables 5-8

As noted earlier, we use *’s to indicate levels of significance for the Wilcoxon test, and
+’s to indicate the corresponding significance levels for the sign test.
Tables 5-8 provide results for each of the four retail categories and run up to 40 hours
after the MR deal met its minimum. The tables also include the “final results” at the end of the
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promotions. For A&E deals, Table 5 presents details on all of the two-hour periods. For brevity,
Tables 6-8 (B&S, H&F, and REST respectively) report results for periods 0, 10, 20, 30, and 40.
Since some two-day deals might not meet the minimum until several hours have elapsed, some
deals are over before the “deal makes plus 40 hours” time is reached. This resulted in a
somewhat lower number of matched-pair observations for the last two periods. A&E, for
example, had 194 observations through the 36th period, but 168 at the end of the 38th hour and
138 at the end of the 40th hour after the MR deal makes. Consider Table 5 which reports the set
of average values on the output variables for MR and NMR matched deals for A&E deals. Time
“0” is the point in time when the MR deal becomes valid. Time “2” is two hours after time “0”
and so on through time “40”. We stop at 40 because, in many cases, this would be at or near the
endpoint of a two day deal. After this point (see discussion above), the number of (open) deals
drops off sharply as many deals end. In the last row, we report the results at the end of the deal
promotion.
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Table 5. Comparison Results over Time for A&E Deals (Median Values with Mean Values in Parentheses)
Time point
(number of
pairs)
0 (194)
2 (194)
4 (194)
6 (194)
8 (194)
10 (194)
12 (194)
14 (194)
16 (194)
18 (194)
20 (194)
22 (194)
24 (194)
26 (194)
28 (194)
30 (194)
32 (194)
34 (194)
36 (194)
38 (168)
40 (138)
End of
promotion
length (194)

Facebook
likes MR
3 (6.34)
* ++
10 (17.06)
** +++
18 (28.79)
*** ++
23 (38.62)
*** +++
27 (47.29)
*** +++
30 (54.09)
*** +++
32 (58.96)
*** +++
35 (63.42)
*** +++
37 (66.39)
*** +++
38 (67.98)
*** +++
38 (68.93)
*** +++
38 (69.80)
*** +++
40 (71.79)
*** +++
43 (75.72)
*** +++
44 (79.87)
*** +++
45 (83.32)
*** +++
47 (86.29)
*** +++
47 (88.57)
*** +++
48 (90.76)
*** +++
51 (97.70)
*** +++
53 (102.45)
*** +++
55 (111.23)
*** +++

Facebook
likes NMR
2 (5.75)
5 (13.28)
8 (19.66)
10 (24.09)
13 (27.45)
15 (30.18)
17 (32.70)
19 (35.04)
19 (36.32)
20 (37.29)
20 (37.69)
21 (38.02)
21 (39.33)
22 (41.77)
22 (44.07)
23 (45.61)
23 (46.93)
24 (48.12)
25 (49.55)
26 (51.62)
29 (56.07)
30 (68.23)

Quantity of
coupons sold
MR
15 (24.75)
*** +++
33 (66.52)
* +++
63 (119.59)
** +++
88 (159.89)
*** +++
100 (190.25)
*** +++
110 (232.00)
*** +++
120 (248.61)
*** +++
130 (263.70)
*** +++
140 (274.01)
*** +++
140 (279.12)
*** +++
145 (281.62)
*** +++
150 (283.56)
*** +++
150 (289.35)
*** +++
160 (326.07)
*** +++
170 (341.98)
*** +++
180 (355.02)
*** +++
190 (365.54)
*** +++
200 (373.68)
*** +++
205 (380.78)
*** +++
220 (418.73)
*** +++
240 (448.82)
*** +++
265 (496.50)
** ++

Quantity of
coupons sold
NMR
6 (27.46)
20 (71.80)
30 (104.42)
40 (126.56)
60 (161.90)
60 (174.25)
70 (185.09)
70 (195.73)
80 (202.32)
80 (205.13)
80 (206.46)
85 (208.35)
85 (214.77)
90 (226.43)
100 (235.07)
105 (243.84)
110 (250.21)
110 (256.03)
110 (262.72)
130 (285.71)
140 (299.79)
170 (360.41)

Total revenue
MR
306 (675.41)
** +++
724 (1877.64)
++
1363 (3136.39)
* +++
1800 (4317.52)
** +++
2088 (5187.85)
** ++
2375 (5939.69)
** +++
2563 (6395.95)
** +++
2875 (6815.11)
** ++
3045 (7076.64)
** +++
3120 (7210.75)
** +++
3120 (7265.95)
** +++
3120 (7324.94)
** +++
3170 (7530.16)
** ++
3465 (8663.37)
** ++
3725 (9131.25)
** ++
3900 (9476.21)
** ++
4150 (9736.28)
** ++
4350 (9964.07)
** ++
4400 (10173.04)
** ++
4940 (11273.62)
** ++
5235 (12035.22)
* +
6170 (14074.00)
* +

Total revenue
NMR
135 (640.77)
551 (1668.76)
910 (2451.47)
1200 (2993.52)
1400 (3688.21)
1600 (4020.59)
1800 (4314.63)
2000 (4588.40)
2065 (4757.62)
2225 (4817.96)
2225 (4853.66)
2225 (4894.57)
2245 (5072.18)
2400 (5401.41)
2610 (5637.28)
2790 (5880.81)
2890 (6054.76)
2913 (6225.46)
3175 (6423.99)
3390 (6982.30)
3600 (7701.41)
4935 (9487.40)
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Table 6. Comparison Results over Time for B&S deals (Median Values with Mean Values in Parentheses)
Time point
(number of
pairs)
0 (219)
10 (219)
20 (219)
30 (219)
40 (196)
End of
promotion
length (219)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes NMR

1 (1.24)
* ++
6 (10.29)
*** +++
8 (13.12)
*** +++
10 (15.16)
*** +++
12 (17.24)
*** +++
13 (20.57)
*** +++

0 (0.95)
4 (6.29)
5 (7.70)
6 (9.01)
6 (10.17)
8 (12.24)

Quantity of
coupons sold
MR
13 (17.38)
** +++
100 (170.30)
** ++
120 (216.39)
** ++
150 (252.44)
** +
180 (309.03)
** ++
230 (365.95)
** +++

Quantity of
coupons sold
NMR
8 (19.30)
82 (144.68)
110 (176.49)
120 (206.49)
140 (228.25)
200 (286.40)

Total revenue MR

Total revenue
NMR

594 (906.82)
*** +++
4900 (8476.73)
*** +++
6240 (10648.07)
*** +++
7650 (12444.93)
*** +++
9035 (15967.07)
*** +++
11200 (19502.10)
**

300 (842.94)
3700 (6107.05)
4830 (7501.72)
5880 (8923.71)
6410 (9769.00)
9360 (13074.30)

Table 7. Comparison Results over Time for H&F Deals (Median Values with Mean Values in Parentheses)
Time point
(number of
pairs)
0 (169)
10 (169)
20 (169)
30 (169)
40 (134)
End of
promotion
length (169)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes NMR

1 (3.72)
*** +++
10 (21.97)
*** +++
12 (27.51)
*** +++
15 (32.38)
*** +++
16 (40.11)
*** +++
20 (44.99)
*** +++

0 (2.37)
5 (11.20)
6 (14.41)
7 (17.18)
7 (17.31)
10 (29.47)

Quantity of
coupons sold
MR
14 (17.88)
*** +++
84 (134.72)
*** +++
110 (173.07)
*** +++
140 (213.59)
*** +++
145 (254.27)
*** +++
220 (318.15)
*** +++

Quantity of
coupons sold
NMR
5 (15.40)
50 (93.12)
60 (116.27)
80 (147.30)
90 (154.10)
140 (232.81)

Total revenue MR

Total revenue
NMR

704 (1127.98)
*** +++
4480 (6984.37)
*** +++
5340 (8952.73)
*** +++
6670 (11274.24)
*** +++
7770 (13533.80)
*** +++
11040 (23399.60)
*** +++

190 (606.37)
2030 (4101.17)
2700 (5087.53)
3430 (6343.08)
3920 (7060.08)
6860 (12006.80)
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Table 8. Comparison Results over Time for REST Deals (Median Values with Mean Values in Parentheses)
Time point
(number of
pairs)
0 (221)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes NMR

2 (2.58)

1 (3.15)

10 (221)

17 (21.87)
*** +++
22 (28.51)
*** +++
26 (33.32)
*** +++
28 (37.55)
*** +++
32 (44.05)
*** +++

20 (221)
30 (221)
40 (199)
End of
promotion
length (221)

Quantity of
coupons sold
NMR
20 (73.30)

10 (19.24)

Quantity of
coupons sold
MR
25 (35.34)
+++
260 (344.70)

13 (23.12)

330 (432.75)

300 (409.64)

15 (26.32)

410 (503.30)

360 (456.26)

17 (28.41)

460 (573.26)
**
570 (654.18)
*

390 (480.60)

21 (33.13)

240 (346.17)

510 (560.77)

Total revenue MR

Total revenue
NMR

506 (781.95)
+++
5600 (7577.81)

336 (1237.25)

7350 (9546.90)
** +
8640 (11218.04)
** ++
10080 (12809.79)
*** +
12000 (14909.40)
*** +++

6380 (8368.10)

4900 (6912.62)

7500 (9423.83)
8400 (10350.04)
10000
(12038.70)

For A&E deals, the significant difference on FL favoring the MR deals existed when MR
levels are met (period 0) and continued to spread and be significant across the remainder of the
periods. The numerical differences were significant for both mean and median values, and
expanded across the observed periods. The differences in coupons sold and revenue were also
significant at period 0 and expanding until the 40th period and the end of the promotions. The
results were consistent for B&S and H&F deals. Thus for A&E, B&S, and H&F deals, H1, H1a,
H2, H2a, H3 and H3a are all supported.
REST deals showed a slightly different pattern. The significant difference of FL favoring
the MR deals began in the two hour period after the MR levels were met and continued to spread
and be significant across the remainder of the periods. The difference in the number of coupons
sold did not show as significant until quite late (just prior to period 40), when there was a
significant positive difference for the MR deals. Total revenue, however, showed a significant
difference favoring the MR deals starting in the 12th period and expanded until the 40th period
and until the end of the promotions. Thus for REST deals, H1a, H2a, and H3a were all
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supported, whereas H1, H2, H3 were not. The results suggest that the advantages of having the
MR feature for restaurant deals was not significant until the MR is met, but they became
significantly positive towards the end of the deal period.
After PSA matching, deal characteristics (including coupon price) of the MR deals were
not statistically significantly different from the deal characteristics of matched NMR deals.
Hence, the greater revenues that MR deals generated resulted from the greater quantity of
coupons sold. We used sensitivity analysis with respect to the PSA matching technique to test
the possibility of significant impact from unobservable (or not included) variables. Our
sensitivity analysis found that our results have low sensitivity to unobservable factors (in Section
2.4.3.3).

Figure 2. Average FL and Total Revenue Plotted across Time for Matched MR and NMR (T = 0
Represents the Time at Which the MR deal is Triggered, that is, PI Ceases)
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Figures 2a-2d graphically illustrate the movement over time for FL and total revenue
after the MR had been met (after time 0). For example, values at T = 4 represent average values
at the end of four hours after the MR deal had met the MR. We note the close tracking between
FL and total revenue for both the MR and NMR deals across time and retail category.
Importantly, the figures also show that the gaps (for FL and total revenue) between MR and NMR
deals all got larger over time for the four categories.
After an MR is met, the PI no longer exists. Only the SI remains for both the MR deals
and the NMR deals. However, as Figures 2a-2d show, the initial impacts of the PI were
magnified over time until the end of deal promotion. We suggest two likely reasons. First,
because of the PI, the MR deals acquired a larger group of seed consumers than the NMR deals
until the MR was met. This larger base of seed consumers provided more individuals who might
have acted based on the SI and also shared the deal with more friends through Facebook. This
social media contagion tended to reinforce deal purchases in a ‘snowball’ fashion over time
(Kempe et al. 2003).
Second, later consumers may have used observational learning to infer the quality of the
offers based on previous consumers’ purchasing decisions (Hu et al. 2013). When consumers
arrived at the Groupon site after the MR had been met, they likely took a positive view toward
the deal from observing more FL and a greater quantity of coupons sold for MR deals. The
positive impression could have strengthened their SI to share the deals and further facilitate
purchasing decisions, perhaps resulting in a herding effect (Li and Wu 2014).
We also noticed that the MR had the smallest impact on REST deals in terms of increased
FL and total revenue. MR deals for A&E acquired about 82.7% more FL and 45% more total
revenue than A&E NMR deals. B&S MR deals totaled 69.5% more FL and 50% more total
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revenue than their matched B&S NMR deals. The figures for H&F had MR deals with a 131.7%
advantage in FL and a 98.2% advantage in total revenue. However, for REST deals, MR deals
had 32.2% more FL and 20% greater total revenue. As we discussed in Section 2.4.1, PI only
exists until the MR is met. Thus, the longer it is from the time the deal is posted until the MR is
met, the longer the PI exists, which, in turn, should lead to a greater impact of PI. We note that
the average time to reach the MR was shortest for REST deals, 7.3 hours, compared with 8.3
hours for A&E, 8.0 hours for B&S and 8.4 hours for H&F. Thus, the MR for REST deals was
reached most quickly and, therefore, the impact of PI was likely to be the smallest. This is
consistent with Figures 2a-2d, in that the increases of Facebook likes and revenue for REST
deals were the smallest. Our results should encourage restaurants to consider raising their MR
level, providing a longer period for the PI and, in turn, improved deal outcomes.
The results show that MR have a causal influence on FL and on total revenue. The results
suggest that, for a local retailer considering Groupon as a promotion and advertising tool, MR are
clearly an element to include. We should note that, while we observed similar movements over
time in FL and total revenue in response to the presence or absence of MR, our analysis was not
able to imply a causal link between FL and Revenue.
In the next two sections, we examine the robustness of our results. In the first section, we
consider issues related to heterogeneity, that is, whether the results noted above hold consistently
across the different levels of propensity scores. In the second, we analyze the sensitivity of
estimated causal effects to potential violations of the strong ignorability assumption.
2.4.3.2 Heterogeneity Analysis
To test whether our results hold consistently across various levels of propensity scores,
we divided deals into sub-groups according to the estimated propensity score, with each

27

subgroup covering 0.15 of the range of the propensity scores (i.e., 0 <0.15, 0.15 <0.30, 0.3 <
0.45, and so on). For each of the intervals within each of the four retail categories, we conducted
Wilcoxon signed rank tests again for FL, quantity of coupons sold and total revenue for time
points 0, 20 and 40. For brevity, we summarize the results here with the tables provided in
Appendix A.1:
1) for each time point, the conclusions for sub-groups are not always the same as the
overall results shown in Tables 5-8. However, for the three or four subgroups in each
category that included the larger numbers of deals, we found general consistency with
the overall results; and,
2) similar to the overall results discussed above, the effects of MR grew stronger over
time. In the heterogeneity analysis, the number of range groups with significance
increased over time and increased in level of significance over time.
The patterns of observed differences between MR and NMR deals across propensity level
groupings supported the potential importance of MR to advertisers across the retail categories.
2.4.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Our PSA utilized the strong assumption that the observed deal characteristics fully
accounted for differences between treatment group (MR) deals and control group (NMR) deals.
Yet the decision whether to include an MR in a particular deal may have been based on retailer
characteristics as well as the deal, that is, be endogenous. So, if the treatment and control groups
actually differ on important unobservable factors, the ignorability assumption was not met and
the strength of our conclusions about the impacts of MR on FL, quantity of coupons sold, and
revenue may be restricted. However, retailer characteristics were not readily available in our
data set. Thus, we performed an analysis to determine how sensitive our estimated causal effects
were to potential violations of the assumption. We refer the reader to detailed discussions of
sensitivity analysis in M&K (2009) and in Rosenbaum (1999), and summarize our results for the
sake of brevity. Following M&K (2009), we use Γ to indicate “the log odds of differential
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assignment to treatment because of unobserved factors.” A larger value of Γ means that
unobservable factors would need to have had a larger effect to undermine the influence of MR,
that is, the initial outcomes are less sensitive to possible unobserved variables.
In Appendix A.2, we summarize the values of Γ where the observed significant positive
effect of MR would become insignificant (at the .01 level). In both analyses, we see that in all or
almost all cases, there is significance at levels above the initial level with larger values of Γ at the
end of the promotion period providing the retailers’ final coupon sales and revenue. Together,
these results suggest that, for the large majority of our results, missing variables must have a
relatively large effect to nullify the importance of MR. Thus, the calculated importance of MR
does not appear to be an artifact of missing variables.

2.5 Summary, Conclusions and Implications
In the context of Groupon’s promotions, we studied causal relations among MR, FL,
quantity of coupons sold, and total revenue. We gathered data hourly, enabling a time-linked
analysis of the persistence of differences between MR deals and NMR deals.

2.5.1 Summary and Conclusions
With a time dimension added, we utilized a PSA to analyze causality. Our results
indicated that, consistent with our hypotheses, MR deals outperform matched NMR deals. MR
deals had more coupons sold and greater total revenue. In addition, MR deals had significantly
more FL, with the total revenue pattern closely following the FL pattern for the entire time
periods studied. For three of the four retail categories, the differences were all significant when
the MR were met and continued to be significant (or significant at higher levels) across the time
period studied. The one exception, restaurants, did not have significant differences when MR
were met, but did so later in the promotion period.
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Though we utilized only a ten-month data period, it is possible that consumers’ interests
or attention on Groupon faded or altered over that time. If so, this could influence our
conclusions. To check for any possible time trend, we analyzed the de-meaned (subtracting
values for each MR (NMR) deal from the mean of all MR (NMR) deals) time trend for FL and for
quantity of coupons sold for all four categories over the ten-month period. We found no
significant overall trend or month-by-month difference.
Our research demonstrates, in the context studied, the existence of a PI before MR are
met. The extra incentive provided consumers more motivation to share a deal through social
media and before MR are met. Our analysis shows that the initial advantage from PI continued
its impact until the promotion end, a type of social contagion or observational learning effect (Li
and Wu 2014). We do not know why Groupon decided to end the use of MR. Perhaps this
decision was based on the company’s observation that virtually all MR were met and thus MR
were viewed as unnecessary. Our results do raise questions about the wisdom of Groupon’s
decision and suggest a reconsideration of that decision. The evidence indicates positive causal
impacts of an MR on coupon sales and revenue, both important to retailers and Groupon.

2.5.2 Generalizations and Implications
Our research has important theoretical implications in the e-WOM arena. While
numerous studies have documented positive influences of e-WOM on sales or revenue, few
studies have examined factors driving the generation of e-WOM (one example is Godes and
Silva 2012). Our research: 1) found the presence of MR drives increasing social media sharing
(FL) across the entire length of such deals; and, 2) demonstrated the importance of PI for
increasing FL, coupon sales, and total revenue.
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Our results have two significant areas of generalization. First, for daily deal sites that do
not diverge significantly from the Groupon format, the results should directly generalize.
Second, the demonstrated importance of PI should carry over to a myriad of market settings. We
currently see many firms assimilating social media. Given what we found about the importance
of PI, we posit that these firms should utilize some form of PI appropriate for their market
activities. People do act altruistically in sharing, but we should not forget that they also can act
in their own personal interest through sharing.
The impact of PI leads to an important managerial insight, but we offer a much broader
and likely more important managerial insight. In terms of generating sales and revenue,
Groupon apparently overlooked the positive effect of using MR. Perhaps because virtually every
MR was met, Groupon might have thought the effort of tracking and reporting on the MR to be
unnecessary. Interestingly, Groupon had all the data to analyze the value of MR, but there is no
indication that they performed the analytics to do so. Our results offer a cautionary tale to those
pondering an abrupt alteration of a market process – do the analytics before you leap!
As in all studies, there are certainly caveats. Our data, although a fairly large data set, was
gathered from three cities over approximately ten months. Second, our data only included
Groupon deals. Third, our analysis covered just four retail categories, albeit some 80% of
Groupon’s local deals. Finally, the utilization of PSA enabled us to analyze the causal relation
between MR and FL, the causal relationship between MR and deal outcomes (quantity of
coupons sold and total revenue), but not the causal relationship between FL and deal outcomes.
Given the consistency in patterns among FL and the outcome variables, we see this as an
interesting direction for a theory paper in future work.
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Chapter 3

Who Will Come and Who Will Return? — An

Empirical Investigation of Business Decisions to Pursue Initial and
Return Groupon Promotions
Online daily deals provide a new marketing tool for local retailers. Despite significant literature
highlighting the importance of both e-WOM and local competition on business strategies, we
found no detailed empirical analysis of how these factors impact a restaurant’s initial and return
promotion decisions. The research reported here addresses these questions for the Chicagoarea restaurant segment of Groupon’s business, utilizing a dataset we developed that combines
promotion details, location factors, and e-WOM measures. Utilizing an extended propensity
score matching method, our analysis identifies the significant causal factors. While some
findings follow expectations, others indicate impacts that clearly differentiate the online daily
deal arena from the historic discount coupon setting. The set of results provide important
implications for Groupon to develop a more strategic marketing plan.

3.1 Introduction
Sites such as Groupon enable consumers both to conveniently purchase products and to
spread opinions (Ferguson 2008). A growing number of local retailers, such as the restaurants
we examine in this essay, are choosing promotion strategies, such as Groupon, to conduct
coupon promotions in lieu of traditional newspaper or flier promotions.
In the daily deal setting, consumers purchase coupons or deals from a website to redeem
later at the retailers’ physical locations. Customers can be expected to make their decisions as
they do for any product, based on a combination of price and perceived quality. But what drives
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businesses to pursue an initial Groupon promotion and, subsequently, to pursue or not pursue a
second such promotion?
Each business faces a variety of factors that they cannot control, but in some cases, they
can influence. Two such factors that we study in this essay are e-WOM and local competition.
e-WOM activities, such as Yelp reviews, are not controlled by a restaurant, but may certainly be
impacted by the restaurants' business operations. A restaurant cannot control local competitors,
but can, by its business decisions, impact the competitive landscape. In the work detailed here,
we address: 1) the impact of e-WOM and local competition on a business’ (in our analysis, a
restaurant’s) decision about whether or not to pursue an initial Groupon promotion, and, 2) the
impact of post-first-promotion shifts in e-WOM, the local competitive landscape, and the results
of the first promotion on the decision on whether or not to pursue a second promotion.
We constructed a detailed dataset of Groupon promotions for restaurants in the Chicago
area that includes data on 7008 restaurants over a period of three years. In order to investigate
causal relationships, we employed propensity score analysis (PSA). In addition, we extended
PSA in order to utilize continuous variables as treatment variables.
Interestingly, what we found was a mix of the expected and the unexpected. As
expected, coupon revenue from the first Groupon promotion is the most important factor driving
restaurants to return for a second Groupon promotion. However, some of the effects of e-WOM
were counter to previous research. Restaurants that were highly rated were more likely to run a
first Groupon promotion but less likely to run a second Groupon promotion than were those that
were less highly rated. Restaurants with more reviews, generally considered a proxy for
popularity in the marketing literature (Liu 2006), were more likely to run both a first and a return
Groupon promotion. The effects of local competition were also interesting. Restaurants in more
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competitive areas were surprisingly less likely to run an initial Groupon promotion but no less
likely to return to Groupon. Restaurants were more likely to run both a first and a return
Groupon promotion if nearby competitors had not run a Groupon promotion, suggesting that
Groupon promotions are viewed more as creating a competitive advantage than as a competitive
response. Note that, because we are using an extended PSA, all of the results reported here are
based on comparisons across grouped pairs of restaurants in which the paired restaurants are
determined to be statistically equivalent except for the indicated treatment variable.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 3.2 includes our discussion
of related literature and details of how our analysis differs from previous work. In Section 3.3
we develop our hypotheses based on previous literature. Section 3.4 is devoted to the definition
of variables and details on how we compiled the dataset. Section 3.5 presents our extended PSA
method along with the estimations of causal relationships, sensitivity analyses, and robustness
checks. Section 3.6 is a summary of our conclusions and managerial insights.

3.2 Literature Review
We briefly review three fields of related research: 1) coupon and online daily deal
promotions, 2) e-WOM and firm strategies, and 3) local competition.

3.2.1 Coupon and Online Daily Deal Promotions
Marketing research has shown that local retailers have used coupon promotions to
generate short-term sales increases (Ehrenberg et al. 1994; Taylor 2001), to attract new
consumers, that is, long-term sales increases (Chapman 1986; Varadarajan 1984), and to
encourage repeat purchases of a brand (Taylor and Long-Tolbert 2002). Short-term sales and
new consumers mostly come from brand switchers who are, by definition, prone to switch again
(Gupta 1988).

34

Previous studies have shown that frequent coupon promotions tend to have two negative
impacts. First, frequent promotions lead consumers to infer low product quality and/or inferior
brand image (Yoo et al. 2000). Second, Jedidi et al. (1999) showed that frequent promotions
cause resistance to buy at the normal price; loyal consumers begin to expect and wait for the next
coupon promotion and lower price.
Online coupons introduced easier access for consumers and lower distribution cost for
retailers (Chiou-Wei and Inman 2008; Lu et al. 2013). At first blush, daily deal coupons, such as
those offered in Groupon promotions, may appear to be a simple extension of online coupons,
but this is not the case. First, consumers must pay to get Groupon coupons, whereas the
traditional coupons (hard copy or online versions) are free. Second, local retailers pay no upfront promotion costs or fees to Groupon. What the retailers do face is the requirement that they
share the coupon sales revenue with Groupon. Thus the daily deal coupon environment shifts the
paradigm from a fee-for-promotion-service to a revenue sharing tactic.
The online daily deal arena has begun to attract growing research interest. Research on
the sustainability of the industry has not reached consistent findings. Arabshahi (2010) and
Kumar and Rajan (2012) concluded that the approach in the industry is not ideally suited to
acquire customers and generate profits for retailers. Others suggested particular niches for
success. For example, Edelman et al. (2011) argued that the online daily deal promotion is more
profitable for lesser known firms and firms with low marginal costs. Dholakia (2012) contended
that daily deal promotions are most attractive for newer and relatively smaller businesses.
The studies discussed above are mostly based on analytical models or data from surveys
or interviews data rather than actual empirical analysis. The lack of analyses utilizing empirical
market data provides a research gap that we begin to fill.
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3.2.2 e-WOM and Firm Strategies
Consumers frequently use e-WOM as part of their purchase decision processes. Thus it
is not surprising that a large body of research literature on e-WOM has emerged. Numerous
studies have shown that e-WOM has significant impact on sales and revenue for industries such
as movies (Liu 2006; Rui et al. 2013), books (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Li and Hitt 2008),
music (Dhar and Chang 2009), and even craft beers (Clemons et al. 2006).
e-WOM also has significant impact on retailers’ response strategies (Feng et al. 2014).
Some retailers respond to consumers’ comments directly. For example, Gu and Ye (2014)
contended that retailers respond to consumers’ comments directly to improve future consumer
satisfaction for those consumers offering negative reviews. Dellarocas (2006) and Mayzlin et al.
(2014) suggested that retailers can go a bit further and attempt to manipulate online comments
through posting fake reviews. Other retailers respond to e-WOM through pricing strategies.
Kuksov and Xie (2010) posited that retailers may respond to e-WOM by offering lower prices to
early customers whose reviews may influence subsequent potential customers.
Chen and Xie (2005, 2008) offered a perspective that ties directly to the work we present
here. Their analytical work suggests that it is more profitable for retailers to respond to e-WOM
using advertising (that is, promotion) rather than pricing. We suggest and empirically analyze
daily deal promotions as one marketing strategy by retailers in response to e-WOM.

3.2.3 Local Competition
A large percentage of online daily deals are from retailers, such as restaurants, whose
competition is generally highly localized (Pinkse et al. 2002). Past studies have focused on the
impact of local competition on three types of retailer decisions. First, local competition tends to
have negative impact on prices. Thomadsen’s study (2005) indicated that competition between
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geographically close fast food stores drives prices lower than would be expected if the stores
merged under a single franchise (see also, Davis 2006 demonstrating that price competition
primarily impacts nearby retailers). Second, Dubé et al. (2005) and Pancras et al. (2012)
demonstrated that local competition influences a retailer’s entry and/or exit decision. Third, Zhu
and Singh (2009), in their analysis of both entry and location selection decisions, maintained that
the number of nearby retail stores exerts a negative effect on whether or not competitors enter,
but the effect decreases with the location’s distance from rival outlets.
Here, we extend the prior work on local competition to the arena of daily deal
promotions. In particular, we focus on a local retailer’s promotion decisions in the presence of
social media, which to the best of our knowledge has not been examined in the previous
literature.

3.3 Hypotheses Development
In this section, we develop our hypotheses related to restaurants’ Groupon promotion
decisions. As discussed in Section 3.2.1, a retailer must use repeated coupon promotions with
great caution due to the potential negative impacts. Thus, we argue that a restaurant’s second
promotion is a very different decision from the initial one. Therefore, our hypotheses for a
restaurant’s two promotion decisions involve some overlapping but other distinct factors.
We first examine the influence of e-WOM factors and local competition factors on the
decision to run an initial Groupon promotion (Figure 3). Then, we examine the influence of eWOM factors, local competition factors, and coupon revenue from the initial Groupon promotion
on the decision to return for a second Groupon promotion (Figure 4). Note that the operational
definitions of factors listed in Figure 3 and Figure 4 will be fully discussed in Section 3.4.1.
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Figure 3. Conceptual Model for the Initial Groupon Promotion Analysis

Figure 4. Conceptual Model for the Second Groupon Promotion Analysis

3.3.1 e-Word-of-mouth (e-WOM) Factors
Previous literature has focused mainly on two e-WOM factors: online review rating and
number of online reviews. Liu (2006) suggested that, in a more general context, an online
review rating can be thought of as the valence of e-WOM and the number of online reviews as
the volume of e-WOM. We use online review rating and number of online reviews in our
analysis because we are using an online review context.
3.3.1.1 e-WOM Factors and the Initial Groupon Promotion Decision
Anderson and Magruder (2012) argued that an online review rating is an indicator of a
retailer’s online reputation and that a high rating has a positive influence on consumer demand.
Byers et al. (2012a) noted that, in the online daily deal context, consumers need to pay for and
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buy the coupons, providing revenue for the daily deal sites and retailers. The authors argued that
higher rated retailers are better perceived by consumers, and therefore, can expect to sell more
coupons and earn more revenue. In addition, some consumers will not just use the coupons, but
also write reviews and spread a retailer’s reputation online. Thus, higher rated restaurants should
be more willing to get exposure through daily deal promotions, and expect that their good online
reputation will be enhanced, which will attract more consumers in the future. This implies that
higher rated restaurants would be more likely to run the initial Groupon promotion, which leads
to the following hypothesis:
H1: A higher rating has a positive influence on restaurants choosing whether to do an
initial Groupon promotion.
However, restaurants without a good online reputation may suffer from attracting new
consumers. Basic marketing theory suggests that lower rated restaurants need marketing tools,
including promotion, to encourage new consumers to try their service. Hence, lower rated
restaurants would be more likely to run an initial Groupon promotion, which leads to a
competing hypothesis:
H1a: A lower rating has a positive influence on restaurants choosing whether to do an
initial Groupon promotion.
Number of online reviews is an indicator of popularity, such that more reviews have a
positive influence on consumer demand (Liu 2006). Restaurants with more reviews are viewed
by consumers as more popular, and therefore should attract more consumers. Restaurants with
more reviews may be more likely to run an initial Groupon promotion for two reasons. First,
restaurants with more reviews may expect to sell more coupons and earn more revenue. Second,
when more Groupon coupons are sold, more coupon users will write online reviews, a positive
for the restaurant. These two reasons lead to the following hypothesis:
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H2: Having more reviews has a positive influence on restaurants choosing whether to
do an initial Groupon promotion.
However, both theoretical work (Edelman et al. 2011) and survey work (Dholakia 2012)
have argued that online daily deal promotions are beneficial to unknown or newer local retailers.
Restaurants with fewer reviews may be more likely to run an initial Groupon promotion, because
they need promotions to encourage new consumers to try their service. This leads to the
following competing hypothesis:
H2a: Having fewer reviews has a positive influence on restaurants choosing whether
to do an initial Groupon promotion.
3.3.1.2 e-WOM Factors and the Second Groupon Promotion Decision
Higher rated restaurants are likely to return for a second Groupon promotion because of
two potential benefits. First, higher rated restaurants may expect to have a successful daily deal
promotion and earn more revenue from selling coupons. Second, the high rating may get
enhanced through new online reviews by Groupon coupon users. Thus, we hypothesize:
H3: After an initial Groupon promotion, a higher rating has a positive influence on
restaurants choosing whether to return.
However, as we discussed earlier, frequent promotions may have a negative impact. For
example, a restaurant may suffer from damage to its brand image if it runs a second Groupon
promotion (Yoo et al. 2000). It is also likely that a restaurant’s loyal consumers will learn not to
purchase without a discount, which will hurt the restaurant’s revenue in the long run (Jedidi et al.
1999). Hence, a fear of potential damage to its brand image and harm to long-term revenue
could well lead higher rated restaurants to avoid return promotions. In contrast, lower rated
restaurants would suffer less from the negative impact because their online review ratings are
already low. Therefore, a lower rated restaurant may be more likely to return for a second
Groupon promotion, an argument leading to the following competing hypothesis:
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H3a: After an initial Groupon promotion, a lower rating has a positive influence on
restaurants choosing whether to return.
The change in a restaurant’s online review rating after the initial Groupon promotion may
influence its decision on a second promotion. The initial Groupon promotion may bring in new
consumers with different perceptions about food and service. These customers may post
qualitatively different online reviews, which may lead to a change in a restaurant’s online
reputation (Byers et al. 2012a). If its online review rating is improved after the first Groupon
promotion, the restaurant will evaluate the promotion as an effective tool. Hence, a restaurant
with improved online review rating after the initial Groupon promotion is more likely to return
for a second Groupon promotion, which leads to the following hypothesis:
H4: After an initial Groupon promotion, improved online review ratings have a
positive influence on restaurants choosing to return.
Restaurants with higher numbers of reviews are more likely to return for two reasons.
Reflecting their popularity, such restaurants are more likely to be successful in selling coupons
and obtaining greater revenue. An additional expectation is that such popular restaurants would
again be more likely to receive even more reviews because they sell more coupons. These
reasons lead to the following hypothesis:
H5: After an initial Groupon promotion, having more reviews has a positive influence
on restaurants choosing whether to return.
On the other hand, unpopular restaurants, i.e. those with fewer reviews, need promotions
to encourage consumers to try their food and service. Hence, repeated daily deal promotions
may benefit unpopular restaurants through advertising effects (Edelman et al. 2011), which leads
to the following competing hypothesis:
H5a: After an initial Groupon promotion, having fewer reviews has a positive
influence on restaurants choosing whether to return.
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3.3.2 Local Competition Factors
As discussed in Section 3.2.3, competition in restaurant markets is highly localized (see
Pinske et al. 2002). In our analysis, we investigate two local competition factors: the level of
local competition and Groupon usage by local competitors.
3.3.2.1 Local Competition Factors and the Initial Groupon Promotion Decision
Local competition was formally modeled by Hotelling (1929) in a highly simplified
format, in which two firms located at the two extremes of a “linear city” sell the same physical
good to consumers with transportation costs. The Hotelling model theoretically demonstrated
that if transportation cost is small, the two firms will be involved in price competition. Empirical
studies have shown that marginal transportation cost declines with distance and that price
competition mostly impacts nearby retailers (Davis 2006). Further, restaurants close to each
other very likely share the same set of potential consumers (Duan et al. 2009). Restaurants in a
more competitive area are more likely to attract brand switchers and increase their short-term
revenue through coupon promotion (Gupta 1988). These analyses lead to the following
hypothesis:
H6: A higher level of local competition has a positive influence on restaurants
choosing whether to do an initial Groupon promotion.
However, another stream of literature on spatial concentration suggests that geographic
proximity in a local area is also likely to increase demand (Klier and McMillen 2008). A
competitive area, such as the downtown area, may be a “destination” place for more consumers
because there are numerous options for consumers to choose from. Restaurants in an area with a
higher level of local competition may have a bigger base of potential consumers. Hence,
restaurants in a more competitive area do not need to run a Groupon promotion to increase
demand, or:
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H6a: A higher level of local competition has a negative influence on restaurants
choosing whether to do an initial Groupon promotion.
Duan et al. (2009) argued that consumers of retailers which are close to each other in a
local area are similar. This suggests that nearby restaurants are competing for similar potential
consumers. In competing for such similar customers, nearby restaurants may run Groupon
promotions, that is, restaurant A may run a competing promotion if nearby restaurant B has just
run such a promotion. Hence:
H7: A higher proportion of Groupon use by local competitors has a positive influence
on restaurants choosing whether to do an initial Groupon promotion.
On the flip-side, if a restaurant runs a Groupon promotion, consumers may notice and
subsequently try nearby restaurants, providing a positive spillover effect (Wang et al. 2015). In
contrast, if few or no competitors nearby are using Groupon promotions, a restaurant will not
benefit from the spillover effect and may be more likely to pursue its own Groupon promotion.
This leads to the competing hypothesis:
H7a: A lower proportion of Groupon use by local competitors has a positive influence
on restaurants choosing whether to do an initial Groupon promotion.
3.3.2.2 Local Competition Factors and the Second Groupon Promotion Decision
Here we also have two competing hypotheses for the level of local competition. On the
one hand, restaurants in a more competitive area are more likely to return for a second Groupon
promotion because: 1) nearby restaurants compete for the similar set of consumers, and 2)
coupon promotions are one marketing tool to maintain a restaurant’s market share. Hence,
restaurants in an area with a higher level of local competition may be more likely to run a second
or follow-up Groupon promotion, summarized in the following hypothesis:
H8: After an initial Groupon promotion, a higher level of local competition has a
positive influence on restaurants choosing whether to return.
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On the other hand, based on the spatial concentration literature, a more competitive area
is more likely to be a “destination” location and draw more consumers to the area. In contrast,
restaurants in a less competitive area may suffer from acquiring new consumers, and be more
likely to run a second Groupon promotion. This leads to the following competing hypothesis:
H8a: After an initial Groupon promotion, a lower level of local competition has a
positive influence on restaurants choosing whether to return.
A higher proportion of Groupon use by local competitors could be expected to make a
restaurant more likely to return for a second Groupon promotion for two reasons: 1) promotions
may intensify local competition and encourage “reaction” promotions, and 2) there can be
“herding effects” that lead to imitating competitors’ promotion behavior (Bronnenberg and Mela
2004). Thus:
H9: After an initial Groupon promotion, a higher proportion of Groupon use by local
competitors has a positive influence on restaurants choosing whether to return.
On the other hand, a restaurant with a higher proportion of Groupon use by its
competitors may be less likely to return due to the spillover effect. In contrast, facing lower or
no use of Groupon promotions a restaurant may be more likely to run a follow-up promotion,
leading to the competing hypothesis:
H9a: After an initial Groupon promotion, a lower proportion of Groupon use by local
competitors has a positive influence on restaurants choosing whether to return.

3.3.3 Coupon Revenue from the First Groupon Promotion
Loyal customers that provide a steady stream of revenue can have a powerful impact on
company performance (Rust et al. 1993; Edvardsson et al. 2000; Lam et al. 2004, Ryals 2005).
Many studies on customer loyalty have shown, not surprisingly, that satisfaction has a positive
relationship with business customer loyalty (Vickery et al. 2004; Lam et al. 2004; and Bennett et
al. 2005). In our setting, the relevant loyalty is whether a restaurant that has conducted an initial
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Groupon promotion decides to return for a follow-up promotion. The greater the coupon
revenue from the first Groupon promotion, the more likely the restaurant would evaluate the
promotion as an effective marketing tool encouraging a return promotion. Although promotions
may be “too successful,” resulting in overcrowding, sell-outs, or other conditions (see, for
example, http://www.yelp.com/topic/chicago-groupon-horror-stories-do-you-have-any), we
conjecture that the coupon revenue from the first Groupon promotion generally has a positive
influence on a restaurant’s return decision. Thus:
H10: After an initial Groupon promotion, greater coupon revenue of that initial
promotion has a positive influence on restaurants choosing whether to return.

3.4 Variable Descriptions and Data Collection Processes
3.4.1 Variable Descriptions
The following variables, with their formal names in italics, appear in our hypotheses and
must be operationally defined:
The online review rating: Average Yelp Rating
The number of online reviews: Number of Yelp Reviews
Level of local competition: Number of Competitors Nearby
Proportion of Groupon use by local competitors: Proportion of Competitors Nearby
Using Groupon
Coupon revenue from the initial Groupon promotion: Coupon Revenue from the First
Promotion
Change in online review rating: Change in Average Yelp Rating.
Table 9 below provides a brief operational definition of each variable along with the
relevant data source. Data collection details are provided in the next subsection.
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Table 9. Variable Descriptions/Definitions and Data Sources
Variables
Groupon Restaurants
Non-Groupon
Restaurants
Groupon Return
Restaurants
Groupon One-Time
Restaurants
Average Yelp Rating
Number of Yelp Reviews
Number of Competitors
Nearby
Proportion of
Competitors Nearby
Using Groupon
Coupon Revenue from
the First Promotion
Change in Average Yelp
Rating

Descriptions/Definitions
Restaurants that ran a Groupon promotion for the first time
prior to the end of data collection.
Restaurants that had not run Groupon promotions prior to the
end of data collection.
Restaurants that returned for a second promotion within 450
days after the first Groupon promotion. a
Restaurants that had not returned for a second promotion
within 450 days after the first Groupon promotion. a
The average of all Yelp ratings when a restaurant either ran
an initial Groupon, or ran a second promotion. b
The number of all Yelp reviews when a restaurant either ran
an initial Groupon or ran a second promotion. b
The number of competitors (other restaurants) within a half
mile from a particular restaurant.
First, we obtain the number of a restaurant A’s competitors
within a half mile that have run a Groupon promotion either
before A ran an initial Groupon promotion (or between A’s
initial and second Groupon promotions). Then we divide this
number by Number of Competitors Nearby. c
The quantity of coupons sold in the initial Groupon offering
multiplied by the price of the coupon for a restaurant.
The value of Average Yelp Rating when a restaurant ran a
second Groupon minus that when it ran an initial Groupon.

Data Sources
Groupon
Identified from
Groupon and Yelp
Groupon
Groupon
Yelp
Yelp
Yelp

Calculated from
Groupon and Yelp

Groupon
Yelp

Note: a We chose 450 days to define a Groupon return restaurant, because 90% of returning restaurants returned
within 450 days. Our results are not sensitive to the choice of 450 days.
b
For non-Groupon restaurants without a date of the initial Groupon promotion, we constructed the two e-WOM
factors (Average Yelp Rating and Number of Yelp Reviews) on April 20, 2011, because April 20, 2011 is the median
date at which Groupon restaurants ran the initial Groupon promotions. For those Groupon one-time restaurants
without a return date, we constructed the two e-WOM factors using the date of 210 days after their initial Groupon
promotion, because 210 is the median interval of days between the initial and second promotion for return
restaurants.
c
Similar to note b, for Groupon one-time restaurants, we calculated the Proportion of Competitors Nearby between
their initial Groupon promotion and the date of 210 days after the initial Groupon promotions.

3.4.2 Data Collection
As shown in Table 9 above, the main sources for constructing the variables include
Groupon and Yelp. From Groupon we collected all Groupon promotions run over the specified
period by each restaurant including the specific date and coupon revenue from each deal. From
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Yelp, we collected all online reviews for each restaurant along with the corresponding price level
and location. The detailed processes of data collection follow.
3.4.2.1 Groupon Data Details
We first collected restaurant deals in the Chicago area via Groupon’s website from
September 1, 2011 through March 31, 2013. Each Groupon deal has a unique ID which
differentiates it from other deals. Even deals from the same restaurant are given different deal
IDs. Based on the ID patterns7, we identified restaurants that were returning (restaurants that had
a prior Groupon promotion), with some of the initial deals occurring before September 1, 2011.
To capture the deals before September 1, 2011 (Groupon started its business in Chicago in
November, 2008), we collected data from three other sources (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Data Collection Sources of Groupon restaurant Deals

First, we obtained a data set compiled by Byers et al. (2012a)8, which covered all
Groupon deals between January 1, 2011 and July 31, 2011. Second, we collected Groupon deal
links from Archive.org, which scans Groupon’s webpages and provides free access to the data.
However, the Archive.org only scanned Groupon data on randomly selected days each month.

Deal IDs roughly follow a certain pattern. For example, ‘delux-grill’ would be the deal ID for a grill restaurant’s
first promotion, ‘delux-grill -1’ for the second deal, and ‘delux-grill -2’ as the third deal.
8
http://people.bu.edu/zg/daily-deals-dataset.html
7
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Overall, we determined that the Archive.org scanned Groupon deals in Chicago for 23 days
during 2009 and 118 days during 2010. Third, for the days not covered by Archive.org, we
searched Groupon deal links through Google Custom Search with key words being the physical
addresses and/or phone numbers of the restaurants in question. Archive.org and Google Custom
Search together provided 1143 restaurant deals for 2010 and earlier in the Chicago area.
Overall, the Groupon restaurant deal data span the period December 7, 2008, to March
31, 2013. However, we cannot guarantee that all the first-time deals from 2010 and earlier were
captured by Archive.org and Google Custom Search. This is a caveat to our results.9 We
identified restaurants which had returned for a second promotion (Groupon Return Restaurants)
and those which had not returned prior to March 31, 2013 (Groupon One-Time Restaurants).
Wanting to allow a sufficiently long period for a restaurant to return, we set this period to be 450
days because our data show that 90% of identified return restaurants returned within 450 days.
Thus a Groupon Return Restaurant is defined as one that returned for a second promotion within
450 days after the restaurant’s first Groupon promotion.10
Through Groupon’s public API11, we obtained the information about each deal,
including: 1) the date when the deal was issued, 2) the discounted coupon price, and 3) the
quantity of coupons sold by the end of the promotion. Using the coupon price and the quantity
of coupons sold, we calculated coupon revenue from the coupon promotion. From Groupon’s
public API, we also obtained each restaurant’s longitude and latitude, physical address, and zip
code. With the longitude and latitude for any restaurant, we determined Groupon usage by local

We indeed obtained every first deal for later deals like ‘*-1’ or ‘*-2’, i.e. we will not mistake a second promotion
for a first-time promotion.
10
We also used 420 days and 480 days, and find our main conclusions still hold (Appendix B.4).
11
An application programming interface (API) is a source code based specification intended to be used as an
interface by software components to communicate with each other.
9
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competitors within a specified distance (e.g. half mile).12 Regarding restaurant A’s decision
whether to run an initial promotion at time t, we obtained Number of Competitors Nearby using
Groupon by calculating the number of restaurants within half mile from A that had run Groupon
promotions within 180 days13 prior to time t. Regarding A’s decision whether to return for a
second promotion at time t’, we obtained Number of Competitors Nearby using Groupon by
calculating the number of restaurants within a half-mile that had run Groupon promotions
between t and t’.
3.4.2.2 Yelp Data Details
As mentioned above, Yelp provides the necessary operationalizations of e-WOM (Yelp
ratings) and price level for each restaurant (Yelp dollar signs). We collected Yelp information
for all restaurants in the Chicago area. We then differentiated Groupon restaurants from nonGroupon restaurants as follows:
1) for some Groupon restaurants (58.2%), Groupon directly provided Yelp
information;
2) for the remaining Groupon restaurants, using phone numbers, business names and
physical addresses from Groupon listings, we searched for the necessary Yelp
information. This yielded the necessary information for another 39.5% of the
Groupon restaurants.
Overall, we matched 97.7% of those restaurants that had run Groupon with the necessary
Yelp information specific to those restaurants. For each restaurant we collected all of the
restaurant’s individual reviews with corresponding numeric ratings (1-5 points) and review dates.
We then constructed the average of individual Yelp ratings and the number of Yelp reviews for

12

As discussed in detail in Section 3.5.4, we performed robustness tests using different distances. Detailed results
are provided in Appendix B.2.
13
Its competitors’ promotion behaviors within a period may influence a restaurant’s promotion decision. We
operationalize the period by choosing 180 days before it ran its initial Groupon promotion, because the median of
coupon duration (days when a coupon buyer can use the coupon) is 180 days.
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every restaurant available on the particular day when the restaurant ran the initial Groupon
promotion and on the day of return for restaurants with a second promotion. We also collected
the number of Yelp dollar signs (‘$’), which indicates the price level of each restaurant.
For each restaurant, we used Yelp to identify the number of restaurants (i.e. number of
competitors nearby) within a certain distance (e.g. a half-mile) based on latitude and longitude.
This data provided the Number of Competitors Nearby. Using this information with
corresponding information from Groupon on what restaurants conducted a promotion and when
the promotion occurred, we constructed the Proportion of Competitors Nearby Using Groupon.
We collected demographic information (average household income and average age) from the
2010 U.S. Census by zip code and used these variables as controls.

3.5 Data Analysis
3.5.1 Method
Earlier we laid out two research questions:
1) Are e-WOM factors and/or local competition factors significant drivers of a
restaurant’s decision to run an initial Groupon promotion?
2) Are e-WOM factors, local competition factors, and/or the outcome of an initial
promotion significant drivers of a retailer’s decision to return for a second promotion?
Given our interest in identifying accurate answers to these questions, we considered a
variety of possible methods and settled on propensity score analysis (PSA), a quasi-experimental
method where comparisons are performed over matched pairs of restaurants. As we analyze the
impact of each factor in turn, the restaurants are paired for similarity on all other e-WOM and
competition factors along with a set of control variables.
The analyses reported here are part of an eventual theory development effort in the arena of ecouponing. We strive to learn critical causal relationships to be later integrated in a formal
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model. Thus SEM, which requires a formal model for estimation, would be premature. PLSPath Modeling, sometimes referred to as a “soft modeling approach” might seem a likely choice,
but even PLS-PM utilizes a path structure and involves a process to iteratively estimate the joint
set of path coefficients. PSA, on the other hand, harkens back to controlled experimentation
(along the lines of Smith 1976, 1982, and 1994) where a treatment measure is manipulated on a
treatment group and the outcomes compared to those for a control group undergoing no
treatment. Analysis is done on the causal impact of each individual treatment.14
We chose the PSA approach over either laboratory or field experimentation for a number
of reasons. With respect to laboratory experimentation, we were able to collect actual microlevel data for more than 7000 real restaurants engaging in Groupon promotions. This use of real
data enabled us to make comparisons on fairly large sets of matching pairs over long periods of
time in direct contrast to the very limited observation sets over limited amounts of time that are
typical of controlled laboratory experiments. Finally, because we used real restaurants, our data
reflect the actual decision-making of a large number of real business owners and consumers
rather than the actions of participants in a laboratory setting.15 With respect to field experiments,
similar factors argued for our approach. Constructing a field experiment generally requires the
experimenter to limit the context to one or, at most, a few stimuli that may or may not be
representative of the real environment created by the experimenters, not real participants in the
environment, over a relatively limited time frame. Because we matched pairs of real deal offers

14

Careful experimental design can, of course, utilize a factorial approach to lessen the overall number of necessary
experiments.
15
For a more thorough consideration of data source comparisons, see Bapna, R., Goes, P., Gopal, R., and Marsden,
J. R. (2006). Moving from data-constrained to data-enabled research: experiences and challenges in collecting,
validating and analyzing large-scale e-commerce data. Statistical Science, 116-130.
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from real restaurants purchased by real consumers, none of these limitations affected our data.
As a result, we see our results as both realistic and highly likely to be causally valid.

3.5.2 Extended Propensity Score Method
PSA involves identifying a variable (or combination of variables) for which a two-level
separation is possible (e.g., low versus high, or zero value versus positive value). The set of
observations is then divided into two groups, one called a treatment group (e.g., high value,
positive value) and a control group (e.g., low value, zero value). A structured search is then
conducted to identify corresponding members (matches), one from the control group and one
from the treatment group, such that the likelihood of each paired observation being a member of
the treatment group is “close” (within a specified ε). That is, given the observed values on all
variables but the variable under causal analysis (the treatment variable), the propensity score or
likelihood that the paired observation from the control group “is” in the treatment group is very
close to the propensity score for the matching observation that actually is in the treatment group
(see Mithas and Krishnan 2009, and Bai et al. 2015a, for in-depth explanation and details of
alternative matching procedures). Once a set of such matched pairs is identified, the analysis
focuses on examining the difference (or lack thereof) in the outcome variable of interest. The
basic idea is to evaluate the differences in outcomes for two sets of observations that are matched
on all but the variable being analyzed for a causal effect.
Here we add a twist, creating an Extended Propensity Score Analysis (EPSA), which
allows us to perform causal analysis on each of the continuous variables appearing in our
hypotheses. Past uses of PSA involved binary treatment variables (e.g., drug treatment versus no
drug treatment in medicine, an MBA degree versus no MBA degree). The variables analyzed
here are continuous or nearly continuous, such as Average Yelp Rating, Number of Yelp Reviews,
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or Coupon Revenue from the First Promotion. Thus, we must dichotomize our explanatory
variables.
Table 10 provides the range of values that we used to transform the variables of interest
into binary variables. In seeking to create binary variables with separation, we ordered
observations and then assigned the bottom third of observed values as a “0” or Control Group
value and those whose values in the upper third of observed values as a “1” or Treatment Group
value. The middle third were not assigned. Thus, in our propensity score analysis, matched
pairs involve matching elements from the lowest one third to those in the upper one third, or, in
treatment terms, high values of a variable are considered as treatments for those variables.
Though the division into treatment and control groups does not involve a direct binary split (e.g.,
drug versus no drug), the basic approach is the same, though we must note that our decision to
base divisions on “bottom third” (control) versus “upper third” (treatment) is certainly subjective
in nature. To examine the “validity” of this decision, we also tested other possible splits, ranging
from “bottom 20% versus top 20%” to “bottom 40% versus top 40%”. The former splits resulted
in significantly lowered numbers of matches, while the latter actually had negligible impact.
Thus, we utilize the “bottom third” versus “upper third” splits for the EPSA.
Table 10 reports variable levels and the number of observations or matched pairs for all
of our treatment/control groups. To aid clarity, we utilize a running example for the variable,
Number of Yelp Reviews. As shown in Table 10, for the initial decision on a Groupon promotion
(yes or no), there are 2338 observations in the control group, with a mean value of 2.59 and a
standard deviation of 1.38, in contrast to 2335 observations in the treatment group, with a mean
value of 102.48 and a standard deviation of 115.47.
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Table 10. Variable Levels and Number of Observations for Control and Treatment
Initial Groupon Promotion decision
control group
treatment group
2.70
4.27
(0.60)
(0.32)
2447
2336
2.59
102.48
(1.38)
(115.47)
2338
2335
11.52
241.33
(5.31)
(199.00)
2441
2326
0
0.05
(0)
(0.05)
3511a
2320a

Second Groupon Promotion decision
control group
treatment group
2.46
4.34
(0.51)
(0.30)
196
138
3.49
42.28
(1.79)
(25.53)
246
221
9.31
197.70
(4.64)
(175.73)
242
229
0
0.10
(0)
(0.12)
298a
230a
4689.57
32966.00
(1885.27)
(31762.81)
232
227
-0.81
0.73
(0.51)
(0.48)
317b
135b

mean
(Std. Dev.)
N
mean
(Std. Dev.)
Number of Yelp Reviews
N
mean
Number of Competitors
(Std. Dev.)
Nearby
N
mean
Proportion of Competitors
(Std. Dev.)
Nearby Using Groupon
N
mean
NA
NA
Coupon Revenue from the
(Std. Dev.)
First Promotion
N
mean
NA
NA
Change in Average Yelp
(Std. Dev.)
Rating
N
Note: N—indicates number of observations.
a
Due to the distribution of Proportion of Competitors Nearby Using Groupon, 0 is both 1/3 quantile and median in
the case of Groupon or not. That is why about 1000 more data are assigned into low level than high level. Similar
reason for the case of return or not.
b
To examine the same magnitude of Change in Average Yelp Rating, here instead of the one-third split method we
take the restaurants with the value lower than -0.25 as the control group, and those with the value greater than 0.25
as the treatment group.
Average Yelp Rating

3.5.3 Analysis and Results
Our analysis follows the ordering of hypotheses set out earlier, except that we first
consider the hypotheses related to an initial Groupon promotion (H1, H2, H6, and H7) followed
by those related to a decision on a return or follow-up Groupon promotion (H3,H4, H5, H8, H9,
and H10).
3.5.3.1 Initial Groupon Promotion Decision
The EPSA results for each variable are presented in Table 11.
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Table 11. Proportion of Restaurants in Matched Pairs Running an Initial Groupon Promotion in Control
and Treatment Groups
Control
group

Treatment
group

Number of
matched pairs

Hypotheses

Average Yelp Rating

0.082

0.098**

1947

H1 supported

Number of Yelp Reviews

0.075

0.117***

1345

H2 supported

Number of Competitors Nearby

0.132***

0.054

869

H6a supported

Proportion of Competitors Nearby
Using Groupon

0.137***

0.108

1332

H7a supported

Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon signed rank test: <0.1 = *; <0.05 = **; <0.01= ***

To continue our running example, consider the bolded second row in Table 11. The
EPSA results in a comparison across 1345 matched pairs, each pair containing an observation
from the control group (low number of Yelp reviews) and from the treatment group (high
number of yelp reviews). 11.7% of the treatment group restaurants in the matched pairs decided
to conduct an initial Groupon promotion, whereas 7.5% of the control group restaurants in the
matched pairs decided to do so. Based on the Wilcoxson signed rank test, this difference is
significant at the .01 level (***). As noted below, this result supports H2. We now summarize
results for each of the hypotheses related to whether to do an initial Groupon promotion.
H1 proposed that a higher average Yelp rating for a restaurant increases its likelihood to
choose an initial promotion, whereas H1a proposed the alternative. Across the 1947 matched
pairs, 9.8 % of the restaurants in the high Yelp rating treatment group pursue an initial Groupon
promotion, while 8.2% of the restaurants in the low Yelp rating decide to conduct an initial
Groupon promotion. The difference is significant at the .05 level and supports H1 and not H1a.
H2 proposed that more reviews for a restaurant increase its likelihood to choose an initial
promotion, whereas H2a proposed the alternative. As explained above as part of our running
example, the 11.7% versus 7.5% difference is significant ta the .01 level and supports H2.
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H6 proposed that a higher level of local competition around a restaurant increases its
likelihood to choose an initial promotion, whereas H6a proposed the alternative. The EPSA
yielded 869 matched pairs. In this case, the restaurants in the low local competition settings
were actually the ones more likely to conduct an initial Groupon promotion (13.2% versus 5.4%)
and the difference was significant at the .01 level. This result supports H6a and not H6.
H7 proposed that a higher use of Groupon by a restaurant's local competition increases its
likelihood to choose an initial promotion, whereas H7a proposed the alternative. In this case,
EPSA identified 1332 matched pairs, with 13.7% of the restaurants facing low (actually 0) use of
Groupon by local competitors deciding to do an initial Groupon promotion while 10.8% of those
restaurants facing some Groupon use by local competitors decided to do an initial Groupon
promotion. The difference is significant at the .01 level and supports H7a rather than H7.
3.5.3.2 Second Groupon Promotion Decision
Table 12 presents the EPSA results relating to hypotheses on restaurant decisions on
whether or not to do a second or follow-up Groupon promotion. Since the results relate only to
restaurants that did an initial promotion, the number of identified matched pairs is much smaller
than the corresponding numbers in Table 11.
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Table 12. Proportion of Restaurants in Matched Pairs Running a Second Groupon Promotion in Control
and Treatment Group
Control
group

Treatment
group

Number of
matched pairs

Hypotheses

Average Yelp Rating

0.377*

0.321

53

H3a supported

Number of Yelp Reviews

0.408

0.461**

76

H5 supported

Number of Competitors Nearby

0.317

0.317

41

Neither H8 nor H8a
supported

0.436***

0.390

172

H9a supported

0.253

0.434***

99

H10 supported

0.361

0.421***

133

H4 supported

Proportion of Competitors Nearby
Using Groupon
Coupon Revenue from the First
Promotion
Change in Average Yelp Rating

Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon signed rank test: <0.1 = *; <0.05 = **; <0.01= ***

Continuing our running example, we see in the second row of Table 12 that restaurants in
the low number of Yelp review category are less likely (40.8% v. 46.1%) than their matched
counterpart in the high number of Yelp reviews group do a follow-up Groupon promotion
(remember that all the restaurants included here have done an initial promotion). The EPSA
results are based on 76 matched pairs. We now summarize the results related to each of the
hypotheses on the decision of whether or not to do a second Groupon promotion.
H3 proposed that restaurants with a higher rating are more likely to return for a second
Groupon promotion; H3a proposed the alternative. 37.7% of restaurants in the lower Yelp rating
group decided to pursue a follow-up Groupon promotion compared to 32.1% of the restaurants in
the high Yelp rating group, a difference that is significant at the .1 level. EPSA supports H3a.
H4 proposed that an increase in average ratings for a restaurant after its first Groupon
promotion increases the likelihood of it returning; there is no alternative hypothesis. Considering
the results in the last row of Table 12, we see that restaurants in the high positive change in Yelp
ratings return at a rate of 42.1% while those in the low category of this variable return at the
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36.1% rate. The difference, based on 133 matched pairs, is significant at the .01 level and
supports H4.
H5 proposed that more reviews for a restaurant lead to a greater likelihood that restaurant
will return; H5a proposed the alternative. Using the results in the second row of Table 12, we
see that 46.1% of the restaurants in the high number of reviews group return compared to 40.9%
of their matched pair counterparts in the low number of reviews group. The difference is
significant at the .05 level and supports H5.
H8 proposed that a higher level of local competition makes a restaurant's return more
likely; H8a proposed the alternative. Based on the results in the third row of Table 12, the EPSA
analysis indicates no significant impact on return decisions from the level of local competition.
Thus, the results support neither H8 nor H8a.
H9 proposed that more use of Groupon by local competition would lead a restaurant to be
more likely to return; H9a proposed the alternative. The results in Table 12, row 4, indicate that
restaurants in the group with no local competitors using a Groupon promotion are actually more
likely (43.6% vs. 39.0 %) to return for a second promotion than restaurants facing positive
number of local competitors that have run a Groupon promotion. The EPSA results, based on
comparing 172 matched pairs, are significant at the .01 level and support H9a.
H10 proposed that greater revenue for a restaurant from the first promotion increases its
return likelihood. As suggested earlier, while H10 might be expected, it is important to complete
the analysis. In fact, based on 99 matched pairs, restaurants that experience high coupon revenue
during their first promotions are more likely to return (43.4% vs. 25.3%) than their matched pair
restaurants that experience low coupon revenue in their first Groupon promotion. The results,
significant at the .01 level, support H10.
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In the next section we expand on our examination of the impact of Coupon Revenue from
the First Promotion on the decision regarding whether to pursue a second Groupon promotion.
This examination is brief and examines the strength of the initial promotion result versus various
possible interaction effects.
3.5.3.3 The Interaction Effects
As detailed above, both Coupon Revenue from the First Promotion and Change in
Average Yelp Rating affect a restaurant’s decision whether to return. But the two factors are
different in nature. Coupon Revenue from the First Promotion is received relatively
immediately, whereas Change in Average Yelp Rating will typically take more time to be
received by restaurants. Although both factors have a positive influence on the second Groupon
promotion decision, it is unclear how the two factors will interact.
We divided the 99 matched pairs for Coupon Revenue from the First Promotion (see
Table 12) into two groups, one group with positive Change in Average Yelp Rating and one with
negative Change in Average Yelp Rating. We performed comparison tests and summarized the
results in Table 13 below. As expected, when Change in Average Yelp Rating is positive,
restaurants with high Coupon Revenue from the First Promotion are more likely to return (45.7%
vs. 31.4%). Interestingly, even when Change in Average Yelp Rating is negative, that is, online
reputation is damaged, restaurants with high Coupon Revenue from the First Promotion are still
more likely to return (40.3% vs. 19.4%). These results suggest that Coupon Revenue from the
First Promotion impacts the return decision more than does Change in Average Yelp Rating.

59
Table 13. Proportion of Return Restaurants of two types of Change in Average Yelp Rating within
Matched Pairs of Analysis of Coupon Revenue from the First Promotion
Low Coupon Revenue High Coupon Revenue
Number of
(Control)
(Treatment)
matched pairs
Restaurants with increased Average Yelp Rating
Proportion of Return
Restaurants

0.314

0.457**

35

Restaurants with decreased Average Yelp Rating
Proportion of Return
Restaurants

0.194

0.403***
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Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon signed rank test: <0.1 = *; <0.05 = **; <0.01= ***

As shown in Table 12, there were 133 matches in our analysis of Change in Average Yelp
Rating. We divided these 133 pairs into two groups, one with high Coupon Revenue from the
First Promotion and the other with low Coupon Revenue from the First Promotion. We
summarized the comparison results in Table 14. We see that increased Average Yelp Rating
positively affects a restaurant’s decision when Coupon Revenue from the First Promotion is
relatively high and not when it is relatively low.
Table 14. Proportion of Return Restaurants of two types of Coupon Revenue from the First Promotion
within Matched Pairs of Analysis of Change in Average Yelp Rating
Decreased Average
Increased Average Yelp
Number of
Yelp Rating (Control)
Rating (Treatment)
matched pairs
Restaurants with high Coupon Revenue
Proportion of Return
Restaurants

0.379

0.545***

66

Restaurants with low Coupon Revenue
Proportion of Return
Restaurants

0.343

0.299
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Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon signed rank test: <0.1 = *; <0.05 = **; <0.01= ***

Overall, we find that Coupon Revenue from the First Promotion dominates Change in
Average Yelp Rating. Change in Average Yelp Rating has an impact on the return decisions only
when the revenue from the first promotion is high, whereas the Coupon Revenue from the First
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Promotion positively impacts the return decisions regardless Change in Average Yelp Rating
from the first promotion.

3.5.4 Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Checks
3.5.4.1 Sensitivity Analysis
The EPSA method has its own limitations. The stringent assumption is that the
differences between the treatment group and the control group can be fully captured by
observable variables (the strong ignorability assumption, Rosenbaum 1999). Thus, conclusions
may be sensitive to unobserved factors. Therefore, we conducted sensitivity analysis.
Following Mithas and Krishnan (2009), we define Γ to indicate “the log odds of
differential assignment to treatment because of unobserved factors”. If there are no hidden
factors, Γ is equal to 1. If the potential hidden factors are underestimated, Γ is larger than 1. A
larger Γ means a larger influence of potential unobservable factors on the assignment to the
treatment group and the control group. If our conclusions hold when Γ is larger, we are more
confident in our results. We computed the value of Γ at which test results of the hypotheses start
to be insignificant (Appendix B.1). For almost all factors, there is significance at levels with
relatively large values of Γ. These results suggest that, the calculated importance of each factor
does not appear to be an artifact of missing variables.
3.5.4.2 Different Radii
Our local competition variables are operationalized using a half mile radius. The results
may be sensitive to this definition, although a half mile is a reasonable measure for the restaurant
industry. We also operationalized local competition variables using a quarter of a mile and one
mile as the radii and ran the analysis for each (Appendix B.2). Results are generally not
sensitive to the size of this radius, consistent with previous literature (Reinitz 1968).
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3.5.4.3 Different Split Methods
Currently we divided our data into treatment group and control group by assigning the
top 1/3 quantile of data to the treatment group and the bottom 1/3 to the control group. The
results may be sensitive to this particular data split method. Thus, we reran our analysis using a
20% quantile split (bottom 20% versus top 20%) and a 40% quantile split (bottom 40% versus
top 40%). Results show that our main conclusions still hold (Appendix B.3).
3.5.4.4 Different Interval of Days
In our analysis, we used 180 days to operationalize the Proportion of Competitors Nearby
using Groupon for the initial Groupon promotion decision. To test whether this specification
influences our results, we also used 150 days and 210 days. Results show that our main
conclusions still hold (Table B.4.1 and Table B.4.2 in Appendix B.4).
In Table 9, we used 450 days to define Groupon Return Restaurants. To test whether this
specification influences our results, we also used 420 days and 480 days. We find consistent
results (Table B.4.3 and Table B.4.4 in Appendix B.4).
3.5.4.5 Areas with Tourist Attractions
The Chicago area is a large metropolitan area with significant tourist attractions in some
areas. Tourist attractions in these areas may attract consumers from outside of the zip code. To
examine whether tourist areas influence our results, we redid our analysis excluding restaurants
from the key zip codes with tourist attractions (covering Navy Pier, Rush Street, Old Town, Gold
Coast, and Uptown). The results show that out main conclusions still hold (Appendix B.5).
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3.6 Summary and Conclusions
3.6.1 Theoretical Implications from Empirical Results
Our results make interesting theoretical implications with respect to how e-WOM and
local competition affect both initial and return Groupon promotion decisions. Previous literature
(e.g., Liu 2006) has suggested that there are two factors related to the influence of e-WOM: the
valence (positivity or negativity) and the volume or amount of e-WOM. In our work, we
operationalize volume as the number of reviews of a restaurant and valence as the average
numeric rating of the reviews for that restaurant. With respect to the number of reviews, we find
consistency across the two types of decision, that is, the greater the number of reviews for a
restaurant, the more likely that restaurant was to engage in an initial and a subsequent promotion.
These results suggest that decisions about Groupon promotions are contrary to many other
promotion decisions; the more people who are interested in the product or service, the less
necessary ordinary promotions are. The difference here probably revolves around the fact that
Groupon promotions are not free to the consumer and thus result in a new and relatively
immediate stream of revenue.
With respect to ratings, we find somewhat contrary results. That restaurants with higher
ratings were more likely to decide to run initial Groupon promotions which suggests that the
decision-makers or managers of these restaurants were both attracted to the revenues and
confident that their good ratings would continue. But the fact that this positive impact of high
ratings did not carry over for the return to a second Groupon promotion, suggests that managers
of higher rated restaurants became aware of possibly negative issues associated with a significant
increase in customers and thus were less likely to decide to run another Groupon promotion. To
summarize, e-WOM did clearly impact both initial and return decisions, but quite differently.
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We considered two local competition factors: 1) competitive density of restaurants in the
area, and 2) proportion of restaurants in the area that had engaged in a Groupon promotion. That
fewer restaurants in high competitive density areas ran Groupon promotions than in low
competitive density areas indicated that Groupon promotions were initially seen by restaurant
owners as a mechanism to draw customers when there were few competitive restaurants
competing for those customers. Interestingly, competitive density was not seen as a significant
issue in return decisions, suggesting that return decisions were more a function of the restaurant's
results from the initial promotion, revenue generated and ratings changes than of the
environment the restaurant inhabits. That restaurants are more likely to run a Groupon
promotion when competitors have not, is evidence that Groupon promotions seem to be viewed
by restaurant managers as a way for owners to create a competitive advantage by drawing in
consumers, not simply acting as a response to competitors' running Groupon promotions. To
summarize, we see that a lack of competitive density and a lack of competitors using Groupon
promotions both tend to increase the likelihood that a restaurant will decide to use a Groupon
promotion initially, but that it is performance that drives return decisions.

3.6.2 Methodological Contributions
Recall that all of our results are based on comparisons across matched pairs of restaurants
in which the paired restaurants are determined to be statistically equivalent except for the
indicated treatment variable. Our EPSA paired comparison analysis is based on PSA, but
involves two extensions of the standard PSA approach. The first modification is that we do our
propensity score matching by developing separate groupings, treatment and control variable
combinations, individually for each of the set of independent variables we want to test. This
allows us to test the causal relationship for each independent variable separately, rather than
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building an analysis of multiple variables that might mask each other's true impacts. The second
modification is relatively straightforward and relates to our focus of independent causal variables
that are continuous. We create treatment versus control groups by dividing observations of a
specific variable under analysis in almost all cases by means of quantiles (the bottom third of the
independent variable is assigned to the control group and the top third of the same variable to the
treatment group). In the case of Yelp ratings we used differing score levels that lead to
separation between control and treatment groups (change in Yelp ratings below -0.25 were
assigned to the control group and above 0.25 to the treatment group).
We note that the choice of our second modification is not cost free since it results in the
loss of potential pairs from our analysis. This occurs because we seek to pair one restaurant from
the lowest 1/3 of values on an independent variable with a restaurant from the group having the
highest 1/3 of values on that variable. This requires that we ignore those restaurants having the
middle third of values on variable. We thought it important to have the paired restaurants very
different on the variable under analysis while being very close to the same on all other variables.

3.6.3 Managerial Contributions
Our results provide useful managerial implications for Groupon, suggesting opportunities
to increase both the initial trial rate and the relatively low (approximately 38.1% in our data set)
return rate for Groupon promotions. Our results suggest that Groupon may be better able to
entice highly rated and heavily reviewed restaurants located in less competitive locations to try a
Groupon promotion. This suggests a possible redeployment of their sales force and to emphasize
on more likely customers. Perhaps more importantly, to entice more restaurants to return,
Groupon needs to ensure that the first promotion works for its customers. The evidence is quite
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clear that initial deal revenue has the greatest effect on the decision to return, followed by the
effect on the restaurant's ratings.

3.6.4 Limitations
Our empirical test uses EPSA, a quasi-experimental method that allows for analysis of
causation among the paired observations. However, there are costs to using this technique.
First, using EPSA can result in small numbers of paired observations with which to carry out the
causal tests, which, in turn, can lead to the inability to test some relationships or to false negative
tests due to inflated standard errors. Second, EPSA runs the omitted variables risk, that other
variables that are important to creating the matched groups are not included in the analysis, a risk
that can be examined but not totally resolved by means of the sensitivity test that we employ in
our robustness check. Finally, the technique entails acceptance of the risk that unpaired
observations are inherently different from paired observations. All of these concerns suggest
that, while our results are theoretically interesting, statistically significant, and empirically
verified, further research using a different empirical method should be encouraged.
Any sampling decision involves trade-offs. Our need to create a data set that
incorporated the full population of ratings data from Yelp, an online ratings service, location data
from geographical information in Yelp, and promotion data from the Groupon website
necessitated limiting our data set, such that it is comprised of one category, restaurants, and one
Groupon city website, Chicago. Obviously, this may limit the generalizability of our results to
some degree. This suggests the same call for different empirical analyses with broader category
and location coverage.
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3.6.5 Conclusions
We use extended propensity score analysis (EPSA) to provide a causal analysis of the
effects of e-WOM and local competition on restaurant's decisions whether or not to engage in an
initial Groupon promotion and whether or not to return for additional Groupon promotions. In
terms of e-WOM, we find that restaurants with higher ratings on the reviews they receive are
more likely to engage in initial promotions but less likely to return for additional promotions. We
also find that restaurants with more reviews are more likely both to engage in initial promotions
and to return for additional promotions. In terms of local competition, we find that the greater
the local competition, the less likely restaurants are to engage in initial promotions, but that this
variable does not affect additional promotions. In addition, we find that restaurants are more
likely to engage in initial Groupon promotions, and additional Groupon promotions if their
competitors are not engaged in Groupon promotions. These results have important implications
for understanding the effects of e-WOM and local competition on online promotion decision
making.
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Chapter 4

The Impact of Daily Deal Promotions on Retailers’

Online Reputation
Online daily deals are becoming a popular promotion tool for local retailers. Despite a
decreasing trend in retailers’ Yelp ratings after Groupon promotions, we know little of factors
which may explain the negative impact of Groupon promotions on online ratings, or whether the
negative effect is the same for all types of retailers. In this study, we addressed these questions
utilizing a dataset combing promotion data from Groupon and online review data from Yelp for
restaurants in the Chicago area. We showed that Groupon promotions decreased consumers’
perceptions of food quality and service quality, which further caused a decline in Yelp ratings,
i.e. food quality and service quality mediate the negative main effect of promotions on online
ratings. Another interesting finding is that Groupon promotions had a negative impact on online
ratings only for higher rated restaurants, versus a positive impact for lower rated restaurants.
Our results provide important guidance for managers to make promotion decisions and to avoid
potential damage to their firm's online reputation.

4.1 Introduction
Marketing research has well documented the separate roles of promotion tools and eword-of-mouth (e-WOM) on customer demand. For example, coupon promotions are often used
by retailers to accelerate short-term sales (Ehrenberg et al. 1994; Taylor 2001). On the other
hand, e-word-of-mouth (e-WOM), such as online reviews, provides information about products
or services and has a positive effect on sales (Chevalier and Mayzlin 2006; Liu 2006).
Recognizing the effectiveness of promotions and e-WOM, retailers may rely on both strategies
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simultaneously to reach their consumers (Lu et al. 2013). However, there are few studies
investigating the interaction between promotions and e-WOM.
In recent years, online daily deal sites such as Groupon are a growing promotion tool for
local retailers, such as restaurants. Daily deal coupon users sometimes post their opinions of
their experiences online after their consumption, and these postings influence a retailer’s online
reputation after promotions. Byers et al. (2012a) showed a decreasing trend in retailers’ Yelp
ratings after they used Groupon promotions. However, the decline may not be caused by
Groupon promotions. Even without promotions, online ratings also decline naturally (Godes and
Silva 2012). Therefore, the first question addressed in this study is: What is the main causal
effect of daily deal promotions on retailers’ online ratings?
Although Byers et al. (2012b) showed the negative effect of promotions on online
ratings, we still know little of the factors which may have caused these direct effects of
promotions on online ratings. In this study we focus on consumers’ perceptions of quality,
because consumers’ perception of their consumption experience is the main factor reflected in
online reviews (Hu et al. 2009). A particular question addressed in this study is: Does consumer
perceptions of quality mediate the main effect of daily deal promotions on online ratings?
Further, Li and Hitt (2008) showed that a retailer's initial ratings moderate the trend of
future online ratings. That is, when initial ratings are relatively lower (higher), online ratings
will increase (decrease) over time. Hence, we also examined the potential moderating effect of
online ratings on the main effect of promotions on online ratings: Will the main effect be
different for retailers with different levels of initial ratings?
To answer these questions, we constructed a data set including: 1) 936 restaurants
(Groupon Restaurants) that ran one Groupon promotion and 6402 restaurants (Non-Groupon
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Restaurants) that did not run a Groupon promotion over a three-year period in the Chicago area;
and 2) online review data from Yelp for all restaurants. To investigate the main causal effect, we
applied a propensity score matching (PSM) method and obtained a matched set of Non-Groupon
Restaurants and Groupon Restaurants. We found that on average the Yelp ratings of Groupon
Restaurants declined statistically significantly more than did their matched Non-Groupon
Restaurants, i.e. we found a negative main effect.
We then sought to determine what caused the Groupon promotions to reduce consumers'
on-line ratings. To do this we employed text mining techniques to the contents of Yelp reviews
after promotions to isolate the two features most frequently mentioned by reviewers, their
perceptions of food quality and service quality, and measures of sentiment that corresponded to
the two measures of perceived quality. Through a formal test of the mediation and moderation
effect models, we obtained two interesting findings. First, both food quality and service quality
mediate the main effect of Groupon promotions on the Yelp ratings. Particularly, Groupon
promotions decreased perceived food quality and service quality, which led to a decline in Yelp
ratings. Second, regarding the moderation effect of pre-promotion ratings, Groupon promotions
had a negative effect on Yelp ratings for relatively higher rated restaurants, but a positive effect
on Yelp ratings for relatively lower rated restaurants. We also discuss important implications for
retailers in Section 4.7.
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses related
literature and how our work differs from previous studies. In Section 4.3 we introduce our
model. Section 4.4 includes the details of our data collection and variable definition. Section 4.5
presents our propensity score analysis and the results for the main effect. In Section 4.6 we

70

formally test mediators and moderators using text mining to identify the mediating variables.
Section 4.7 summarizes the conclusions from our study and contains related managerial insights.

4.2 Literature Review
This study aims to examine the main causal influence of promotions on online reviews,
and potential moderation and mediation effects on the main effect. In this section, we
summarize three areas of related research: 1) drivers and dynamics of online reviews. The
literature of this area provides us potential moderators and mediators in our research model; 2)
the impacts of promotions16 on e-WOM. Previous research has shown the influence of
promotions on the volume of e-WOM. Our work complements the stream of literature by
focusing on the valence of e-WOM (online ratings); and 3) online daily deals, which is a
growing area in research. Online daily deals are becoming a new promotion tool for local
retailers. Previous studies have shown us interesting trends, on which we build our model.
We also highlight the differences between our study and each stream of previous
research.

4.2.1 Drivers and Dynamics of Online Reviews
Previous studies on online reviews have explored the generation of online reviews by
consumers and the dynamics of online ratings over time.
First, many studies have shown that the generation of online reviews is driven by
consumers’ perception of the consumption. For example, consumers tend to write reviews only
when they are either extremely satisfied or extremely dissatisfied about the products or services

Promotions are traditionally defined as a marketing mix element comprising “a wide variety of tactical promotion
tools of a short-term incentive nature designed to stimulate earlier and/or stronger target market response” (Lilien et
al. 1992). Popular forms of sales promotions include coupons, price discounts, premiums, and free trials.
16

71

(Hu et al. 2009). Consumers are also more likely to post online reviews when satisfied than
when dissatisfied (Dellarocas and Wood 2008).
Second, environmental factors, such as previously posted opinions, can influence the
posting of online reviews. Wu and Huberman (2008) find that exposing potential reviewers to
previously posted opinions leads to the increasingly extreme reviews because individuals tend to
provide comments deviating from previous reviews. Moe and Schweidel (2012) further
identified two types of reviewers: 1) expert reviewers, who are more active, more negative and
more likely to differentiate from previous reviews; and, 2) non-expert reviewers, who are less
active, more positive and more likely to show a consensus with previous opinions.
Regarding the dynamics of online ratings, Li and Hitt (2008) utilized book reviews from
Amazon and showed that when the initial ratings are low, online ratings increase over time,
whereas when the initial ratings are high, online ratings decrease over time. Godes and Silva
(2012) established two processes to examine the dynamics of online ratings, one as the process
of the amount of time (temporal pattern) and another as a process of the sequence of reviews
(ordinal pattern). They showed an increasing temporal pattern of online ratings controlling for
calendar dates, but a decreasing online ratings over the sequence. Through a simulation on the
two types of reviewers (expert and non-expert), Moe and Schweidel (2012) argued an overall
decreasing trend of online ratings over time.
Promotions may influence consumers’ perception of consumption, which further impacts
the posting of online reviews. For example, consumers with coupons tend to infer low product
quality (Yoo et al. 2000). And the new consumers brought by promotions may also have
different opinions from previous reviews, and therefore leave a higher (lower) rating if previous
ratings are lower (higher). However, there are few research studies on the influence of
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promotions on the dynamics of online reputation. In this study, we fill that gap by utilizing
Groupon promotion data and Yelp review data of restaurants in the Chicago area.

4.2.2 Impacts of Promotions on e-WOM
Marketing studies have well documented the value of promotions and e-WOM
separately. Retailers may apply promotions and e-WOM marketing simultaneously to increase
sales (Lu et al. 2013). However, it is important to understand the impact of promotions on eWOM, because the changed online reputation may impact retailers’ sales or revenue in the
future.
Current studies have shown that promotions can trigger the generation of WOM. Berger
and Schwartz (2011) examined the psychological factors influencing immediate and ongoing
WOM. They showed that promotional giveaways were associated with increased overall WOM.
Godinho de Matos et al. (2015) found that price discounts increased the volume of e-WOM,
which further boosted sales. From the perspective of the valence (positive or negative) of eWOM, Feinberg et al. (2002) showed that selective targeted promotions will increase perception
of unfairness for consumers without promotions, which generates negative e-WOM. However,
this research focuses on a selective targeted promotion context, rather than a general coupon
promotion situation as examined in our study.
Our study has three key differences from previous literature on e-WOM. First, our work
focuses on the causal effect of promotions on the valence of e-WOM (indicated by online
ratings) by utilizing empirical promotion data in the online daily deal context. Second, we
further examined the moderation role of previous online ratings (before promotions) on the
causal effect of promotions on online ratings. Third, we measured consumer perception of
consumption implicitly by mining textual reviews and extracted perceived quality (food quality
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and service quality) most frequently mentioned by reviewers. The perceived quality serves as a
mediator between daily deal promotions and the change in online ratings.

4.2.3 Online Daily Deals
Online daily deals have drawn much attention in media and practice in recent years, but
the area remains relatively new in academics (Smith Brain Trust 2015). Recent studies focused
on the effect and/or profitability of daily deal promotions and reached inconsistent conclusions.
Some studies argued that online daily deal promotions have a negative impact on retailers.
Based on an analytical model, Kumar and Rajan (2012) concluded that the daily deal promotion
is not ideally suited to acquire customers and generate profits for retailers. Utilizing empirical
data, Byers et al. (2012a) showed that restaurant’s Yelp ratings have a declining trend overall
after Groupon promotions.
Other studies suggested that online daily deals are profitable for niche markets. Edelman
et al. (2011) argued that the online daily deal promotion is more suitable for unknown firms and
firms with low marginal costs. Based on a survey of restaurants having run daily deal
promotions, Dholakia (2012) contended that daily deal promotions mostly benefit newer and
relatively smaller businesses.
Current studies have rarely examined the daily deal promotions on retailers’ online
reputation. A study closest to our work is from Byers et al. (2012b), which also utilized Groupon
promotion data and Yelp review data, and investigated the fact that Yelp ratings decreased on
average after Groupon promotions from various aspects. We extend their study in two ways.
First, we posit that previous ratings (prior to the Groupon promotions) are a moderator of the
main effect of promotions on online ratings. Second, we suggest that consumer perceived
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quality is a mediator, which may provide deeper understanding of the impact of promotions on
online ratings.

4.3 Research Model
Figures 6 – 9 outline the models analyzed in this presentation. Figure 6 provides the
basic main effect model. Using familiar marketing terms, Figure 7 provides the mediation effect
model. In this model, the perceived quality of the restaurant during the promotion is expected to
serve as a mediator of the impact of a Groupon promotion on online ratings. Figure 8 adds a
separate moderation effect to the model in Figure 7. Existing ratings before a Groupon
promotion are expected to moderate the direct impacts of the Groupon promotion on online
ratings. Finally, the model in Figure 9 includes an additional moderating effect such that the prepromotion ratings serve as a moderator to impact the mediation effect of perceived quality on the
Groupon promotion effect on online ratings.
In the next four subsections, we detail and explain each of the four models.

Figure 6. Main Effect Model

Figure 7. Mediation Effect Model
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Figure 8. Separated Mediation Effect and Moderation Effect Model

Figure 9. Moderated Mediation Effect Model

4.3.1 Main Effect
Byers et al. (2012a, 2012b) showed a declining trend of Yelp ratings on average after
Groupon promotions. We start our analysis with the same basic question: What is the main
effect of Groupon promotions on retailers’ online ratings?
We expect a negative impact based on the studies by Byers et al (2012a, 2012b). As
described in the next sections our work analyzes more complex relationships than those studied
by Byers et al.
In the next section, we consider whether or not there is a mediation effect of perceived
quality between the promotion and the evaluation.
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4.3.2 Mediation Effect
As discussed in Section 4.2.1, the generation of online reviews is driven by consumers’
post-purchase perception. If the perceived quality of products or services is high (or low),
consumers tend to leave positive (or negative) reviews (Hu et al. 2008). Promotions may impact
the online ratings through influencing such perceived quality. For example, consumers with
coupons have been shown to infer low product quality (Yoo et al. 2000).
Groupon promotions may also change the environment in which consumers consume the
products or services, which leads to a different perceived quality. For example, Groupon
promotions may bring a larger volume of consumers to a restaurant in a short period of time
(Kumar and Rajan 2012), and the crowded dinning environment may lower consumer perceived
quality and lead to a lower rating. Using a survey based analysis, Dholakia (2010) found that
Groupon promotions also influence employees’ satisfaction Unsatisfied (satisfied) employees
may probably provide a bad (good) service, which will decrease (increase) consumers’ perceived
service quality and therefore leads to negative (positive) reviews.
Hence, we posit that consumer perceived quality mediates17 the main effect of Groupon
promotions on the change in online ratings (Figure 7). Assuming the overall negative impact of
Groupon promotions on online ratings, we expect Groupon to promotions have a negative
influence on consumer perceived quality, which, in turn, causes the decreased online ratings. As
shown in Section 4.6, we included two potential mediators in this study: food quality and service
quality, because these two features are the most frequently mentioned by reviewers.

17

A mediator (perceived quality in this study) is defined as a third variable that accounts for the relation between an
independent variable (Groupon promotions) and a dependent variable (online ratings) (Baron and Kenny 1986).
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4.3.3 Moderation Effect
Li and Hitt (2008) has shown that the change in online ratings over time without
promotion varies according to the initial ratings. They argued that when initial ratings are high,
online ratings will decrease over time, whereas when initial ratings are low, online ratings will
increase over time. Some studies (Li and Hitt 2008; Godes and Silva 2012) based on selfselection theories examined the phenomenon from the aspect of the timing of the purchase and
reviews. Consumers who are more likely to appreciate the products or services will come early
and leave high initial ratings (Li and Hitt 2008). Godes and Silva (2012) indicated that the high
initial ratings may lead to purchase errors for later consumers who are less likely to appreciate
the products or services and therefore leave low ratings, which in turn leads to a declining trend
in online ratings. On the other hand, Sun (2012) shows how low initial ratings can help later
consumers to identify their niche market under a certain condition. Hence, later consumers with
matched retailers with their preferences are more likely to leave high ratings, which leads to the
increasing trend of online ratings.
Coupon promotions are a traditional marketing tool to attract new consumers for retailers
(Chapman 1986; Varadarajan 1984). Dholakia (2012) claimed that, in the context of online daily
deals, 80% of coupon users are new consumers. We posit that online ratings prior to Groupon
promotions will directly moderate18 the main effect of promotions on the change in online ratings
(Figure 8). Based on the self-selection theories discussed above, we further expect that Groupon
promotions will magnify the natural trend of online ratings due to the increased number of new

18

A moderator (pre-promotion ratings in this study) is defined as a variable that affects the direction and/or strength
of the relation between an independent variable (Groupon promotions) and a dependent variable (online ratings)
(Baron and Kenny 1986).

78

consumers. That is, when the pre-promotion ratings are high (low), online ratings after
promotion will decrease (increase) more than the case of no Groupon promotion.

4.3.4 Moderated Mediation Effect
As discussed in Section 4.2.1, Wu and Huberman (2008) and Moe and Schweidel (2012)
argued that the generation of online reviews is also influenced by previous reviews, because later
reviewers tend to differentiate their opinion from early reviews. We argue that if pre-promotion
ratings are high, new consumers brought by promotions are more likely to perceive a relatively
lower quality conditional on previous high ratings and hence leave lower ratings to differentiate
themselves. In contrast, if pre-promotion ratings are low, new consumers are more likely to
perceive a relatively higher quality than previous reviewers and leave higher ratings. On the
other hand, exposed to higher (lower) pre-promotion ratings, new consumers are likely to have
higher (lower) expectations. The higher (lower) reference points may lead to lower (higher)
perceived quality, which further decrease (increase) the online ratings.
Therefore, we conjecture that there exists a moderated mediation effect (Figure 9). We
expect to see that Groupon promotions increase (decrease) the perceived quality when prepromotion ratings are low (high), which further increase (decrease) online ratings.
In the next section, we provide the details of the data collection.

4.4 Data Collection
To investigate the research models illustrated in Figures 6 – 9, we operationalized the
required variables and constructed the appropriate data set. We gathered the data from Groupon
through our own automated process, from Yelp’s online reviews, and from the 2010 U.S.
Census’ detailed demographic information.
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4.4.1 Groupon Promotion Data
Groupon, the current leader of the daily deal industry, started to provide daily deal
couponing services for local retailers in Chicago in November 2008. Groupon expanded in the
next few years to 175+ geographic markets (Byers et al. 2012a). Groupon deals are from a
variety of retailers, including restaurants, beauty salons, and amusement parks (Gupta et al.
2012). In this study, we chose to focus on restaurants for two reasons. First, restaurant deals are
one of the largest categories provided by Groupon (Gupta et al. 2012). Second, as discussed in
the next subsection, Yelp ratings are also readily available for restaurants. Through Groupon’s
website (Bai et al., 2015b) we were able to collect the necessary data on all restaurants in the
Chicago area that had run at least one Groupon promotion from January 7, 2008 to February 29,
2012. From this set, we identified 943 restaurants which had run one and only one Groupon
promotion over the period January 7, 2008 through one year and one month after our last data
collection from Groupon on February 29, 2012 (March 31, 2013). We used these one-time
Groupon promotion restaurants (hereafter, Groupon Restaurants) for our analysis so that the
impact of an initial Groupon promotion on online ratings will not be conflated with that of a
second promotion.
Through Groupon’s public API, we obtained information on each deal, including coupon
price, discount rate, and quantity of coupons sold by the end of the deal offer. We also captured
the start date when a coupon buyer could first redeem the coupon and the coupon duration.

4.4.2 Yelp Review Data
Yelp.com is a website for consumers to post their reviews for restaurants and other
businesses19. Yelp provides both online ratings and restaurant-related information including four

19

http://www.yelp.com/about
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price level categories which indicate approximate cost level per person per meal. First, we used
Yelp to identify all the restaurants in the Chicago area. For each restaurant we collected all of its
individual reviews and each review’s corresponding numeric rating (1-5 points), review texts,
and review dates. Second, we matched the restaurants we collected from Groupon to those from
Yelp by their names, physical addresses and/or phone numbers. This provided us with two
restaurant sets: 1) Groupon Restaurants, and, 2) non-Groupon restaurants (see detailed
definitions in Table 15). Information on each restaurant in each set included the necessary Yelp
rating and Yelp data relate to the restaurant.
Yelp also provides one of the four price level categories for each restaurant (e.g. $, $$,
$$$, $$$$). Finally, with the latitude and longitude details for each restaurant provided by Yelp,
we could identify the number of local competing restaurants, the local competitive landscape if
you will, within a specified distance of any restaurant in our set.

4.4.3 Census Data
As one would expect, the collection of data from the 2010 U.S. Census was
straightforward and included average household income, average age, and population density
data by zip code.

4.4.4 Variable Definition
To measure the change in Yelp ratings, the dependent variable in this study, we
constructed a series of variables as follows.
Having numeric ratings and the corresponding review dates, we were able to construct
Average Yelp Rating at any time point 𝑡, which is equal to the average of all Yelp numeric
ratings prior to a particular date 𝑡. For each Groupon Restaurant, we first calculated Average
Pre-promotion Yelp Rating using the date immediately prior to the start date of the promotion.
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We then calculated Average After-promotion Yelp Rating using the end date of the promotion.
Therefore, we constructed the Change in Yelp Ratings using the following formula:
Change in Yelp Ratings = Average After-Promotion Yelp Rating - Average PrePromotion Yelp Rating.
Please note that Non-Groupon Restaurants did not have a start date of the promotion. In
this study, we conducted propensity score matching (PSM) analysis, which enabled us to find a
Non-Groupon Restaurant having similar characteristics of a Groupon Restaurant as a matched
pair. For each matched Non-Groupon Restaurant, we calculated the Change in Yelp Rating
using the same period as the paired Groupon Restaurant. Please find details on the matching
process in Section 4.5.
We also constructed Number of Yelp Reviews, Number of Pre-promotion Yelp Reviews,
Number of Competitors Nearby and other variables. Table 15 below summarizes the definitions
and data sources for variables used in this research.
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Table 15. Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Variables

Average Pre-promotion
Yelp Rating

Definitions
Restaurants that ran one and only one Groupon promotion
prior to the end of data collection, i.e. March 31, 2013.
Restaurants that had not run Groupon promotions prior to the
end of data collection, i.e. March 31, 2013.
The average of all Yelp numeric ratings prior to a particular
date t.
The average of all Yelp numeric ratings immediately prior to
the start date of the promotion.

Average Afterpromotion Yelp Rating

The average of all Yelp numeric ratings prior to the end date
of the promotion a.

Identified by combining
Yelp and Groupon data
Constructed using Yelp
data
Constructed using Yelp
data
Constructed using Yelp
data

Change in Yelp Rating

Equal to Average After-promotion Yelp Rating minus
Average Pre-promotion Yelp Rating.

Constructed using Yelp
data

Number of Yelp
Reviews

The number of all Yelp reviews prior to a particular date t.

Constructed using Yelp
data

Number of Prepromotion Yelp reviews

The number of all Yelp reviews prior to the start date when
coupon buyers can redeem the coupons.

Constructed using Yelp
data

Number of Yelp Dollar
Signs

Yelp measure indicating approximate cost per person per
meal for a restaurant. There are 4 levels: 1 – less than $10,
labeled ‘cheap’; 2 – $11-$30, labeled ‘moderate’; 3 – $31$60, labeled ‘spendy’; 4 – more than $61, labeled ‘splurge’.
The number of competitors (other restaurants) within half
mile from a particular restaurant.
Average yearly household income (thousand dollars) in the
zip code where a restaurant is located.
Average age of people living in the zip code where a
restaurant is located.
Average number of people in a household in the zip code
where a restaurant is located.
Number of people (thousand) per square mile in the zip code
where a restaurant is located.

Groupon Restaurants
Non-Groupon
Restaurants
Average Yelp Rating

Number of Competitors
Nearby
Average Household
Income by Zip Code
Average Age by Zip
Code
Average Household
Size by Zip Code
Population Density by
Zip Code

Data Sources
Groupon

Yelp data
Constructed using Yelp
data
2010 U.S. Census Data
2010 U.S. Census Data
2010 U.S. Census Data
2010 U.S. Census Data

Note: a — we chose 210 days after the start date of the promotion as the end date of the promotion for all
restaurants, because we wanted to use the same interval of days for all restaurants and a significant majority of
coupon durations (86.6%) are 210 days or less.
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4.5 Preliminary Analysis
4.5.1 Summary of Data
After data collection, we obtained 936 Groupon Restaurants and 6402 Non-Groupon
Restaurants (as shown in Table 16). We see that the Average Yelp Rating under Groupon
promotions declined by 0.08, i.e. the average of the Change in Yelp Ratings is -0.08. To
examine the general trend of Average Yelp Rating without promotions, we chose June 1, 2011 as
the hypothetical start date for Non-Groupon Restaurants to calculate the Average Yelp Rating at
the starting point, because it is the median date of the Groupon restaurants’ start dates. We then
calculated the Average Yelp Rating using the date of 210 days after June 1, 2011 as the
hypothetical end date. We find that Average Yelp Rating declined 0.02 on average without
Groupon promotions, i.e. the average of the Change in Yelp Ratings is -0.02. The comparison
test showed that the decline of Average Yelp Rating for Groupon Restaurants is statistically
significantly larger than the decline for Non-Groupon Restaurants. However, we cannot
necessarily conclude that Groupon promotions have a negative impact on online ratings, because
there exist statistically significant differences between the two groups of restaurants in other
variables. Therefore, to conclude the causal relationship between Groupon promotions and the
change in Yelp ratings, we need to control the differences between Groupon Restaurants and
Non-Groupon Restaurants in other variables.
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Table 16. Comparisons between Groupon Restaurants and Non-Groupon Restaurants before Matching

Variables

Change in Yelp Ratings
Average Pre-promotion Yelp
Rating a
Number Pre-promotion of Yelp
Reviews a
Number of Yelp Dollar Signs
Number of Competitors Nearby
Average Household Income
Average Age
Average Household Size
Population Density

Number of
restaurants
mean
(Std. Dev.)
mean
(Std. Dev.)
mean
(Std. Dev.)
mean
(Std. Dev.)
mean
(Std. Dev.)
mean
(Std. Dev.)
mean
(Std. Dev.)
mean
(Std. Dev.)
mean
(Std. Dev.)

Groupon
Restaurants

Non-Groupon
Restaurants

936

6402

-0.08
(0.33)
3.61**
(0.59)
56.41***
(74.49)
1.90***
(0.57)
88.75
(142.42)
77.08***
(21.08)
37.16***
(4.57)
2.39
(0.48)
6.06
(6.54)

-0.02***
(0.28)
3.51
(0.78)
39.37
(84.80)
1.52
(0.63)
97.33**
(157.14)
69.82
(21.58)
36.62
(4.56)
2.42
(0.52)
6.46***
(6.25)

Note: a — we calculated Average Pre-promotion Yelp Rating and Number Pre-promotion of Yelp Reviews for
Non-Groupon Restaurants using June 1, 2011 as the hypothetical start date.
*’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon tests of larger means Groupon vs. non-Groupon restaurants, and <0.1
*; <0.05 **; <0.01***

4.5.2 Propensity Score Matching Process
To examine the causal impact of Groupon promotions on Yelp ratings, we applied a
propensity score matching (PSM) method, a quasi-experimental method (Rosenbaum 2002).
Through the PSM method, we obtained matched pairs of Groupon Restaurants (the treatment
group) and Non-Groupon Restaurants (the control group) with similar control variables, i.e. the
only significant difference between the two groups is that one has run Groupon promotions,
whereas the other one has not. Then for each matched pair, we calculated the Change in Yelp
Rating for the Non-Groupon Restaurant using the same start date of the promotion as the
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Groupon Restaurant. The comparison of the Change in Yelp Rating over exactly the same
period of time for each matched pair allowed us to conclude the causal relationship between
Groupon promotions and online ratings.
However, please note that, before matching, we constructed Average Pre-promotion Yelp
Rating (and Number of Pre-promotion Yelp Review) for each Groupon Restaurants using its
specific start day of the promotion, whereas we use June 1, 2011 as the start date for NonGroupon Restaurants as discussed in section 4.5.1. The challenge is, how to obtain the matched
pair of a Groupon Restaurants and a Non-Groupon Restaurant with the same start date before
knowing the potential matched Non-Groupon Restaurants having no start date. Facing the
similar challenge in a labor market policy context, Lechner (2002) suggested drawing from the
distribution of the observed start dates of all participants (Groupon Restaurants) for each nonparticipant (Non-Groupon Restaurants). Lechner’s method may be sensitive to one-time
simulation and might not make full use of non-participants information. Therefore, we used the
following modified matching process:
Step 1: calculate the propensity score of being assigned to the treatment group, i.e.
Groupon Restaurants, using values of Average Pre-promotion Yelp rating and Number of Prepromotion Yelp Review based on June 1, 2011 for Non-Groupon Restaurants;
Step 2: sort Groupon Restaurants from smallest to largest by the estimated propensity
score;
Step 3: for a Groupon Restaurant, take all Non-Groupon Restaurants within the 0.001
caliper of propensity score as potential options;
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Step 4: calculate the new Average Pre-promotion Yelp rating and Number of Prepromotion Yelp Review for selected Non-Groupon Restaurants using the same start date of
promotion as the specific Groupon Restaurant;
Step 5: calculate the distance of all matching variables (normalized) between the
Groupon Restaurant and the selected Non-Groupon Restaurants, and choose the Non-Groupon
Restaurant with the smallest distance to a matched one. Take the matched pair off the list;
Step 6: repeat Step 3 to Step 5 until no Groupon Restaurant remains on the ordered list.

4.5.3 Preliminary Results on Main Effect
After the matching process above, we obtained 896 matched pairs of Groupon
Restaurants and Non-Groupon Restaurants. We summarize the results of comparison tests in
Table 17 below.
We see that there is no statistically significant difference between Groupon Restaurants
and Non-Groupon Restaurants in all control variables. Hence the only significant difference is
that one group has already run Groupon promotions, whereas the other one has not. The
comparison test in Change in Yelp Ratings shows that Average Yelp Rating of Groupon
Restaurants decreased 0.07 after Groupon promotions, statistically significantly larger than the
decrease (0.01) of Non-Groupon Restaurants. Therefore, we conclude that on average Groupon
promotions have negative impact on Yelp ratings.
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Table 17. Comparisons between Groupon Restaurants and Non-Groupon Restaurants after Matching

Variables

Change in Yelp Ratings
Average Pre-promotion Yelp
Rating
Number of Pre-promotion Yelp
Reviews
Number of Yelp Dollar Signs
Number of Competitors Nearby
Average Household Income
Average Age
Average Household Size
Population Density

Groupon
Restaurants
Number of
matched pairs
mean
(Std. Dev.)
mean
(Std. Dev.)
mean
(Std. Dev.)
mean
(Std. Dev.)
mean
(Std. Dev.)
mean
(Std. Dev.)
mean
(Std. Dev.)
mean
(Std. Dev.)
mean
(Std. Dev.)

Non-Groupon
Restaurants
896

-0.07
(0.29)
3.61
(0.57)
57.04
(73.91)
1.87
(0.54)
89.88
(143.88)
75.91
(19.82)
37.16
(4.57)
2.39
(0.48)
6.10
(6.51)

-0.01***
(0.18)
3.62
(0.54)
56.40
(80.48)
1.85
(0.55)
85.80
(137.09)
75.69
(18.24)
36.62
(4.56)
2.38
(0.46)
5.77
(6.11)

Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon tests of larger means between Groupon vs. non-Groupon
restaurants, <0.1 *; <0.05 **; <0.01***

4.6 Mediation and Moderation Analysis
In this section, we report the results for the mediation, moderation, and moderated
mediation analyses to test the effects discussed in section 4.3. In order to create our mediating
variables, we conducted text mining analysis, which provided us with text based measures of
consumer's perceptions of perceived quality and their sentiments about that perceived quality.
We begin by describing the process by which we extracted the features from which we
developed the measures of perceived quality and sentiment.
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4.6.1 Feature and Sentiment Extraction through Text Mining
Text mining techniques have been used to extract important information from the texts of
online reviews in marketing and other business areas (Lee and Bradlow 2011; Bai 2011; Netzer
et al. 2012). In this study the text mining analysis involves two components: 1) identifying
features (from which we derive consumers perceptions of quality) most frequently mentioned by
reviewers; and 2) identifying the consumers' sentiments about the sentences containing those
features.
4.6.1.1 Extracting Important Features
We adopted one of the well-established techniques (see Hu and Liu 2004) for feature
identification to extract nouns and noun phrases as candidates, because the most frequently
described features have been shown to be nouns and noun phrases.
The steps we used of features extraction include:
1) applied POS tagging and obtained nouns and noun phrases for each review. This
yielded more than 9,000 nouns and noun phrases from Yelp reviews;
2) manually pre-defined five categories of features and built our own dictionary (see
Table 18) to reduce the dimensionality of features;
3) classified each sentence into one of the 5 categories according to the dictionary; and,
4) selected food quality and service quality as the two key potential mediators because
they were the most frequently mentioned features as detailed in Table 19.
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Table 18. Feature Categories, Definitions and Example Words in the Dictionary
Feature Categories
Food quality
Service quality
Ambiance
Social setting
Others

Definitions
Perceived quality related to food, including
various types of food and drink.
Perceived quality related to service in a restaurant
from various servers, such as waiter and waitress.
Perceived quality related to the dinning
environment, such as atmosphere.
A feature indicating whom the reviewers dine
with.
Any other feature which does not belong to any
category above.

Example words
‘salad’, ‘chicken’, ‘ice tea’,
‘wine’
‘waiter’, ‘waitress’,
‘manager’
‘ambiance’, ‘atmosphere’,
‘music’
‘husband’, ‘wife’,
‘boyfriend’, ‘girlfriend’
The rest of noun phrases

Table 19. Frequency Distribution of Features
Feature
Categories

Food quality
Service quality
Ambiance
Social setting
others
Total Reviews

Matched Groupon
Restaurants
Number of
Frequency
Reviews
15336
99.0%
6410
41.4%
263
1.7%
3511
22.7%
6255
40.4%
15487
-

Matched Non-Groupon
Restaurants
Number of
Frequency
Reviews
9661
98.9%
3430
35.1%
168
1.9%
1895
19.4%
3852
39.4%
9765
-

4.6.1.2 Extracting Sentiments
Focusing on the two types of perceived quality detailed above we identified the sentiment
for each sentence that mentioned food quality and/or service quality. We applied the corpusbased machine learning method, which enabled us to capture the contextual structure and
domain-related knowledge (see Pang and Lee 2002).
The steps of sentiment identification included:
1) randomly selected 100 reviews and split them into 946 sentences;
2) manually assigned the sentiment (positive, negative or neutral) to each of the 946
sentences;
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3) assigned 80% (757) of sentences as the training set and the remaining 20% (189) of
sentences as the test set;
4) trained various machine learning models (including naïve Bayes, Support Vector
Machine, and Logistic Regression) using the training set;
5) applied the trained model to the test set, and selected the model with the highest
prediction rate, Logistic Regression; and,
6) utilized trained Logistic Regression model and obtained the sentiment of each sentence
mentioning food quality and/or service quality.
To categorize the sentiments, we assigned -1 to indicate negative sentiment, 0 for neutral,
and 1 for positive and then calculated the average sentiment of food quality (service quality) over
all sentences mentioning food quality (service quality) for matched Groupon Restaurants and
Non-Groupon Restaurants.
4.6.1.3 Preliminary Evidence of Mediation and Moderation Effects – Food Quality and
Service Quality
Table 20 below summarizes the comparisons of average sentiment of food quality and
Change in Yelp Rating for the matched pairs. Please note that we excluded any matched pair in
which one or both restaurants in the matched pair did not mention food quality. Hence, we have
751 matched pairs for analysis.
The average sentiment of food quality for Groupon Restaurants is statistically
significantly lower than that of Non-Groupon Restaurants, which potentially explains the overall
declining trend of Yelp ratings. Hence, food quality is a potential mediator of the main effect.
We then divided the matched pairs into three groups according to pre-promotion ratings:
1) low rating, [1, 2.5); 2), 2) medium rating, [2.5, 3.5); and 3) high rating, [3.5, 5]. In all three
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cases the average sentiment of food quality for Groupon Restaurants is statistically significantly
lower than that of Non-Groupon Restaurants. However, regarding the Change in Yelp Ratings,
the decline in Yelp Rating for Groupon Restaurants is statistically significantly larger than that
of Non-Groupon Restaurants only for high rated restaurants. There is no statistically significant
difference in Change in Yelp Ratings between Groupon Restaurants and Non-Groupon
Restaurants for medium and low rated restaurants.
These results provide some direct evidence for the potential moderation role of prepromotion ratings on the effect of Groupon promotions on Yelp ratings.
Table 20. Comparisons of Average Sentiment of Food Quality and Change in Yelp Ratings
Pre-promotion
Rating
Total
Low
Medium
High

Number of
Matched
Pairs
751
15
262
474

Average Sentiment of Food Quality
Groupon
Non-Groupon
Restaurants
Restaurants
0.52
0.58***
0.40
0.66**
0.48
0.53***
0.55
0.60***

Change in Yelp Ratings
Groupon
Non-Groupon
Restaurants
Restaurants
-0.07
-0.01***
0.30
0.39
-0.0004
0.002
-0.12
-0.03***

Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon tests of larger means between Groupon vs. non-Groupon
restaurants, <0.1 *; <0.05 **; <0.01***

Similarly, Table 21 summarizes the comparisons of average sentiment for service quality
and Change in Yelp Ratings for the matched pairs. We excluded any matched pair in which one
or both restaurants in the matched pair did not mention service quality. Because service quality
was mentioned than food quality, we obtained fewer matched pairs (527) than for food quality.
The average sentiment for service quality for Groupon Restaurants is statistically
significantly less than that of Non-Groupon Restaurants, which suggests that service quality is
also a potential mediator for the overall decline of Yelp ratings after Groupon promotions.
We divided the matched pairs into three groups based on the three pre-promotion ratings.
As detailed in Table 21, the average sentiment of service quality for Groupon Restaurants is less
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than that of Non-Groupon Restaurants for all three groups, although the difference for low rated
restaurants is not statistically significant.
Regarding the Change in Yelp Ratings, for the medium and high rated restaurants, the
decline of Yelp ratings for Groupon Restaurants is statistically significantly larger than that of
Non-Groupon Restaurants. However, the difference of the Change in Yelp Ratings between
Groupon Restaurants and Non-Groupon Restaurants is 0.027 for the medium rated restaurants
compared to 0.08 for the high rated restaurants. For the low rated restaurants, Yelp ratings for
Groupon Restaurants increased more than Non-Groupon Restaurants. Because we only have 7
matched pairs for this group, statistical significance for the comparison test is not considered.
The results above also suggest the potential for moderation role of pre-promotion ratings
on the effect of Groupon promotions on Yelp ratings.
Table 21. Comparisons of Average Sentiment of Service Quality and Change in Yelp Ratings
Pre-promotion
Rating
Total
Low
Medium
High

Number of
Matched
Pairs
527
7
184
336

Average Sentiment of Service Quality
Groupon
Non-Groupon
Restaurants
Restaurants
0.51
0.56***
-0.18
0.14
0.17
0.28*
0.25
0.34***

Change in Yelp Ratings
Groupon
Non-Groupon
Restaurants
Restaurants
-0.07
-0.02***
0.37
0.34
-0.03
-0.003**
-0.11
-0.03***

Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon tests of larger means between Groupon vs. non-Groupon
restaurants, <0.1 *; <0.05 **; <0.01***

In the next sections, we test the formal models of the mediation effect and moderation
effect that we proposed in Section 4.3. In subsection 4.6.2 and subsection 4.6.3, we test the
models for food quality and service quality separately. In subsection 4.6.4, we combined both
food quality and service quality in the analysis. Please note that, because we do not have enough
marched pairs for low rated restaurants, the analyses are limited to the matched pairs of the
medium (relatively lower) and high (relatively higher) pre-promotion rated restaurants.
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4.6.2 Mediation and Moderation Effects – Food Quality
4.6.2.1 Separated Mediation and Moderation Effect – Food Quality
We tested a separated mediation and moderation effect model (Figure 8 in Section 4.3,
hereafter Model I) for food quality. In this model, food quality is expected to mediate the main
effect of Groupon promotions on the Change in Yelp Ratings, while pre-promotion ratings are
expected to moderate the main effect. The formal test is based on the following regression
equations:
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 = 𝛼𝐼∙1 + 𝛽𝐼∙1 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝜇𝐼∙1

(I∙1)

𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼𝐼∙2 + 𝛽𝐼∙2 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝜇𝐼∙2

(I∙2)

𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 = 𝛼𝐼∙3 + 𝛽𝐼∙3 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝛾𝐼∙3 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛿𝐼∙3 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝜌𝐼∙3 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜇𝐼∙3

(I∙3)

where 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 indicates the dependent variable in this study, Change in Yelp
Ratings. 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 is the binary independent variable indicating whether a restaurant has run a
Groupon promotion or not; 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 is the mediator and the measure of the average
sentiment of food quality for each restaurant; 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 is the binary moderator, indicating
whether the level of pre-promotion rating is relatively higher or not. We also use 𝛼I∙𝑛 to indicate
the intercept for equation 𝑛 of Model I, where 𝑛 ∈ {1,2,3}. We use the same format of 𝛽’s to
indicate the coefficients of 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛, 𝛾’s for the coefficients of the moderator 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝛿’s
for the coefficients of the interaction term of between 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 and 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝜌’s for the
coefficients of the mediator variable (𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡), and 𝜇’s for the error terms (please see
detailed notation of parameters in Table C.1 of Appendix C).
We summarize the regression estimation results in Table 22 using bold font for those
coefficients of main interest in this study. We also illustrate the corresponding coefficients in
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Figure 10. We see that the mediation effect of food quality is -0.01320, and is statistically
significant. This indicates that Groupon promotions had a negative impact on consumer
perceived food quality which had a negative causal impact on Yelp ratings. Hence, food quality
mediates the main effect of Groupon promotions on the Change in Yelp Ratings. Because the
coefficient of the independent variable (𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛) is still significant when we include the
mediator (𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) in Equation (I∙3), the mediation effect of food quality is
categorized as a complementary mediation (Zhao et al. 2010).
The estimation results of Equation (I∙3) also show a significant moderation effect for prepromotion ratings. Groupon promotions have a statistically significantly negative impact (-0.07)
on the Change in Yelp Ratings for higher rated restaurants, whereas a statistically significantly
positive impact (0.0121) for lower rated restaurants.
Table 22. Results of Separated Mediation and Moderation Effect – Food Quality (Model I)
Dependent Variables

Change in
Ratings
(I∙1)

Food Sentiment

Change in Ratings

(I∙2)

(I∙3)

-0.06***

-0.05***

-0.07***

𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡

-

-

0.26***

𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔

-

-

-0.74***

𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛

-

-

0.08***

Number of restaurants

1472

1472

1472

Adjusted R square

0.02

0.02

0.11

Regression Model
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛

Note: *’s denote significance level, <0.1 *; <0.05 **; <0.01***
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The formula to calculate the mediation effect here is -0.05*0.26=-0.013.
In Equation (I∙3), ‘Pre-Rating’ is a dummy variable, indicating whether pre-promotion ratings are higher or not.
The coefficient of the interaction term: Pre-Rating*Groupon measures the difference between higher and lower
level. To obtain the Groupon promotions on online ratings for the lower level, the formula is: -0.07+0.08=0.01.
21
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Figure 10. Results of Separated Mediation and Moderation Effect – Food Quality (Model I)

4.6.2.2 Moderated Mediation Effect – Food Quality
We next tested the moderated mediation effect model (Figure 9 in Section 4.3, hereafter
Model II) for food quality. In this model food quality is still expected to mediate the main effect
of Groupon promotions on the change in online ratings, while the pre-promotion ratings are
expected to moderate both the main effect and the mediation effect.
The formal test for this model is based on a similar set of equations:
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 = 𝛼𝐼𝐼∙1 + 𝛽𝐼𝐼∙1 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝜇𝐼𝐼∙1

(II∙1)

𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼𝐼𝐼∙2 + 𝛽𝐼𝐼∙2 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝛾𝐼𝐼∙2 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛿𝐼𝐼∙2 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝜇𝐼𝐼∙2

(II∙2)

𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 = 𝛼𝐼𝐼∙3 + 𝛽𝐼𝐼∙3 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝛾𝐼𝐼∙3 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛿𝐼𝐼∙3 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝜌𝐼𝐼∙3 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜇𝐼𝐼∙3

(II∙3)

where variables 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠, 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛, 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡, and 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 here in
Model II have the same meanings as Model I. Consistently, 𝛼II∙𝑛 indicates the intercept for
equation 𝑛 of Model II, and 𝑛 ∈ {1,2,3}. Again, we use 𝛽’s to indicate the coefficients of
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛, 𝛾’s for the coefficients of the moderator 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝛿’s for the coefficients of the
interaction term of between 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 and 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝜌’s for the coefficients of the mediator
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variable (𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡), and 𝜇’s for the error terms (please see detailed notation of
parameters in Table C.1 of Appendix C).
We summarized the regression estimation results in Table 23 and bolded the coefficients
of key interest. We also illustrate the corresponding numbers in Figure 11. The mediation effect
of food quality on the main effect of Model 2 is the same as Model 1, which is equal to -0.013
and statistically significant. The mediation effect of food quality on the main effect is also a
complementary mediation.
We obtained the same moderation effect on the main effect, which is that Groupon
promotions have a statistically significantly negative impact on the Change in Yelp Ratings for
higher rated restaurants, but a statistically significantly positive impact for lower rated
restaurants. However, we do not see a significant moderated mediation effect, because the
estimated coefficient of the interaction term 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 in equation (II∙3) is not
significant.
Table 23. Results of Moderated Mediation Effect – Food Quality (Model II)
Dependent Variables

Change in
Ratings
(II∙1)

Food Sentiment

Change in Ratings

(II∙2)

(II∙3)

-0.06***

-0.05***

-0.07***

𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡

-

-

0.26***

𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔

-

-0.07***

-0.74***

𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛

-

-0.005

0.08***

Number of restaurants

1472

1472

1472

Adjusted R square

0.02

0.05

0.11

Regression Model
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛

Note: *’s denote significance level, <0.1 *; <0.05 **; <0.01***
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Figure 11. Results of Moderated Mediation Effect – Food Quality (Model II)

Overall, we conclude that food quality mediates the main effect of Groupon promotions
on the change in ratings directly and that pre-promotion ratings moderate the main effect directly.
However, there is no moderated mediation effect of pre-promotions on food quality's mediating
effect on change in ratings.

4.6.3 Mediation and Moderation Effects – Service Quality
In this subsection, we examined the mediation and moderation effects for service quality.
4.6.3.1 Separated Mediation and Moderation Effect – Service Quality
Similar to the food quality, first we tested the separated mediation and moderation effect
model (Figure 8 in Section 4.3, i.e. Model III) for service quality. In this model service quality is
expected to mediate the main effect of Groupon promotions on the Change in Yelp Ratings,
while the pre-promotion ratings are expected to moderate the main effect.
The formal test is based on the following regression equations:
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 = 𝛼𝐼𝐼𝐼∙1 + 𝛽𝐼𝐼𝐼∙1 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝜇𝐼𝐼𝐼∙1

(III∙1)

𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼𝐼𝐼𝐼∙2 + 𝛽𝐼𝐼𝐼∙2 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝜇𝐼𝐼𝐼∙2

(III∙2)

𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 = 𝛼𝐼𝐼𝐼∙3 + 𝛽𝐼𝐼𝐼∙3 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝛾𝐼𝐼𝐼∙3 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛿𝐼𝐼𝐼∙3 ∗
𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝜌𝐼𝐼𝐼∙3 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜇𝐼𝐼𝐼∙3

(III∙3)
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where variables 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠, 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛, and 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 here in Model III have the
same meanings as previous models. 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 is the mediator and indicates the
measure of the average sentiment of service quality for each restaurant. Consistently, 𝛼III∙𝑛
indicates the intercept for equation 𝑛 of Model III, and 𝑛 ∈ {1,2,3}. We also use 𝛽’s to indicate
the coefficients of 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛, and 𝛾’s for the coefficients of the moderator 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝛿’s for
the coefficients of the interaction term of between 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 and 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝜌’s for the
coefficients of the mediator variable (𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡), and 𝜇’s for the error terms (please
see detailed notation of parameters in Table C.1 of Appendix C).
We summarized the estimation results in Table 24 and bolded the coefficients of key
interest. We also illustrated the corresponding numbers in Figure 12. The calculated mediation
effect of service quality is -0.005 and is statistically significant. This indicates that Groupon
promotions had a negative impact on consumer perceived service quality, and that the reduced
service quality further caused the decline of Yelp ratings. Hence, service quality mediates the
impact of Groupon promotions on the Change in Yelp Ratings directly. Because the coefficient
of the independent variable for 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 is still significant when we include the mediator
(𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) in Equation (III∙3), we classify the mediation effect of service quality as a
complementary mediation (Zhao et al. 2010).
The estimation results of Equation (III∙3) also show a significant moderation effect for
pre-promotion ratings. Although Groupon promotions have a statistically significantly negative
impact on the Change in Yelp Ratings for both higher rated and lower rated restaurants, the
impact is larger for higher rated restaurants (-0.07) than that of lower rated restaurants (-0.02).

99
Table 24. Results of Separated Mediation and Moderation Effect – Service Quality (Model III)
Dependent Variables
Regression Model
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛

Change in
Ratings
(III∙1)

Service
Sentiment
(III∙2)

Change in Ratings
(III∙3)

-0.06***

-0.09***

-0.07***

𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡

-

-

0.06***

𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔

-

-

0.04**

𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛

-

-

0.05**

Number of restaurants

1040

1040

1040

Adjusted R square

0.04

0.01

0.09

Note: *’s denote significance level, <0.1 *; <0.05 **; <0.01***

Figure 12. Results of Separated Mediation and Moderation Effect – Service Quality (Model III)

4.6.3.2 Moderated Mediation Effect – Service Quality
We also tested the moderated mediation effect model (Figure 9 in Section 4.3, i.e. Model
IV) for service quality. In this model, service quality is expected to mediate the main effect of
Groupon promotions on the change in online ratings directly, while the pre-promotion ratings are
expected to moderate both the main effect and the mediation effect.
The formal test for this model is based on estimations of the following equations:
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 = 𝛼𝐼𝑉∙1 + 𝛽𝐼𝑉∙1 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝜇𝐼𝑉∙1

(IV∙1)

𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼𝐼𝑉∙2 + 𝛽𝐼𝑉∙2 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝛾𝐼𝑉∙2 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛿𝐼𝑉∙2 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝑒𝐼𝑉∙2

(IV∙2)
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𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 = 𝛼𝐼𝑉∙3 + 𝛽𝐼𝑉∙3 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝛾𝐼𝑉∙3 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛿𝐼𝑉∙3 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝜌𝐼𝑉∙3 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜇𝐼𝑉∙3

(IV∙3)

where variables 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠, 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛, 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 and 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 here
have the same meanings as Model III. Consistently, we use 𝛼’s to indicates the intercepts for the
three equations, and use 𝛽’s to indicate the coefficients of 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛, and 𝛾’s for the coefficients
of the moderator 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝛿’s for the coefficients of the interaction term of between
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 and 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔, 𝜌’s for the coefficients of the mediator variable
(𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡),and 𝜇’s for the error terms (please see detailed notation of parameters in
Table C.1 of Appendix C).
We summarize the estimation results in Table 25 with the coefficients of key interest in
bold. We illustrate the corresponding numbers in Figure 13. The calculated mediation effect of
service quality on the main effect is still -0.005 and statistically significant, which indicates a
complementary mediation.
Regarding the moderation effect on the main effect, Groupon promotions have a
statistically significantly negative impact on the Change in Yelp Ratings for both higher rated
restaurants and lower rated restaurants. But the impact for the higher rated restaurants is stronger
than that of lower rated restaurants. Similar to the case of food quality, we do not see a
significant moderated mediation effect for service quality, indicated by the statistically
insignificant coefficient of the interaction term 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 in Equation (IV∙2).
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Table 25. Results of Moderated Mediation Effect – Service Quality (Model IV)
Dependent Variables
Regression Model
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛

Change in
Ratings
(IV∙1)

Service
Sentiment
(IV∙2)

Change in Ratings
(IV∙3)

-0.06***

-0.09***

-0.07***

𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡

-

-

0.06***

𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔

-

-0.08

0.04**

𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛

-

0.05**
1040
0.09

Number of restaurants

1040

-0.02
1040

Adjusted R square

0.04

0.02

Note: *’s denote significance level, <0.1 *; <0.05 **; <0.01***

Figure 13. Results of Moderated Mediation Effect – Service Quality (Model IV)

Overall, the examination of the service quality shows that service quality mediates the
main effect of Groupon promotions on the change in ratings directly and that pre-promotion
ratings moderate the main effect directly. However, there is no moderated mediation effect of
pre-promotions on service quality.

4.6.4 Joint Mediation and Moderation Effects – Food Quality and Service
Quality
Previously we examined the mediation and moderation effect for food quality and service
quality separately. In this subsection, we conducted the joint analysis of the two types of
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perceived quality. We assume that the food quality and service quality are independent
mediators, because the correlation of average sentiment between them is relatively low (0.28).
4.6.4.1 Separated Mediation and Moderation Effect – Food Quality and Service Quality
First we tested the separated mediation and moderation effect model (Figure 8 in Section
4.3, i.e. Model V) for the two types of perceived quality. In this model, food quality and service
quality are both expected to mediate the main effect of Groupon promotions on the Change in
Yelp Ratings independently, while the pre-promotion ratings are expected to moderate the main
effect only.
The formal test for this model is based on estimations of the following equations:
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 = 𝛼𝑉∙1 + 𝛽𝑉∙1 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝜇𝑉∙1

(V∙1)

𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼𝑉∙2 + 𝛽𝑉∙2 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝜇𝑉∙2

(V∙2)

𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼𝑉∙3 + 𝛽𝑉∙3 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝜇𝑉∙3

(V∙3)

𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 = 𝛼𝑉∙4 + 𝛽𝑉∙4 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝛾𝑉∙4 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛿𝑉∙4 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗
𝑓

𝑠
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝜌𝑉∙4 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜌𝑉∙4
∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜇𝑉∙4

(V∙4)

where the variables and coefficients above are still consistent with previous models. Please note
𝑓

that, 𝜌𝑉∙4 indicates the coefficient of 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 in equation 4 for Model V, and similarly
𝑠
𝜌𝑉∙4
indicates the coefficient of 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 in equation 4 for Model V. For the detailed

notation of parameters, please see Table C.1 of Appendix C.
We summarize the estimation results in Table 26 and bolded the coefficients of key
interest. We illustrate the corresponding numbers in Figure 14. The calculated mediation effect
of food quality is -0.02 and is statistically significant. The calculated mediation effect of service
quality is -0.003 and is also statistically significant. This suggests that Groupon promotions had
a negative impact on consumer perceived food quality and service quality which in turn caused
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the decline in Yelp ratings. Therefore, both food quality and service quality mediate the impact
of Groupon promotions on the Change in Yelp Ratings. The two mediation effects are both
complementary mediations.
The estimation results of Equation (V∙4) also show a significant moderation effect for
pre-promotion ratings. Groupon promotions have a statistically significantly negative impact (0.058) on the Change in Yelp Ratings on for higher rated restaurants, whereas they have a
statistically significant positive impact (0.005) on lower rated restaurants.
Table 26. Results of Separated Mediation and Moderation Effect – Food Quality and Service Quality
(Model V)
Dependent Variables
Regression Model
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛
𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡

Change in
Ratings
(V∙1)

Food
sentiment
(V∙2)

Service
Sentiment
(V∙3)

Change in
Ratings
(V∙4)

-0.06***

-0.05***
-

𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡

-

-

𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔

-

-

𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛

-

1040

0.063***
1040

0.01

0.17

Number of restaurants

1040

1040

Adjusted R square

0.04

0.03

-0.09***
-

-0.058***
0.37***

-

0.05***

0.03***

Note: *’s denote significance level, <0.1 *; <0.05 **; <0.01***

Figure 14. Results of Separated Mediation and Moderation Effect – Food Quality and Service Quality
(Model V)
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4.6.4.2 Moderated Mediation Effect – Food Quality and Service Quality
Next, we tested the moderated mediation effect model (Figure 9 in Section 4.3, i.e. Model
VI) for the two types of perceived quality. In this model food quality and service quality are still
expected to mediate the main effect of Groupon promotions on the change in online ratings
independently, while the pre-promotion ratings are expected to moderate both the main effect
and the mediation effects.
The formal test is based on the following regression equation:
𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 = 𝛼𝑉𝐼∙1 + 𝛽𝑉𝐼∙1 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝜇𝑉𝐼∙1

(VI∙1)

𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼𝑉𝐼∙2 + 𝛽𝑉𝐼∙2 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝛾𝑉𝐼∙2 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛿𝑉𝐼∙2 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝑒𝑉𝐼∙2

(VI∙2)

𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 𝛼𝑉𝐼∙3 + 𝛽𝑉𝐼∙3 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝛾𝑉𝐼∙3 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛿𝑉𝐼∙3 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝑒𝑉𝐼∙3

(VI∙3)

𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒_𝑖𝑛_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 = 𝛼𝑉𝐼∙4 + 𝛽𝑉𝐼∙4 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝛾𝑉𝐼∙4 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛿𝑉𝐼∙4 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗
𝑓

𝑠
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 + 𝜌𝑉𝐼∙4 ∗ 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜌𝑉𝐼∙4
∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝜇𝑉𝐼∙4

(VI∙4)

where the variables and coefficients above are still consistent with previous models. Please note
𝑓

that, 𝜌𝑉𝐼∙4 indicates the coefficient of 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 in equation 4 for Model VI, and
𝑠
similarly 𝜌𝑉𝐼∙4
indicates the coefficient of 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 in equation 4 for Model VI. For

the detailed notation of parameters, please see Table C.1 of Appendix C.
We summarized the regression estimation results in Table 27 and bolded the coefficients
of key interest. We illustrated the corresponding numbers in Figure 15. The calculated
mediation effects of food quality and service quality on the main effect are -0.03 and -0.005
respectively and both are statistically significant, which is the same as the separated mediation
and moderation effect model.
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Estimation results from Equation (VI∙4) show that Groupon promotions have a
statistically significantly negative impact (-0.058) on the Change in Yelp Ratings on for higher
rated restaurants, whereas a statistically significantly positive impact (0.005) on lower rated
restaurants. Therefore pre-promotion ratings moderate on the main effect directly. However, we
do not see significant moderation effects on the mediation effect of food quality or service
quality, indicated by the statistically insignificant coefficient of the interaction term
𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 in Equation (VI∙2) and Equation (VI∙3).
Table 27. Results of Moderated Mediation Effect – Food Quality and Service Quality (Model VI)
Dependent Variables
Regression Model
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛

Change in
Ratings
(VI∙1)

Food
sentiment
(VI∙2)

Service
Sentiment

Change in
Ratings

(VI∙3)

(VI∙4)

-0.06***

-0.04***

-0.09***

-0.058***

𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡

-

-

-

0.37***

𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡

-

-

-

0.03***

𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔

-

-0.04***

-0.08

0.05***

𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛

-

-0.03

Number of restaurants

1040

1040

-0.02
1040

0.063***
1040

Adjusted R square

0.04

0.05

0.02

0.17

Note: *’s denote significance level, <0.1 *; <0.05 **; <0.01***

Figure 15. Results of Moderated Mediation Effect – Food Quality and Service Quality (Model VI)

106

Overall, we conclude that food quality and service quality both mediate the main effect of
Groupon promotions on the change in ratings directly, and that pre-promotion ratings moderate
the main effect directly. However, there is no moderation effect of pre-promotion ratings on the
mediating effects of food quality or service quality on change in online ratings. Thus, the
separated mediation and moderation effect model fits our data better.

4.7 Discussion and Future Work
In this essay, we examine the impact of Groupon promotions on its change in online
ratings. We begin by exploring main impact of promotions on the change in online ratings
through propensity score matching process. We then analyze the mediation effects of food and
service quality factor and moderation effect of pre-promotion rating on the main effect. We
utilize the text and sentiment extraction techniques and obtain food and service quality features
and their associated sentiment through the period of promotion. We tested a range of causal
relationship models using the data compiled from Groupon, Yelp, and the US Census. We find
that mediation effects of food quality and service quality are both significant. Particularly,
Groupon promotions decreased perceived food quality and perceived service quality, which
cause the decrease in Yelp ratings. The moderation effect of pre-promotion ratings is found to
be significant. Groupon promotions had a negative effect on Yelp ratings for relatively higher
rated restaurants, while for lower rated restaurants Groupon promotions had a positive effect on
Yelp ratings.

4.7.1 Summary of Theoretical Contributions
Our study makes two major theoretical contributions to the literature on the influence of
retailer promotion strategies on e-WOM. First, we empirically examine the impact of retailers’
promotions on the valance of e-WOM. Previous studies have shown that promotions can trigger
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the generation of e-WOM and hence have a positive impact on the volume of e-WOM (Berger
and Schwartz 2011; Godinho de Matos et al. 2015). Our analysis showed that Groupon
promotions had a negative impact on online ratings on average, i.e. the online ratings after
Groupon promotions declined more than that of without promotions. We operationalized
valence with the average numeric ratings of retailers’ online reviews. To identify the influence
of Groupon promotions on online ratings from the natural trend of ratings over time, we applied
a modified propensity score matching (PSM) method to Groupon Restaurants (the treatment
group) and Non-Groupon Restaurants (the control group).
Second, we investigated consumer perceived quality as a mediator and pre-promotion
ratings as a moderator of the main effect. Through text mining techniques, we extracted food
quality comments and service quality comments from the textual contents of reviews and
determined the corresponding sentiment (positive, negative or neutral). Interestingly, we found
that food quality and service quality both mediated the main effect of Groupon promotions on
online ratings. Specifically, Groupon promotions decreased consumers’ perception of food
quality and service quality, which further decreased online ratings. Another interesting finding is
that Groupon promotions had a negative influence on online ratings for higher rated restaurants
on average but a positive influence on online ratings for lower rated restaurants on average.

4.7.2 Discussion of Managerial Implications
Our results have important managerial implications for retailers. First, our results
provide guidance for restaurant managers who are considering whether or not to run a daily deal
promotion. Particularly for higher rating restaurants, the managers should take the potential
damage to online ratings into account, because the changed online reputation may impact the
future demand (Anderson and Magruder 2012). However, for lower rating restaurants, Groupon
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promotions will likely not hurt their online reputation, and may be an effective marketing tool to
reach more consumers who are likely to find them (Sun 2012).
Second, our findings suggest that restaurant managers who decide to run a Groupon
promotion should pay special attention to the food quality and service quality during the
promotion period. Managers may take appropriate actions, such as, for example, increasing
training for wait staff before engaging in Groupon promotions, to avoid any decline in online
ratings after promotions.

4.7.3 Limitations and Future Work
Our study, like all studies, has certain limitations. First, our main mediation and
moderation effect analysis is based on matched Groupon Restaurants and Non-Groupon
Restaurants with similar observable characteristics, that was the result of a modified propensity
score matching process. However, it is possible that unobservable factors might influence the
generation of matched pairs, which might impact our results. Although we employed a
sensitivity analysis, there is still a caveat to, as in all analyses, relate to the potential for omitted
factors.
Second, we conducted our analysis using online review data from one retail category,
restaurants. Therefore the two mediators (food quality and service quality) obtained in this study
likely restrict the generalizability of our results to other retail categories. However, our method
is applicable for any type of retailer, if review data are available. Our future work will focus of
the analysis to other retail categories and the possible generalization of our initial results.
Third, to obtain the mediators (average sentiment of perceived quality), we implicitly
assumed that the three types of sentiment (positive, negative, and neutral) have equal weights.
However, in reality, reviewers (and review readers) may have different weights for different
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types of sentiment. For example, negative sentiment may have more impacts on final ratings than
positive sentiment. Some advanced measures, such as a 5-score scale, might be useful in a future
study.

4.7.4 Conclusions
We apply a propensity score matching (PSM) analysis to provide a causal analysis of the
main effect of Groupon promotions on the change in online ratings. Consistent with previous
empirical evidence, Groupon promotions have a negative effect on online ratings on average.
Regarding the mediation effect, we find that food quality and service quality are two mediators
of the main effect, i.e. Groupon promotions decrease consumers’ perceived food quality and
service quality, which further causes the decline of online ratings. Regarding the pre-promotion
ratings as the moderator of the main effect, we find that Groupon promotions have negative
effect on online ratings for higher rated restaurants, versus a positive impact for lower rated
restaurants. These results provide important insights into the impact of promotions on retailers’
online reputation.
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Chapter 5

Conclusions and Future Research

This dissertation provides a systematic investigation of the online daily deal industry
utilizing data collected from the industry leader, Groupon, complemented Yelp data and U.S.
Census data. The results from the three essays enable us to understand business models of online
daily deals from various angles, including consumer purchasing decisions and social media
sharing, retailer initial and repeat promotion decisions, and characteristics of the e-platforms.
The first essay identifies the positive influence of minimum requirements on deal
outcomes and social media sharing, and demonstrates that retailers and daily deal sites gain by
including minimum requirements. The second essay provides a causal analysis of the effects of
e-WOM and local competition on restaurants' decisions whether or not to engage in an initial
Groupon promotion and whether or not to return for additional Groupon promotions. Interesting
findings include: 1) restaurants with higher ratings on the reviews they receive are more likely to
engage in initial promotions but less likely to return for additional promotions; 2) the greater the
local competition, the less likely restaurants are to engage in initial promotions, but this variable
does not affect additional promotions; and 3) restaurants are more likely to engage in initial
Groupon promotions and additional Groupon promotions if their competitors are not engaged in
Groupon promotions. The third essay investigates the effect of Groupon promotions on retailers’
online reputation. We find that Groupon promotions have a negative main effect on the change
in online ratings on average. We also find that consumers’ perception of food quality and
service quality mediates the main effect. Another interesting finding is that Groupon promotions
had a negative impact on online ratings only for higher rated restaurants, versus a positive impact
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for lower rated restaurants. Our results provide important guidance for managers to make
promotion decisions and to avoid potential damage to their firm's online reputation.
Although there are rich findings from the three essays, there are still many interesting
questions that deserve rigorous studies. For example, data we have gathered indicates that the
proportion of bankruptcy for restaurants which have run Groupon promotions is 23.5%,
significantly higher than the 6% rate for restaurants which have not run Groupon promotions.
There are two potential explanations. One is that Groupon promotions exerted a negative
influence on a restaurant’s performance, perhaps because of negative online reviews, and thus
Groupon promotions caused the restaurant’s bankruptcy. The other explanation is that
restaurants that were more close to bankruptcy were more likely to try Groupon promotions. A
future study will examine the relationship between Groupon promotions and a restaurant’s
bankruptcy. Other interesting future research directions include: 1) the investigation of other
retail categories; and 2) formal theory development and related theory testing informed by the
current empirical analyses.
In summary, we hope this dissertation and future research will inspire more studies on the
online daily deals area, contribute to the IS literature and provide practical insights for
consumers, and managerial implications for retailers and daily deal sites in the daily deal emarket.
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Appendix
Appendix A. Tables for Heterogeneity Analysis, Sensitivity Analysis and
Robustness Tests (Chapter Two)
Appendix A.1 Tables for Heterogeneity Analysis
Table A.1.1 Heterogeneity analysis at time point 0 for A&E deals
Propensity score
range (No. of
matched pairs)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes NMR

Quantity of
coupons sold
MR

Quantity of
coupons
sold NMR

Total revenue
MR

Total revenue
NMR

<0.15 (11)

4 (10.73)

3 (7.82)

15 (19.91)

4 (46.18)

1170 (2043.55)

447 (1607.91)

0.15-0.30 (55)

3 (5.09)

2 (6.07)

5 (23.07)

1 (5.21)

0.45-0.60 (27)

3 (7.22)
** +++
3 (3.81)

3 (6.26)

20 (43.78)

340 (559.18)
* +++
228 (649.86)
*** +++
343 (450.37)

90 (562.53)

0.30-0.45 (101)

12 (16.67)
** ++
15 (30.35)
*** +++
17 (22.26)

0.60-0.75 (0)

-

-

-

-

-

-

>0.75 (0)

-

-

-

-

-

-

5 (23.46)

117 (506.95)
236 (906.70)
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Table A.1.2 Heterogeneity analysis at time point 20 for A&E deals
Propensity
score range
(No. of
matched pairs)
<0.15 (11)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes NMR

Quantity of
coupons sold
MR

Quantity of
coupons
sold NMR

Total revenue
MR

Total revenue
NMR

59 (144.00)
***
32 (60.53)
*

24 (31.64)

100 (211.91)

90 (166.91)

11060 (22485.36)

4900 (6626.73)

15 (43.18)

106 (198.07)
** ++

50 (154.02)

3015 (8132.67)
** +++

1450 (4296.42)

18 (32.64)

0.60-0.75 (0)

-

-

-

260 (344.48)
* +
-

2800 (6027.78)
** +
3480 (3931.56)

2000 (4207.22)

31 (47.81)

170 (345.45)
*** +++
160 (241.44)

80 (202.44)

0.45-0.60 (27)

38 (69.27)
*** +++
34 (54.19)

>0.75 (0)

-

-

-

-

0.15-0.30 (55)
0.30-0.45
(101)

-

5200 (7684.59)
**
-

-

-

Table A.1.3 Heterogeneity analysis at time point 40 for A&E deals
Propensity
score range
(No. of
matched
pairs)
<0.15 (11)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes NMR

Quantity of
coupons sold
MR

Quantity of
coupons
sold NMR

Total revenue
MR

Total revenue
NMR

103 (202.55)
***

37 (48.82)

220 (322.00)

110 (249.18)

20826 (34850.18)

7450 (10297.18)

41 (90.47)
*

20 (59.84)

154 (279.90)
* ++

80 (215.59)

3900 (10177.37)
* ++

2159 (6182.22)

52 (96.70)
** +

29 (49.48)

300 (625.84)
*** +++

160 (340.16)

5250 (10751.61)

4000 (7291.85)

0.45-0.60
(15)

30 (93.13)

43 (75.40)

220 (396.27)

430 (459.00)

5220 (6841.00)

0.60-0.75 (0)

-

-

-

-

-

12000 (12628.67)
*
-

>0.75 (0)

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.15-0.30
(51)
0.30-0.45
(61)
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Table A.1.4 Heterogeneity analysis at time point 0 for B&S deals
Propensity score
range (No. of
matched pairs)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes NMR

Quantity of
coupons sold
MR

Quantity of
coupons
sold NMR

Total revenue
MR

Total revenue
NMR

<0.15 (6)

2 (1.17)

0(1.17)

8 (9.50)

4 (8.33)

225 (735.00)

0.15-0.30 (33)

0 (1.30)

0 (1.00)

4 (9.09)

0.30-0.45 (73)

0 (0.60)

0.45-0.60 (86)

1 (1.58)
*** +++
1 (1.13)

10 (20.65)

0.60-0.75 (19)

0 (0.37)

0 (1.37)

10 (12.06)
* ++
16 (17.59)
*** +++
14 (18.36)
+
17 (24.11)

693 (1482.17)
*
825 (948.09)
*** +++
590 (836.37)
*** +++
536 (819.59)

20 (39.58)

750 (1289.63)

490 (1403.68)

>0.75 (2)

0 (1.00)

2 (3.00)

15 (15.00)

50 (85.00)

875 (1185.00)

1950 (2775.00)

0 (1.08)

7 (16.14)

180 (386.82)
273 (628.11)
350 (1039.03)

Table A.1.5 Heterogeneity analysis at time point 20 for B&S deals
Propensity
Facebook
score range (No. likes MR
of matched
pairs)
5 (5.67)
<0.15 (6)

Facebook
likes NMR

Quantity of
coupons
sold MR

Quantity of
coupons
sold NMR

Total revenue
MR

Total revenue
NMR

5 (8.83)

56 (87.67)

40 (60.00)

3447 (3842.33)

3 (4.45)

50 (82.27)

6 (8.52)

90 (135.06)
** +
150 (189.90)
*** +++
140 (246.86)

135 (211.33)

0.60-0.75 (19)

10 (12.58)
*** +++
7 (11.78)
*** ++
9 (13.28)
*** +++
13 (21.21)

9453 (10097.67)
*
9000 (10607.03)
*** +++
4640 (9427.96)
*** +++
5805 (10953.47)

9 (12.32)

220 (350.21)

190 (312.00)

8250 (13563.63)

7410 (10826.42)

>0.75 (2)

2 (9.50)

8 (17.00)

39 (329.50)

210 (605.00)

11661 (16680.50)

8199 (19095.00)

0.15-0.30 (33)
0.30-0.45 (73)
0.45-0.60 (86)

4 (6.64)

80 (140.62)

2400 (3947.30)
3960 (5729.11)
5390 (9621.45)
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Table A.1.6 Heterogeneity analysis at time point 40 for B&S deals
Propensity
score range
(No. of
matched pairs)
<0.15 (6)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes
NMR

Quantity of
coupons sold
MR

Quantity of
coupons
sold NMR

Total revenue
MR

Total revenue
NMR

7 (9.67)

5 (11.50)

72 (117.17)

70 (96.00)

4822 (6027.33)

0.15-0.30 (33)

12 (15.45)
** ++
13 (15.53)
*** +++
11 (17.46)
** ++
18 (33.38)

4 (6.79)

70 (117.36)

9 (11.89)

132 (177.64)
** +
185 (253.51)
*** ++
210 (344.77)

240 (294.00)

12637 (13489.50)
*
12250 (14918.27)
*** +++
6633 (12626.42)
*** +++
7840 (15861.58)

12 (16.00)

220 (794.08)

280 (388.69)

10050 (37521.62)

10780 (12974.38)

20

34

950

1000

33250

30000

0.30-0.45 (72)
0.45-0.60 (71)
0.60-0.75 (13)
>0.75 (1)

5 (8.53)

120 (185.57)

3400 (5633.76)
5630 (7829.57)
8400 (13102.11)

Table A.1.7 Heterogeneity analysis at time point 0 for H&F deals
Propensity score
range (No. of
matched pairs)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes NMR

Quantity of
coupons sold
MR

Quantity of
coupons
sold NMR

Total revenue
MR

Total revenue
NMR

0.15-0.30 (35)

6
1 (3.03)

0
0 (2.94)

0
3 (9.14)

1 (4.49)

1 (2.21)

0.45-0.60 (59)

1 (2.90)
** +
2 (5.73)
* +

0 (1.98)
0 (3.82)

18 (24.73)

20(24.64)

8985
714 (1636.74)
*** +++
500 (797.32)
*** +++
725 (1058.88)
*** +++
900 (1059.36)

0
147 (496.80)

0.30-0.45 (63)

3
10 (13.00)
** +++
12 (17.52)
*** +++
16 (20.14)

-

-

-

-

-

-

<0.15 (1)

0.60-0.75 (11)
>0.75 (0)

4 (8.71)
8 (24.80)

160 (325.05)
300 (873.31)
1290 (1189.55)
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Table A.1.8 Heterogeneity analysis at time point 20 for H&F deals
Propensity
score range
(No. of matched
pairs)
<0.15 (1)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes NMR

Quantity of
coupons
sold MR

Quantity of
coupons
sold NMR

Total revenue
MR

Total revenue
NMR

0
4 (13.71)

60 (168.27)

20965
5070 (11457.03)
** ++
4818 (6973.52)
*** +++
5880 (9684.80)
*** +++
5950 (7301.36)

2999
2610 (7053.29)

5 (24.73)

7
77 (124.54)
* +
110 (165.16)
*** +++
140 (213.31)
**
160 (172.09)

1
41 (76.71)

0.60-0.75 (11)

12
12 (19.06)
** ++
12 (33.24)
*** +++
11 (26.95)
*** ++
16 (26.00)

>0.75 (0)

-

-

-

-

-

-

0.15-0.30 (35)
0.30-0.45 (63)
0.45-0.60 (59)

6 (11.70)
6 (16.03)

50 (103.29)
100 (145.86)

2450 (3725.03)
3000 (5060.54)
6650 (6970.82)

Table A.1.9 Heterogeneity analysis at time point 40 for H&F deals
Propensity
score range
(No. of
matched pairs)
<0.15 (1)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes NMR

Quantity of
coupons
sold MR

Quantity of
coupons
sold NMR

Total revenue
MR

Total revenue
NMR

0
5 (19.09)

-

-

20965
8060 (16705.09)
*** ++
6840 (10245.04)
*** +++
8400 (15003.23)
*** +
11700 (15197.60)
*
-

2999
3765 (10530.68)

>0.75 (0)

7
115 (178.74)
*
150 (244.51)
*** +++
190 (326.08)
*
260 (364.60)
+
-

1
70 (128.53)

0.60-0.75 (5)

12
16 (23.88)
** +++
13 (44.91)
*** ++
19 (47.21)
*** ++
8 (48.00)

0.15-0.30 (34)
0.30-0.45 (55)
0.45-0.60 (39)

9 (16.04)
8 (18.36)
8 (14.40)

80 (149.93)
130 (195.13)
92 (84.40)
-

3510 (5432.27)
4200 (6637.08)
5200 (5477.60)
-
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Table A.1.10 Heterogeneity analysis at time point 0 for REST deals
Propensity score
range (No. of
matched pairs)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes NMR

Quantity of
coupons
sold MR

Quantity of
coupons
sold NMR

Total revenue
MR

Total revenue
NMR

<0.15 (4)

4 (4.25)
** +
2 (3.17)

0 (0.25)

41 (47.25)
* +
24(35.39)

9 (9.50)

1383 (1452.50)
* +
433 (839.44)

145 (181.25)

0 (1.76)

2 (2.40)

>0.75 (4)

2 (2.25)

2 (6.82)
**
1 (3.00)

500 (731.33)
+
466 (714.71)
* ++
620 (841.20)

200 (949.72)

0.60-0.75 (55)

25 (35.93)
+++
21 (33.71)
++
25 (36.93)

10 (44.96)

0.45-0.60 (86)

2 (2.94)
*
1 (2.29)

2216 (1167.25)

851 (1519.25)

0.15-0.30 (18)
0.30-0.45 (54)

1 (1.44)

1 (2.19)

22 (28.50)

25(30.28)

13 (58.03)
37 (141.89)
**
89 (98.25)

475(1002.56)

320 (940.29)
600(2116.98)

Table A.1.11 Heterogeneity analysis at time point 20 for REST deals
Propensity
score range
(No. of
matched pairs)
<0.15 (4)
0.15-0.30 (18)
0.30-0.45 (54)
0.45-0.60 (86)
0.60-0.75 (55)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes NMR

Quantity of
coupons
sold MR

Quantity of
coupons
sold NMR

Total revenue
MR

Total revenue
NMR

26(45.00)
* +
15 (20.89)

10 (8.75)

575 (625.00)
* +
388 (404.89)

290 (242.50)

17100 (17860.00)
* +
8425 (8581.17)

5150 (4750.00)

18 (27.46)
** +
22 (28.57)
** +
26 (31.02)
+

13 (17.17)

250 (320.91)

6910 (9680.02)
*
6750 (9444.34)

5675 (7436.56)

13 (20.51)

330 (465.26)
*
325 (436.48)

23 (36.69)

320 (398.15)

430 (538.93)
*** ++

7000 (9222.75)

8340 (8816.36)

22 (24.75)
*

24 (23.00)

285 (322.50)

645 (542.50)

10050 (10445.00)

10930
(10902.50)

12 (15.17)

260 (356.89)

260 (395.30)

>0.75 (4)

6815 (12452.78)

6195 (7861.80)
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Table A.1.12 Heterogeneity analysis at time point 40 for REST deals
Propensity
score range
(No. of
matched pairs)
<0.15 (4)
0.15-0.30 (18)
0.30-0.45 (54)
0.45-0.60 (83)
0.60-0.75 (28)
>0.75 (2)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes NMR

Quantity of
coupons
sold MR

Quantity of
coupons
sold NMR

Total revenue
MR

Total revenue
NMR

37 (58.00)
* +
19 (27.61)

13 (11.00)

970 (907.50)
* +
500 (524.94)

375 (325.00)

24750 (27302.50)
* +
10750 (11252.83)

6700 (6437.50)

24 (36.06)
*** ++
27 (37.90)
** ++
34 (42.13)
+
25 (24.50)

16 (21.56)

349 (399.63)

10040 (12711.17)
** +
8960 (12598.13)
*
10400 (12943.13)

7455 (9444.78)

22 (49.00)

497 (594.50)
**
460 (576.88)
*
453 (534.87)

22 (21.50)

345 (345.00)

6750 (6750.00)

13008 (13007.50)

16 (19.33)

20 (26.41)

315 (440.28)

377 (476.70)
610 (640.58)
*
464 (463.50)

9408 (15328.72)

8400 (9887.46)
10000 (10560.47)
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Appendix A.2 – Sensitivity Analysis Tables
Table A.2.1 The value of Γ where positive effect of the MR becomes insignificant (based on Wilcoxon
signed rank test)
FL

Arts&Entertainment
Beauty&Spas
Health&Fitness
Restaurant
Arts&Entertainment
Beauty&Spas
Health&Fitness
Restaurant
Arts&Entertainment
Beauty&Spas
Health&Fitness
Restaurant
Arts&Entertainment
Beauty&Spas
Health&Fitness
Restaurant

Quantity of
coupons sold
Time point when deals meet the MR
1.1
1.3
1.2
1.2
1.3
1.7
20 Hours after meeting the MR
1.6
1.3
1.7
1.2
1.9
1.7
1.5
40 Hours after meeting the MR
1.5
1.3
1.7
1.2
2.0
1.8
1.6
1.1
At the end of promotion length
1.5
1.5
1.8
1.8
1.5
1.5
1.5
1.5

Total revenue

1.2
1.3
2.3
1.2
1.4
2.2
1.1
1.1
1.6
2.6
1.3
1.5
1.8
1.5
1.5
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Table A.2.2 The value of Γ where positive effect of the MR becomes insignificant (based on sign test)
FL

Arts&Entertainment
Beauty&Spas
Health&Fitness
Restaurant
Arts&Entertainment
Beauty&Spas
Health&Fitness
Restaurant
Arts&Entertainment
Beauty&Spas
Health&Fitness
Restaurant
Arts&Entertainment
Beauty&Spas
Health&Fitness
Restaurant

Quantity of
coupons sold
Time point when deals meet the MR
1.2
1.6
1.2
1.4
1.3
1.7
1.2
20 Hours after meeting the MR
1.3
1.3
1.5
1.1
1.6
1.5
1.3
40 Hours after meeting the MR
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.1
1.7
1.5
1.4
At the end of promotion length
1.4
1.2
1.6
1.2
1.4
1.4
1.3
-

Total revenue

1.4
1.6
2.1
1.3
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.1
1.1
1.4
1.6
1.1
1.1
1.9
1.2
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Appendix A.3 Tables for Starting Time Point Set at Two Hours after Deal Offer
Begins (same starting point for all)
Table A.3.1 Comparison Results for A&E deals based on hours after a deal being posted (median values
with mean values in parentheses)
Hours after
a deal being
posted
(number of
pairs)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes NMR

Quantity of
coupons sold
MR

Quantity of
coupons sold
NMR

Total revenue MR

Total revenue
NMR

2 (194)

0 (0.63)

0 (0.74)

0.5 (2.74)

16 (31.05)
*** +++
36 (67.43)
*** +++
43 (79.84)
*** +++
48 (95.06)
*** +++
50 (104.6)
**
54 (118.19)
** +
55 (111.23)
*** +++

8 (17.63)

165 (337.15)

12 (66.05)
**
1202 (3543.16)
** +++
2980 (7070.67)
** ++
3707 (8947.76)
** ++
4600 (10668.68)
** +++
5050 (14014.87)

3 (67.14)

12 (194)

1 (3.19)
**
57 (134.9)
*** +++
140 (274.15)
*** +++
170 (340.59)
*** +++
210 (392.38)
*** +++
225 (424.69)
+
250 (478.69)

200 (422.43)

6110 (16360.54)

5510 (10793.73)

265 (496.50)
** ++

170 (360.41)

6170 (14074.00)
* +

4935 (9487.40)

24 (194)
36 (194)
48 (183)
60 (122)
72 (113)
End of
promotion
length (194)

19 (36.45)
23 (43.24)
28 (52.84)
30 (63.7)
31 (71.92)
30 (68.23)

30 (97.65)
80 (200.74)
100 (231.92)
130 (280.92)

800 (2188.80)
2065 (4694.65)
2580 (5533.32)
3600 (6938.58)
4535 (8935.2)
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Table A.3.2 Comparison Results for B&S deals based on hours after a deal being posted (median values
with mean values in parentheses)
Hours after a
deal being
posted (number
of pairs)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes
NMR

Quantity of
coupons sold
MR

Quantity of
coupons sold
NMR

Total revenue MR

Total revenue
NMR

2 (219)

0 (0.27)

0 (0.32)

1 (1.70)

1 (1.75)

16 (71.17)

34 (65.80)

12 (219)

3 (6.22)
*** +++
8 (12.71)
*** +++
10 (14.62)
*** +++
12 (17.23)
*** +++
12 (17.8)
*** +++
14 (19.67)
*** +++
13 (20.57)
*** +++

2 (3.82)

61 (103.08)
** +++
120 (207.85)
** +++
140 (241.68)
** +++
175 (272.79)
** +++
180 (292.7)
** +
200 (325.72)
** ++
230 (365.95)
** +++

50 (93.60)

2750 (4981.47)
* +
6000 (10098.37)
**
7020 (11695.48)
**
8457 (14055.09)
** +
9360 (16319.47)
*** +++
10245 (18520.41)
*** +++
11200 (19502.10)
**

2100 (3759.63)

24 (219)
36 (219)
48 (212)
60 (187)
72 (164)
End of promotion
length (219)

4 (7.42)
5 (8.56)
6 (9.9)
6 (10.33)
7 (11.74)
8 (12.24)

100 (171.30)
120 (197.98)
140 (228.15)
150 (229.9)
170 (252.85)
200 (286.40)

4500 (7279.40)
5520 (8522.13)
6750 (10063.35)
6900 (10366.34)
7595 (10879.98)
9360 (13074.30)

Table A.3.3 Comparison Results for H&F deals based on hours after a deal being posted (median values
with mean values in parentheses)
Hours after
a deal being
posted
(number of
pairs)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes NMR

Quantity of
coupons sold
MR

Quantity of
coupons sold
NMR

Total revenue MR

Total revenue
NMR

2 (169)

0 (0.37)

0 (0.60)

0 (1.21)

6 (13.04)
*** +++
11 (26.91)
*** +++
14 (31.04)
*** +++
16 (37.30)
*** +++
16 (42.96)
*** +++
16 (46.71)
*** +++
20 (44.99)
*** +++

3 (6.56)

39 (143.34)
*** +++
2520 (3981.93)
*** +++
5040 (8552.69)
*** +++
6321 (10499.31)
*** +++
8000 (12964.89)
*** +++
8260 (14410.67)
*** +++
10195 (17031.96)
*** +++
11040 (23399.60)
*** +++

0 (41.06)

12 (169)

1 (3.63)
** +++
49 (81.82)
*** +++
100 (166.22)
*** +++
120 (201.32)
*** +++
150 (248.97)
*** +++
160 (271.8)
*** +++
185 (300.69)
*** +++
220 (318.15)
*** +++

24 (169)
36 (169)
48 (165)
60 (133)
72 (118)
End of
promotion
length (169)

5 (13.79)
6 (16.30)
8 (20.05)
8 (18.78)
9 (20.33)
10 (29.47)

20 (55.51)
50 (111.89)
70 (136.17)
90 (169.12)
100 (168.27)
120 (197.78)
140 (232.81)

1110 (2219.35)
2610 (4900.76)
3190 (5903.80)
4100 (7408.88)
4410 (7549.46)
5305 (9013.44)
6860 (12006.80)
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Table A.3.4 Comparison Results for REST deals based on hours after a deal being posted (median values
with mean values in parentheses)
Hours after
a deal being
posted
(number of
pairs)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes NMR

Quantity of
coupons sold
MR

Quantity of
coupons sold
NMR

Total revenue MR

Total revenue
NMR

2 (221)

0 (0.56)

0 (0.38)

3 (5.23)

3 (5.93)

66 (102.95)

60 (111.65)

12 (221)

10 (13.88)
*** +++
22 (27.89)
*** +++
24 (32.45)
*** +++
29 (37.61)
*** +++
28 (37.98)
*** +++
31 (41.57)
*** +++
32 (44.05)
*** +++

6 (11.98)

160 (217.77)

150 (249.96)

3300 (4706.82)

3200 (4769.99)

13 (22.73)

320 (416.12)

290 (401.45)

6240 (8171.81)

15 (25.52)

390 (483.91)

350 (445.62)

17 (28.92)

460 (559.22)
**
500 (592.38)
**
525 (635.8)
***
570 (654.18)
*

400 (484.82)

7000 (9237.98)
** ++
8320 (10824.43)
*** ++
9850 (12608.39)
*** +++
10650 (13473.44)
*** ++
11450 (14917.04)
*** ++
12000 (14909.40)
*** +++

24 (221)
36 (221)
48 (218)
60 (191)
72 (164)
End of
promotion
length (221)

19 (30.24)
20 (32.34)
21 (33.13)

410 (493.66)
435 (509.21)
510 (560.77)

7200 (9175.31)
8405 (10240.41)
8800 (10835.13)
9000 (11487.32)
10000 (12038.70)
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Appendix A.4 Tables for Analysis of All Deals Including Failed MR Deals
Table A.4.1 Summary of Wilcoxon Rank Sum test for larger median of two groups of deals (group means
in parentheses) with failed deals included

# of deals
Price ($)
Discount rate
(%)
Promotion
length (days)
Featured
Coupon
duration (days)
Limited supply

A&E
MR
NMR
228
494
20
25***
(34.26)
(37.87)
51
51
(53.00)
(52.97)
3
3***
(3.43)
(3.81)
0
0
(0.14)
(0.11)
111***
61
(129.21)
(95.94)
1
1**
(0.77)
(0.85)

B&S
MR
NMR
303
413
39
45***
(63.19)
(83.87)
56
58
(60.24)
(61.51)
3
4***
(3.34)
(3.97)
0
0
(0.10)
(0.08)
187***
186
(231.87) (199.69)
1
1
(0.76)
(0.80)

H&F
MR
NMR
197
313
45
40
(126.91) (357.08)
64
67
(66.21)
(67.63)
3
4***
(3.47)
(4.05)
0**
0
(0.10)
(0.05)
186***
185
(200.03)
179.24
1
1***
(0.69)
(0.81)

REST
MR
NMR
354
325
20
20
(22.17)
(23.93)
51
51
(53.70)
(54.30)
3
4***
(3.11)
(3.73)
0
0
(0.10)
(0.08)
185***
152
(169.84) (151.42)
1***
1
(0.79)
(0.70)

Table A.4.2 Comparison results over time for all A&E deals including failed deals (median values with
mean values in parentheses)
Hours after
meeting MR
(number of
pairs)
0 (201)
10 (201)
20 (200)
30 (199)
40 (143)
End of
promotion
length (201)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes NMR

Quantity of
coupons sold
MR

Quantity of
coupons sold
NMR

Total revenue MR

Total revenue
NMR

3 (6.19)
* ++
29 (52.95)
*** +++
38 (68.02)
*** +++
44 (82.46)
*** +++
52 (100.8)
*** ++
54 (109.31)
*** +++

2 (5.61)

15 (24.16)
*** +++
100 (225.25)
*** +++
140 (273.42)
*** +++
180 (346.30)
*** +++
220 (433.41)
** ++
250 (479.20)
** ++

5 (26.77)

300 (658.44)
** +++
2241 (5761.5)
** ++
2930 (7047.97)
** ++
3700 (9238.12)
** +
4977 (11614.41)
*
5890 (13583.90)

126 (624.67)

14 (29.37)
19 (36.9)
23 (44.84)
28 (54.84)
30 (66.96)

50 (169.4)
80 (201.31)
100 (238.61)
130 (291.2)
170 (353.28)

1535 (3915.39)
2030 (4751.89)
2720 (5769.23)
3600 (7505.77)
4920 (9375.40)
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Table A.4.3 Comparison results over time for all B&S deals including failed deals (median values with
mean values in parentheses)
Hours after
meeting MR
(number of
pairs)
0 (225)
10 (225)
20 (225)
30 (225)
40 (202)
End of
promotion
length (225)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes NMR

Quantity of
coupons sold
MR

Quantity of
coupons sold
NMR

Total revenue MR

Total revenue
NMR

1 (1.20)
* ++
6 (10.04)
*** +++
8 (12.81)
*** +++
10 (14.80)
*** +++
11 (16.79)
*** +++
13 (20.08)
*** +++

0 (0.93)

13 (16.92)
** +++
100 (165.84)
** ++
120 (210.80)
** +
150 (245.90)
**
175 (300.16)
** +
220 (356.19)
** ++

8 (18.80)

585 (882.64)
*** +++
4800 (8250.68)
*** ++
5976 (10364.12)
*** +++
7200 (12113.07)
*** ++
8695 (15492.8)
*** +++
10890 (18982.04)
*

290 (821.31)

4 (6.16)
4 (7.53)
5 (8.81)
6 (9.95)
8 (12.00)

80 (141.69)
100 (173.97)
120 (203.39)
140 (225.10)
200 (282.85)

3570 (5985.68)
4810 (7402.78)
5880 (8798.63)
6410 (9646.59)
9360 (12959.08)

Table A.4.4 Comparison results over time for all H&F deals including failed deals (median values with
mean values in parentheses)
Hours after
meeting MR
(number of
pairs)
0 (171)
10 (171)
20 (171)
30 (171)
40 (136)
End of
promotion
length (171)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes NMR

Quantity of
coupons sold
MR

Quantity of
coupons sold
NMR

Total revenue MR

Total revenue
NMR

1 (3.68)
*** +++
10 (21.73)
*** +++
12 (27.20)
*** +++
14 (32.06)
*** +++
15 (39.61)
*** +++
19 (44.54)
*** +++

0 (2.35)

14 (17.67)
*** +++
84 (133.20)
*** +++
110 (171.12)
*** +++
130 (211.18)
*** +++
140 (250.65)
*** +++
210 (314.43)
*** +++

5 (15.22)

700 (1114.79)
*** +++
4350 (6902.68)
*** +++
5340 (8848.02)
*** +++
6650 (11142.37)
*** +++
7445 (13334.77)
*** +++
11040 (23125.95)
*** +++

190 (599.27)

5 (11.08)
6 (14.30)
7 (17.05)
7 (17.16)
10 (29.23)

48 (92.06)
60 (115.03)
80 (145.69)
85 (152.05)
140 (230.44)

2030 (4057.15)
2610 (5043.11)
3330 (6283.98)
3920 (6986.92)
6670 (11915.12)
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Table A.4.5 Comparison results over time for all REST deals including failed deals (median values with
mean values in parentheses)
Hours after
meeting MR
(number of
pairs)
0 (222)

Facebook
likes MR

Facebook
likes NMR

Quantity of
coupons sold
MR

Quantity of
coupons sold
NMR

Total revenue MR

Total revenue
NMR

2 (2.57)

1 (3.14)

20 (72.97)

17 (21.77)
*** +++
22 (28.38)
*** +++
26 (33.17)
*** +++
28 (37.37)
*** +++
32 (43.86)
*** +++

10 (19.19)

503 (778.43)
+++
5550 (7543.68)

336 (1231.74)

10 (222)

25 (35.18)
+++
260 (343.29)

13 (23.09)

330 (431.15)

300 (408.69)

6370 (8343.91)

15 (26.28)

405 (501.41)

360 (455.28)

17 (28.36)

460 (570.84)
**
570 (651.23)
*

390 (479.65)

7185 (9503.90)
** +
8633 (11167.51)
** ++
10040 (12745.74)
*** +
11950 (14842.20)
*** ++

20 (222)
30 (222)
40 (200)
End of
promotion
length (222)

22 (33.09)

240 (344.96)

505 (559.96)

4900 (6886.75)

7470 (9397.60)
8300 (10320.03)
10000 (12010.14)
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Appendix B. Tables for Sensitivity Analysis and Robustness Tests (Chapter
Three)
Appendix B.1 Sensitivity Analysis
Table B.1.1 Γ Values in Sensitivity Analysis
Variables

Initial Groupon
Promotion decision

Second Groupon
Promotion decision

Average Yelp Rating

1.1

1.9

Number of Yelp Reviews

34.0

2.5

Number of Competitors Nearby

41.4

-

Proportion of Competitors
Nearby Using Groupon

23.7

4.9

Coupon Revenue from the First
Promotion

NA

11.0

Change of Average Yelp Rating

NA

4.9
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Appendix B.2 Different Radii for Local Competition Measures
We used a quarter of a mile to operationalize our local competition variables and
summarized the results in Table B.2.1 and Table B.2.2 below.
Table B.2.1 Proportion of Restaurants in Matched Pairs Running an Initial Groupon Promotion in Control
and Treatment Groups
Control
group

Treatment
group

Number of
matched pairs

Hypotheses

Average Yelp Rating

0.080

0.099**

1929

H1 supported

Number of Yelp Reviews

0.079

0.117***

1360

H2 supported

Number of Competitors Nearby

0.121***

0.076

1135

H6a supported

Proportion of Competitors Nearby
Using Groupon

0.135***

0.102

1513

H7a supported

Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon signed rank test: <0.1 = *; <0.05 = **; <0.01= ***

Table B.2.2 Proportion of Restaurants in Matched Pairs Running a Second Groupon Promotion in Control
and Treatment Group
Control
group

Treatment
group

Number of
matched pairs

Hypotheses

Average Yelp Rating

0.323*

0.274

62

H3a supported

Number of Yelp Reviews

0.370

0.466**

73

H5 supported

Number of Competitors Nearby

0.337

0.314

86

0.349

0.343

175 a

0.313

0.458**

96

H10 supported

0.328

0.432***

125

H4 supported

Proportion of Competitors Nearby
Using Groupon
Coupon Revenue from the First
Promotion
Change in Average Yelp Rating

Neither H8 nor H8a
supported
Neither H9 nor H9a
supported

Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon signed rank test: <0.1 = *; <0.05 = **; <0.01= ***
a
p value is 0.50.
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We used a distance of one mile to operationalize our local competition variables and
summarized the results in Table B.2.3 and Table B.2.4 below.
Table B.2.3 Proportion of Restaurants in Matched Pairs Running an Initial Groupon Promotion in Control
and Treatment Groups
Control
group

Treatment
group

Number of
matched pairs

Hypotheses

Average Yelp Rating

0.089

0.099*

1940

H1 supported

Number of Yelp Reviews

0.072

0.125***

1295

H2 supported

Number of Competitors Nearby

0.128***

0.051

752

H6a supported

Proportion of Competitors Nearby
Using Groupon

0.137***

0.105

1350

H7a supported

Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon signed rank test: <0.1 = *; <0.05 = **; <0.01= ***

Table B.2.4 Proportion of Restaurants in Matched Pairs Running a Second Groupon Promotion in Control
and Treatment Group
Control
group

Treatment
group

Number of
matched pairs

Hypotheses

Average Yelp Rating

0.385**

0.269

52

H3a supported

Number of Yelp Reviews

0.380

0.437**

71

H5 supported

Number of Competitors Nearby

0.229

0.257

35

0.392

0.376

189 b

0.237

0.474***

97

H10 supported

0.333

0.434***

129

H4 supported

Proportion of Competitors Nearby
Using Groupon
Coupon Revenue from the First
Promotion
Change in Average Yelp Rating

Neither H8 nor H8a
supported
Neither H9 nor H9a
supported

Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon signed rank test: <0.1 = *; <0.05 = **; <0.01= ***
b
p value is 0.38.
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Appendix B.3 Different Split Methods
We applied the 20%-quantile split method. That is, we take the top 20% quantile as the
treatment group and the bottom 20% quantile as the control group. We summarized the results
in Table B.3.1 and Table B.3.2.
Table B.3.1 Proportion of Restaurants in Matched Pairs Running an Initial Groupon Promotion in Control
and Treatment Groups
Control
group

Treatment
group

Number of
matched pairs

Hypotheses

Average Yelp Rating

0.081

0.096**

1089

H1 supported

Number of Yelp Reviews

0.064

0.118***

707

H2 supported

Number of Competitors Nearby

0.146***

0.047

451

H6a supported

Proportion of Competitors Nearby
Using Groupon

0.157***

0.112

1147

H7a supported

Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon signed rank test: <0.1 = *; <0.05 = **; <0.01= ***

Table B.3.2 Proportion of Restaurants in Matched Pairs Running a Second Groupon Promotion in Control
and Treatment Group
Control
group

Treatment
group

Number of
matched pairs

Average Yelp Rating

0.385

0.423

26 a

Number of Yelp Reviews

0.455

0.409

22 a

Number of Competitors Nearby

0.211

0.211

19

0.405*

0.357

126

H9a supported

0.209

0.488***

43

H10 supported

0.297

0.484***

91 b

H4 supported

Proportion of Competitors Nearby
Using Groupon
Coupon Revenue from the First
Promotion
Change in Average Yelp Rating

Hypotheses
Neither H3 nor H3a
supported
Neither H5 nor H5a
supported
Neither H8 nor H8a
supported

Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon signed rank test: <0.1 = *; <0.05 = **; <0.01= ***
a
the 20% quantile split method leads to significantly fewer matched pairs. For Average Yelp Rating and Number of
Yelp Reviews, we do not have enough matched pairs to draw any conclusion.
b
here instead of the 20% quantile split method we take the restaurants with the value lower than -0.40 as the control
group, and those with the value greater than 0.40 as the treatment group.
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We also applied the 40%-quantile split method. That is, we take the top 40% quantile as
the treatment group and the bottom 40% quantile as the control group. We summarized the
results in Table B.3.3 and Table B.3.4.
Table B.3.3 Proportion of Restaurants in Matched Pairs Running an Initial Groupon Promotion in Control
and Treatment Groups
Control
group

Treatment
group

Number of
matched pairs

Hypotheses

Average Yelp Rating

0.089

0.098*

2297

H1 supported

Number of Yelp Reviews

0.077

0.127***

1767

H2 supported

Number of Competitors Nearby

0.125***

0.055

1145

H6a supported

Proportion of Competitors Nearby
Using Groupon

0.138***

0.107

1338

H7a supported

Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon signed rank test: <0.1 = *; <0.05 = **; <0.01= ***

Table B.3.4 Proportion of Restaurants in Matched Pairs Running a Second Groupon Promotion in Control
and Treatment Group
Control
group

Treatment
group

Number of
matched pairs

Hypotheses

Average Yelp Rating

0.400*

0.356

115

H3a supported

Number of Yelp Reviews

0.302

0.427**

96

H5 supported

Number of Competitors Nearby

0.379

0.368

87

Neither H8 nor H8a
supported

0.400**

0.351

185

H9a supported

0.348

0.455**

132

H10 supported

0.337

0.386**

184 c

H4 supported

Proportion of Competitors Nearby
Using Groupon
Coupon Revenue from the First
Promotion
Change in Average Yelp Rating

Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon signed rank test: <0.1 = *; <0.05 = **; <0.01= ***
c
here instead of the 40% quantile split method we take the restaurants with the value lower than -0.10 as the control
group, and those with the value greater than 0.10 as the treatment group.

139

Appendix B.4 Different Intervals of Days

Table B.4.1 Proportion of Restaurants in Matched Pairs Running an Initial Groupon Promotion in Control
and Treatment Groups (using 150 days)
Control
group

Treatment
group

Number of
matched pairs

Hypotheses

Average Yelp Rating

0.086

0.099*

1949

H1 supported

Number of Yelp Reviews

0.075

0.137***

1300

H2 supported

Number of Competitors Nearby

0.129**

0.088

318

H6a supported

Proportion of Competitors Nearby
Using Groupon

0.127***

0.090

747

H7a supported

Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon signed rank test: <0.1 = *; <0.05 = **; <0.01= ***

Table B.4.2 Proportion of Restaurants in Matched Pairs Running an Initial Groupon Promotion in Control
and Treatment Groups (using 210 days)
Control
group

Treatment
group

Number of
matched pairs

Hypotheses

Average Yelp Rating

0.084

0.098*

1949

H1 supported

Number of Yelp Reviews

0.077

0.135***

1298

H2 supported

Number of Competitors Nearby

0.148***

0.093

270

H6a supported

Proportion of Competitors Nearby
Using Groupon

0.126***

0.098

725

H7a supported

Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon signed rank test: <0.1 = *; <0.05 = **; <0.01= ***
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Table B.4.3 Proportion of Restaurants in Matched Pairs Running a Second Groupon Promotion in Control
and Treatment Group (using 420 days)
Control
group

Treatment
group

Number of
matched pairs

Hypotheses

Average Yelp Rating

0.359*

0.302

53

H3a supported

Number of Yelp Reviews

0.416

0.442

77 a

Number of Competitors Nearby

0.319

0.298

47

Neither H5 nor H5a
supported
Neither H8 nor H8a
supported

0.416***

0.376

173

H9a supported

0.242

0.462***

91

H10 supported

0.333

0.411***

129

H4 supported

Proportion of Competitors Nearby
Using Groupon
Coupon Revenue from the First
Promotion
Change in Average Yelp Rating

Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon signed rank test: <0.1 = *; <0.05 = **; <0.01= ***
a
p value is 0.34.

Table B.4.4 Proportion of Restaurants in Matched Pairs Running a Second Groupon Promotion in Control
and Treatment Group (using 480 days)
Control
group

Treatment
group

Number of
matched pairs

Hypotheses

Average Yelp Rating

0.340*

0.264

53

H3a supported

Number of Yelp Reviews

0.408

0.474**

76

H5 supported

Number of Competitors Nearby

0.383

0.340

47

0.391

0.408

169 b

0.277

0.468***

94

H10 supported

0.354

0.431***

130

H4 supported

Proportion of Competitors Nearby
Using Groupon
Coupon Revenue from the First
Promotion
Change in Average Yelp Rating

Neither H8 nor H8a
supported
Neither H9 nor H9a
supported

Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon signed rank test: <0.1 = *; <0.05 = **; <0.01= ***
b
p value is 0.97.
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Appendix B.5 Areas without Tourist Attractions
Table B.5.1 Proportion of Restaurants in Matched Pairs Running an Initial Groupon Promotion in
Control and Treatment Groups
Control
group

Treatment
group

Number of
matched pairs

Hypotheses

Average Yelp Rating

0.082

0.097**

1808

H1 supported

Number of Yelp Reviews

0.078

0.121***

1304

H2 supported

Number of Competitors Nearby

0.136***

0.057

722

H6a supported

Proportion of Competitors Nearby
Using Groupon

0.142***

0.110

1309

H7a supported

Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon signed rank test: <0.1 = *; <0.05 = **; <0.01= ***

Table B.5.2 Proportion of Restaurants in Matched Pairs Running a Second Groupon Promotion in Control
and Treatment Group
Control
group

Treatment
group

Number of
matched pairs

Hypotheses

Average Yelp Rating

0.319

0.298

47 a

Neither H3 nor H3a
supported

Number of Yelp Reviews

0.384

0.465***

86

H5 supported

Number of Competitors Nearby

0.413

0.326

46

0.380

0.399

158 b

0.269

0.419***

93

H10 supported

0.344

0.427***

131

H4 supported

Proportion of Competitors
Nearby Using Groupon
Coupon Revenue from the First
Promotion
Change in Average Yelp Rating

Neither H8 nor H8a
supported
Neither H9 nor H9a
supported

Note: *’s denote significance level of Wilcoxon signed rank test: <0.1 = *; <0.05 = **; <0.01= ***
a
p value is 0.50.
b
p value is 0.73.
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Appendix C. Tables of Notation (Chapter Four)
Table C.1 Notation of Parameters in Mediation and Moderation Effect Analysis
Parameters
𝛼M∙𝑛
𝛽M∙𝑛
𝛾𝑀∙𝑛
𝛿𝑀∙𝑛
𝜌𝑀∙𝑛
𝜇𝑀∙𝑛
𝑓

𝜌𝑀∙4
𝑠
𝜌𝑀∙4

Definitions
The intercept for equation 𝑛 of Model M *.
The coefficients of 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 for equation 𝑛 of Model M.
The coefficients of 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 for equation 𝑛 of Model M.
The coefficients of the interaction term 𝑃𝑟𝑒_𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑜𝑛 for
equation 𝑛 of Model M.
The coefficients of the mediator for equation 𝑛 of Model M.
The error terms for equation 𝑛 of Model M.
The coefficient of 𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑑_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 in equation 4 for Model M, where
M ∈ {V, VI}.
The coefficient of 𝑆𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒_𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 in equation 4 for Model M,
where M ∈ {V, VI}.

Note: * — M indicates a model, and M ∈ I, II, III, IV, V, VI}; n indicate an equation, 𝑛 ∈ {1,2,3} when M
∈ {I, II, III, IV}; and 𝑛 ∈ {1,2,3,4} when M ∈ {V, VI}.

